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DEAN RUSK ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW III

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Signed by Dean Rusk on July 31, 1987

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ACCESSION NUMBER 74-245

INTERVIEW III

INTERVIEWEE: DEAN RUSK

INTERVIEWER: PAIGE E. MULHOLLAN

DATE: January 2, 1970

Tape 1 of 2

M: This is our third session taking place on January 2, 1970. Let's begin, Mr. Secretary, with a couple of questions that have occurred to me in reading your prior transcripts, one involving particularly the coordination between our military effort in Viet Nam and the political goals we sought.

Some of the critics are saying that the Johnson Administration never successfully coordinated the military with the political effort, and that the military declined to push the pacification effort and that the Administration didn't force it to do so. Would you comment on that general subject area?

R: First, let's talk about coordination back in Washington. I think it's important for the historian to bear in mind that the principal decisions made about Viet Nam were made at the Tuesday Luncheon; and at those luncheons President Johnson had with him the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and his own Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. We talked about all aspects of Viet Nam at those luncheons--military, political economical, psychological--and decisions were taken with those who were carrying responsibility for all aspects of the Viet Nam struggle. I don't believe there was any lack of coordination as far as Washington was concerned. President Johnson frequently would say that his right arm was Secretary McNamara in pursuing the military aspect of the job in Viet Nam, and his directive to Secretary McNamara was to get the military job done.

His left arm was his Secretary of State who was expected to try to find a peaceful solution to Viet Nam if possible. Now during the period when President Johnson was President, and the historian will find a good deal of this in President Johnson's book, we had literally dozens of contacts--discussions--with Hanoi trying to probe the possibilities of a peaceful settlement. Those efforts were always known to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Similarly, when we were adopting bombing targets, and when we were authorizing bombing operations, those plans were always brought into the Tuesday luncheon; and the Secretary of State had a chance to comment on them and frequently did so that as far as Washington was concerned there was pretty good coordination.

For a time President Johnson had Mr. Robert Komer in the White House to coordinate what was called "the other war," that is, the political-psychological-economic side of the war, in order that all the agencies in Washington that were concerned about that aspect of the war would pull together. The Department of Agriculture was interested in agricultural developments; the Department of Commerce in trade, and the Department of the Treasury in the economic situation. Komer's job was to coordinate all those activities as far as Washington was concerned.

Now, in the field. In Viet Nam the Ambassador was the President's principal representative, and it was his job to insure that the military and political and psychological operations were coordinated on the ground. That was not easy, because we were expecting the South Vietnamese not only to fight a war but to build a nation in the process. It isn't easy to improve education and improve agriculture and restrain inflation and do all these things in the middle of a war, particularly a guerrilla-type war which subjected the government structure in the countryside to continued harassment. It's hard to build schools when schoolteachers are being assassinated. The Deputy Ambassador in Saigon was the man who was primarily responsible for that job of coordination, reporting to Ambassador Bunker or Ambassador Lodge.

When you're trying to move a complex situation on a broad front, there are always going to be problems of coordination, and so I won't claim that coordination was perfect but it wasn't as bad as some people seem to think. There was no instance where it was a case of not being informed as to what was going on and what was being attempted. The military kept very closely in touch with the political and other developments. The State Department kept very closely in touch with military developments. The first thing I did every morning when I got into the office was to read the detailed military report of the day before in Viet Nam, so I kept always very closely in touch with military developments because they were a crucial part of the total

effort out there.

M: And the military was not then basically out of sympathy with the pacification effort in such a way that made it difficult to make progress in that area?

R: No. The military had a lot to learn about how you fight a guerrilla war. During the 1950's the South Vietnamese armed force, such as it was--it was not very large during that period--was trained more or less for conventional war--divisions against divisions. That seemed to be the nature of the threat posed by the organization of several divisions in North Viet Nam. It was not specially trained to handle guerrilla warfare.

Guerrilla warfare has complications of its own. It's one of the most difficult kinds of warfare to meet, because the defense--the South Vietnamese--had responsibility for protecting a very large number of places. There were forty-three provincial capitals, there were two hundred and forty district towns, and the government held all of those. Now, any one of those was subject to being attacked by guerrillas at any time because the guerrillas did not have to seize and hold a position. They only had to cause trouble and hit and run--strike and fall back. It meant an enormous commitment of forces to protect the positions that were being held by the government, whereas the guerrilla was free to move around, so that the defense in a guerrilla war situation has a special burden and involves a great deal of manpower.

When the North Vietnamese sent their regular divisions into South Viet Nam, you did get a certain amount of conventional war in the classical sense. You had large unit actions against each other in the search-and-destroy operations, and sometimes during the TET offensive of 1968. But I'm not sure in 1970 that we yet have learned all we need to know about how you deal with guerrilla war situations.

M: Certainly we still have problems from time to time.

R: That's right. I think it's a very subtle, complex, difficult kind of struggle to carry out.

M: Mentioning the present--early 1970--president Nixon's policy has gained the title "Vietnamization." How different do you consider that from what you and President Johnson were trying to do during the time that you were in office?

R: President Johnson followed the policy of building up the South Vietnamese armed forces, and if the historian will look at the rate of increase of the South Vietnamese forces--say, from 1965 onward--he will find that there was a very striking increase in the actual numbers, size, equipment, of South Vietnamese forces throughout that period. There were some problems about the rate at which we could turn over responsibility to the South Vietnamese, particularly in matters of equipment.

For example, on the M-16 rifle we were very late in producing the M-16 even for our own troops, and we felt that our own troops had first priority on so sophisticated and complicated a weapon as the M-16 rifle. We only had one producer of that rifle. They were producing only something like--I don't know--thirty thousand a month or something--this is a figure that can be checked. It was not until 1967-68 that new producers were called in to make additional M-16 rifles. That then got the production situation in a position where we could begin to issue M-16 rifles to the South Vietnamese forces, and the Nixon Administration inherited that increase in productive capacity.

As far as helicopters are concerned, we wanted to turn over more helicopter responsibility to the South Vietnamese, but the training time required to train helicopter pilots was very long. It was a minimum of a year and possibly more. The supply of helicopters was limited for awhile to those that were absolutely essential for the U.S. units that were directly involved. Now, as South Vietnamese pilots become trained, and as helicopters can be issued to the South Vietnamese forces, then they can take over more responsibility than they could otherwise.

My guess is that had President Johnson continued in office and continued the policies that he had in chain at the time he left office, that he might well have brought about some reduction in U.S. forces himself. Whether he would have done it exactly like President Nixon, I have no way of knowing at this point, but when you look at the increase in the regular forces, the popular and regional forces, and the local defense units in South Viet Nam, you'll see that from 1965 onward there was a regular and steady increase in available military manpower in South Viet Nam.

M: [You] just didn't call it Vietnamization?

R: We didn't call it Vietnamization because so long as we were in office we were not actually withdrawing U.S. forces on the theory that we were turning over responsibility to the South Vietnamese.

I think that it was unfortunate that the term Americanization of the war caught on as much as it did, because throughout the war the South Vietnamese carried a very heavy part of the struggle. Their casualties, particularly if you include the local forces, were always significantly larger than American casualties. For example, when you look at the figures on wounded, the South Vietnamese only counted as wounded those who turned up in hospitals, whereas the Americans would count anybody who had a scratch on an earlobe due to enemy action as a wounded. Eighty-five percent of the American wounded returned to service--returned to duty--so that we counted everybody, and the South Vietnamese only counted those that were serious enough to go into a hospital. I think if the historian will look at the casualty figures, he will realize that at no time did the United States ever Americanize the war to the point of carrying the sole burden of the war. The South Vietnamese were always carrying a very large part of it, and this is reflected in their casualties--not only the casualties they received themselves but the casualties they inflicted on the enemy.

M: The other part of the Nixon program, to go along with that, is apparently the change from the battle tactics of maximum feasible pressure, or search-and-destroy. Was that a decision that was seriously considered before you left office that might also have been made had the Administration remained in office?

R: We had some debates on search-and-destroy as a technique, as a tactic. The principal purpose of search-and-destroy was to keep the enemy forces, particularly his battalions and regiments, at a distance from the cities. We had no desire to sit back and wait for the enemy to make his own choices as to which towns and cities he would attack, and then find ourselves in an urban war where the civilians would take a great deal of the burden of the fight and where house-to-house fighting would be very mean and difficult. The idea was to catch him while he was still out in the countryside where you could fight him with a minimum of disruption to the life of the country, and where artillery and air bombardment and other weapons could be brought to bear much more effectively than could be done if you waited until he came into the cities.

We debated that at considerable length at times, and, in general, left the actual tactics to the commander in the field. We felt it was not possible back in Washington to give detailed guidance as to how our commanders would handle their battalions and regiments. We pretty well left that up to them. We hoped that they would combine with their search-and-destroy action on the pacification front, so that the countryside would in fact become pacified and that the population of the country would be increasingly secure from Viet Cong raids.

M: The rest of Asia sometimes, I'm afraid, gets overlooked in the emphasis on Viet Nam, but it's a very important area obviously. Was there a major attempt during the Johnson Administration to move toward regularizing our relations with Communist China in any way?

R: We, in our talks in Warsaw, took various steps to try to improve relations with Peking. We repeated the effort made by the Eisenhower Administration to bring about an exchange of newspapermen. We proposed the exchange of scientists, scholars, of professional men--doctors. We proposed the exchange of weather information. We proposed the exchange of basic plant materials in the basic food crops such as rice and wheat, things of that sort, but we got nowhere with it because Peking always came back with the answer that there was nothing to discuss until we are ready to surrender Taiwan.

This has been the great problem about improving relations with mainland China. They insist that Taiwan, sometimes known as Formosa, is a part of China--their China. They don't recognize that China was split in a civil war and that the Republic of China on Taiwan has an existence of its own. They claim that the promise of the Cairo declaration to deliver Taiwan to China meant that we should now deliver Taiwan to mainland China since they claim that the People's Republic of China is the successor to the China to which Taiwan was promised. This simple attitude forces everyone to ask themselves what they're prepared to do about Taiwan, because if you're not prepared to surrender these thirteen million people on Taiwan to mainland China, then you're not in business with China--with Peking. Peking won't talk to you, won't do anything.

My impression in January 1970 is that if the United States were to offer tomorrow morning to recognize Peking without the surrender of Taiwan that Peking would turn it down, and so that has been the bone in the throat of efforts

to improve relations with Peking. Now, the Nixon Administration has renewed these efforts, and as of today we still don't know whether representatives to Peking will resume their discussions in Warsaw, or in some other capital.

M: Are the Warsaw talks--or were they in your Administration--a two-way street, or did we just get a sort of stony silence from them? Do they make any response at all to our overtures other than just rhetorical criticisms?

R: We never got any forthcoming response to any of the proposals we made. We got no satisfactory answer on a few remaining Americans left in mainland China. We never got any positive response to the various proposals we had made about various types of exchanges that I've mentioned. The main theme of the Chinese representatives in the Warsaw talks was always that we must abandon the Chiang Kai-shek clique. We must turn Formosa over to the mainland, and get our forces out of Asia. So it was a very stiff set of talks without any real give and take--without any real exchange. It was a case of talking at each other but no real discussion with each other.

M: You've been involved with the problem of Red China since its successful creation in the late '40's very closely. Is the American political climate essentially different regarding what it is possible to do politically with Red China today than it was, say, in the early '50's when you were in the Department?

R: I think that there's a significant difference. I think there's more flexibility in the general attitude of the American people toward mainland China now than there was back in those days. On several occasions--and the historian will have to check this--on several occasions the Congress passed resolutions back in those days opposing the recognition of Peking.

You see, when the British recognized Peking and we did not--this was before the outbreak of the Korean War; this was 1949--I was then Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs--it was my impression that British and American policy might come together again on the basis of the conduct of Peking. If Peking behaved itself and acted like a loyal member of the international community of nations--lived at peace with its neighbors--it was my impression that eventually American policy would move toward the recognition of Peking but that if Peking acted in a militant fashion and

demonstrated it was going to be a constant source of trouble in Asia, that British policy might then move toward the American point of view.

Well, the Chinese intervened in Korea. Mainland China is the only nation that has ever been called an aggressor by the United Nations. It was my impression that these events would cause the British to pull back on their recognition and maybe break diplomatic relations with mainland China, but they didn't. I understand that Prime Minister Churchill at one time wanted to do that--pull back--but the Foreign Office wouldn't let him do it.

The British also were preoccupied with the problem of Hong Kong. That was a kind of hostage to British policy so they were influenced by the desire to maintain a position in Hong Kong, if at all possible. Hong Kong is not defensible from a military point of view and depends upon the acquiescence of mainland China in the British occupation of Hong Kong.

M: Even their water supply now, I think, comes from inside mainland China.

R: I think that's right. Also, they buy vegetables, and they buy other stuff. There's a very heavy trade between Hong Kong and mainland China.

M: But the point is, I guess, that it's not fear of domestic political reaction that prevent changes in our China policy?

R: No, I think that if it were possible to find a reasonable basis on which to improve relations with mainland China that the American people would be glad to see it happen. There will be some discontent. There's still a small so-called China lobby, I suppose, but it's of no consequence and was not during the Kennedy and Johnson years. The issues really turned on whether or not we were prepared to surrender Taiwan to mainland China.

M: Why does it seem, as it does to me--perhaps not entirely accurately--that the academic expertise in the country--the China scholars, and so on--all are of the opinion, or virtually all, that our China policy is not very imaginative or well advised? Why are they out of phase with the policy makers in this regard, if they are?

R: I think one of the reasons is that they live in the world of opinion, and the policy maker lives in the world of

decision. The policy maker is faced with the fact that thus far there is not much opportunity to improve relations with mainland China without the surrender of Formosa, and that is a major obstacle which the American government just hasn't been able to contemplate. It's not for us to surrender these thirteen million people on Taiwan. They're not ours to surrender in the first place, and it would be a major act of perfidy if we were to do so, or attempt to do so.

I think another thing is that some of the so-called China scholars would like to see us improve our own position by making a gesture, such as toward recognition, even though Peking turned it down. In the world of decision you are not enchanted by empty gestures. If we were to recognize Peking, it would cause a considerable amount of pain to non-Communists in Asia--people like the South Koreans, and of course the people on Taiwan, the Thais, and others in Southeast Asia, the Filipinos. The question is whether you, by making a gesture, give pain to some of your closest friends without accomplishing anything.

M: When it's just a gesture.

R: Just a gesture. So I think that those would be the principal points.

Then I think, too, that in government we have looked upon the Chinese as being very militant in their orientation. What they say is very tough, and they have broken with the Soviet Union over the issue of militancy in support of the world revolution. We know that the Chinese have been active in Burma, sending arms and men across the northeastern frontier of Burma. We know that the Chinese have been causing trouble in eastern India among the tribal areas of eastern India. We know that the Chinese have been sending agents into northern Thailand and are building a road down through Laos aimed at Thailand. So people in government are necessarily concerned about the militancy of Peking.

The scholars are inclined to say, "Oh, well, don't listen to what they say. They don't do anything about it." They're inclined to say that Peking, in fact, is following a policy of caution, and that we should not draw as sharp a distinction as we tend to draw between the Soviet Union and Peking on problems of doctrine. Only the historian will be able to sort that out because it will depend upon what happens in the next several years in Asia.

You see, at the present time peace in Asia is being frustrated because of the more than fifty regiments of North Vietnamese troops that are attacking South Viet Nam, by more than forty thousand North Vietnamese troops operating in Laos, by North Vietnamese trained guerrillas operating in Laos, by North Vietnamese trained guerrillas operating in northeast Thailand. Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia has publicly complained about the assistance which Hanoi and Peking have been giving to guerrillas in Cambodia, and there's the most neutral of all the neutralist countries.

I mentioned the men and arms coming across the northeast frontier of Burma, and the activity of the Chinese in eastern India. Almost every week infiltrators come from North Korea across the thirty-eighth parallel into South Korea to cause trouble. There's no doubt of the fact that these Communist countries in Asia--Peking, Hanoi, North Korea--are acting on a militant basis. They're causing trouble to their neighbors, and sometimes the scholars are inclined to put that to one side, to downgrade the importance of this activity.

There'd be peace in Asia if these Asian Communists were to live a normal life alongside of their neighbors there and leave them alone, because there's no non-Communist country in Asia that has any designs on moving against the Communist countries of Asia.

M: You mentioned Laos there a couple of times. During the Kennedy Administration, I suppose that was the chief public hot spot. Did Mr. Johnson as Vice President have any major responsibilities that involved Laos during that time?

R: He kept well-informed about Laos, but I don't recall that he took a very active part in the basic decisions that we were making about Laos. He did inherit the bitter disappointment of the Kennedy Administration in the failure of the Geneva accords of 1962 on Laos.

When President Kennedy became President, he took a long look at Laos and decided that the best solution for Laos was to get all foreigners out of that country--leave it as a land-locked buffer. The Laotian people themselves were gentle, civilized people who obviously had no interest in killing each other. The battles that were fought were not very bloody; a few big explosions made quite a battle. I remember one incident when the two sides left the battlefield in Laos to go to a water festival together for about ten days and then went back to the battlefield, so we

felt that if they were left alone, that Laos would provide no threat of any sort to anybody and might be a useful buffer between North Viet Nam and the rest of Southeast Asia. President Kennedy talked to Chairman Khrushchev about that in Vienna in June 1961, and Khrushchev seemed to agree that the answer to Laos was for everybody to get out and leave it alone.

So we went to the Geneva Conference, which had already started, and made several important concessions to get an agreement on Laos. For example, we accepted the man as Prime Minister that the Soviet Union recognized as prime minister. He was not our prime minister. We accepted Prince Souvanna Phouma, the neutralist, as the Prime Minister of a coalition government. We accepted a coalition government, one-third of which was to be Pathet Lao, Communist in character. We accepted the international neutralization of Laos, and we accepted the idea that we'd get all of our people out of there. We had about six hundred people there at the time.

But the trouble is that we did not get any performance out of Hanoi on those Laos accords for a single day. The agreement specified that all foreign forces would leave the country. North Vietnamese forces did not leave the country. The agreement specified that Laos would not be used as an infiltration route into other countries. At no time did Hanoi stop using Laos as an infiltration corridor into South Viet Nam. The Pathet Lao--the Communists--did not permit the coalition government to exercise authority in those areas of Laos held by the Communists; and they did not permit the International Control Commission to exercise its functions in those areas of Laos held by the Communists. So President Kennedy was bitterly disappointed by the failure of the Laos accords to achieve their purpose, and President Johnson inherited that failure and our inability to get any measure of compliance by Hanoi. The historian will want to try to find out what the attitude of Russia was toward Laos during all of this period.

I had the impression at the time of the Geneva Conference on Laos in 1962 that the Russians were acting in reasonably good faith on the basis of the agreement which seems to have been reached at the meeting in Vienna in June between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev, but we never got any help from the Russians in getting performance on the Laos accords of 1962. The historian may want to inquire as to whether it just happened that the Russians lost considerable influence in Hanoi at about the time that

the Geneva accords of '62 were concluded, and were not able to bring Hanoi to comply for fear that this would simply drive Hanoi into the arms of Peking. I think this may be one of those points where the Russo-Chinese rivalry led to a frustration of the Geneva accords on Laos, and led to the inability or unwillingness of the Russians to try to press Hanoi to comply with them.

M: Did Mr. Johnson have to make any new decisions on Laos in the first year or so after he came to the Presidency?

R: By the time President Johnson became President, the main effort of North Viet Nam was clearly aimed at South Viet Nam so that President Johnson was greatly preoccupied by the South Vietnamese aspect of it. Of course, the infiltration through Laos was a part of the Viet Nam problem, but the North Vietnamese themselves concentrated more on South Viet Nam than on Laos. Had North Viet Nam thrown against Laos a fraction--a fourth--of the effort that they threw against South Viet Nam, they might well have overrun Laos and seized it completely. Why they did not do that I don't know. It may be that by the time this material is available it will be known that North Viet Nam did in fact expect to pick up Laos as a part of its total program in Southeast Asia.

M: I read just, I think, last week that our bombing program in Laos actually began in about May of 1964. Was that a Presidential-type decision that had been made?

R: Yes, the bombing program in Laos was always the matter of highest policy consideration and was worked out in consultation with the government of Laos--Prince Souvanna Phouma--at all times.

M: And with his approval?

R: With his approval.

M: You had mentioned the beginning of the bombing program in Laos and the acceptance of that by the Laotian government. Why has it been possible for those who are criticizing our policy in Southeast Asia to refer to Laos as a secret war?

R: Well, there's a very simple reason for that. Prince Souvanna Phouma has been very anxious to maintain the formalities of the Geneva Accords of 1962, and it was his judgment that he did not want to publicly talk about American air operations in Laos. He wanted to maintain the theory that it's only the North Vietnamese who are acting

militarily in violation of the Geneva Accords of 1962.

Our view was that since the North Vietnamese were acting militarily against Laos and abusing Laos with infiltration into South Viet Nam, that that suspended the military clauses of the Laos Accords of 1962 and that it was perfectly appropriate for us to take action in Laos--among other things to defend South Viet Nam. But Souvanna Phouma wanted to keep it quiet, and it was solely for that reason that the American side has been as quiet about Lao as it has been--no other reason.

M: But the Administration did make a decision that our commitment to Laos was in the nature of being as strong as our commitment to Viet Nam in the sense that we were pledged to put our force in there?

R: After the Geneva Accords in 1962 there was some doubt about that, because in those Accords Laos promised that it would not call upon the protection of any other group of countries, such as SEATO, and we agreed to that declaration of neutrality by Laos so that it's a very questionable thing that the Southeast Asia Treaty now applies to Laos in the same way that it applies to South Viet Nam. You see, Laos was one of the protocol states of the Southeast Asia Treaty.

M: They wrote themselves out of the protocol--

R: But they wrote themselves out of the protocol, and we accepted their writing themselves out of it. So in the technical sense of law and politics, I think our commitment is somewhat different than is our commitment to South Viet Nam.

M: I see. How does that apply then to Thailand? Shortly after you left office, there was a public outcry regarding secret commitments that the Senate said they had discovered that had been made to Thailand without their knowledge. Were there new agreements made with Thailand during the Johnson Administration that didn't previously exist in the way of commitment?

R: As far as Thailand is concerned it is a main member--signatory member--of the Southeast Asia Treaty so that there is no doubt at all about the treaty commitment as far as Thailand is concerned. Furthermore, Thailand was clearly covered by the August 1964 resolution on Southeast Asia, the so-called Tonkin Gulf Resolution.

In this SEATO military organization a good deal of contingency planning went on, just as it goes on in NATO, in CENTO, and in other places--Plan I, Plan V, Plan VIII, that kind of thing, were worked out simply on a contingency basis as happens in any alliance. Those contingency plans are not ordinarily made public. They're not ordinarily discussed with members of Congress. They're based solidly upon commitments undertaken by the Congress. There was only one negative vote on the South Asia Treaty when it was approved by the Senate. There were only two negative votes in the entire Congress on the August '64 resolution which reenforced the Southeast Asia Treaty commitment.

M: So these agreements were really just contingency plans based on agreements that you feel were adequately known?

R: Contingency plans based upon policies which had been thoroughly discussed with the Congress [and] on which Congress had acted.

M: So there was no evasion of the Congressional prerogatives in that sense?

R: I don't know of any secret political understandings with Thailand. There was secret military contingency planning, but I don't know of anything that went beyond the Southeast Asia Treaty. The so-called Rusk-Tanat communique--which simply spelled out that the obligations of SEATO were both joint and several--was made public at the time, and was entered into after consultation with members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

You see, the SEATO Treaty says that--Article 4, paragraph 1--in the event of aggression by armed attack against a member of the treaty that each state shall take steps to meet the common danger--each signatory, each party, I believe the treaty calls it. Now that meant that the responsibilities were individual as well as collective. It was, of course, up to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization if possible to move as a group to deal with an aggression against a member of the organization, but in the absence of group action, individual responsibilities still were there. Each party shall take steps to meet the common danger, and so the Rusk-Tanat communique made that clear, because at that time France was on the way out of SEATO, and the question was whether there was a veto in SEATO by France in the event of aggression against Thailand. In order to settle down the Thais, we simply confirmed that these obligations were individual as well as collective in

character, but there was nothing secret about them.

M: The allies that we have in the Far East who participated in Viet Nam are frequently called mercenaries because of our contributions to their troop support. Was that a necessary prerequisite to their cooperation--that we bear the cost--perhaps even beyond the actual cost of the troop use?

R: That is a phrase which has been used by some of the opponents of our effort in Southeast Asia. To me it has little substance. For example, Lend Lease during World War II, which was massive in character, did not make mercenaries out of the British and the Russians or the French. We have the resources to be able to help countries that are in trouble, and so we help to pay the bill. We did the same thing in the Korean war. I would compare what we've been doing in Southeast Asia to what we did during World War II under Lend Lease.

M: Our payments haven't gone beyond the military necessities of the power concerned? We haven't paid more than the bill for their participation?

R: No, but bear in mind that quite apart from what they were doing in South Viet Nam, some of these countries had other obligations that they had to be concerned about. For example, North Korea is very menacing these days towards South Korea, and it has been important to help the South Koreans improve their own armed forces with additional manpower and additional equipment and things of that sort. That requires military aid.

The Thais have a pretty good struggle going on up in the northeast part of their own country, and they needed additional materials such as helicopters. They needed additional artillery--things of that sort--and they needed to increase the size of their own armed forces so that there were needs which went beyond the actual needs of troops positioned in South Viet Nam to which we made a contribution. But to call that bribery, or to say that that translates these people into mercenaries, is just a part of the polemics of the South Vietnamese debate.

M: It's not a case of those powers saying, "Well, we won't play unless you perform," this type of thing--there they threaten non-support unless we give them additional aid.

R: I have no doubt that the British, the French, and the Russians said that to us during the Lend lease negotiations.

M: They may have, as a matter of fact.

R: There's nothing unusual in that. It's a matter of capability as well as will so there may have been some discussion of that. I don't recall. No one ever said that to me, but implicit in the situation was that they had various needs and if they were to meet those needs they would need assistance, and we were in a position to give them assistance.

M: It's frequently said that those allies and those elsewhere in the world, as well, who criticized our policy in Southeast Asia publicly were sometimes privately telling us that they were glad we were there and didn't want us to leave. Is that an accurate impression?

R: We have not had public criticism of any importance from those who have troops in South Viet Nam--Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, the South Koreans. We might get some criticism at times when they think that we're not going to see it through to a successful conclusion. They may be a little nervous about our will, particularly when they listen to the domestic debate in the United States on the subject and listen to some United States Senators. There are others in Asia who would not publicly give us support, but who privately realized that they have a stake in the successful outcome of what we were trying to do in South Viet Nam. I have no doubt myself that if we suddenly were to abandon South Viet Nam, that this would cause dismay in places like India and Burma and Indonesia and Malaysia, and even Cambodia.

M: They made that clear to us in various ways?

R: I can't say that each one of them did. It would be embarrassing to some of them for me to try to put words in their mouths on this matter. I don't think Burma ever said that to us, but some Indian leaders have; some Indonesian leaders have; certainly the Malaysians have said that. Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia has never said that in so many words.

M: Some of them are just not in a position to say it at all,

R: That's right,

M: President Nixon just concluded with Japan an agreement concerning Okinawa that seemed remarkably easy, at least in its public manifestations. What was the status of that

problem during the years of President Kennedy and President Johnson?

R: First, let me say that when I was Assistant Secretary of State back in the Truman Administration I tried at that time to arrange for the transfer of Okinawa back to Japan on the basis that our interests in the Far East turned crucially on Japan, and it was far better to have a good strong relationship with Japan than it was to hang on to a little base there at the expense of our relations with Japan. But I was unable to get the various elements of the American government willing to do that in the Truman Administration, and we never moved on it.

Now, as far as the Kennedy-Johnson period is concerned, we were concerned that Okinawa was important as a base while there was a threat to the security of free Asia, particularly in Southeast Asia but also we had our eyes on Korea. We felt that it was not possible for us to return Okinawa to Japan under conditions which would jeopardize its position as a base. President Kennedy was very resistant on this point, much more so than President Johnson. He told the Prime Minister of Japan that he didn't want the position of Okinawa to be nibbled away, and that he would be willing to take one or two steps to improve the situation provided the Prime Minister would tell him that he was not trying to move by minor steps toward the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. The Prime Minister gave him that assurance at that time.

My own personal feeling was, in the latter part of the Johnson Administration, that the time had come to turn Okinawa back to Japan--that it would not be possible for the United States to hold onto a position where it would have to use police methods to subdue the local population if the local population wanted some other political settlement. My guess is that had Johnson remained in office that he would have done the same thing that President Nixon did.

M: It's just a matter of when the Japanese came [to the U.S. to ask reversion?]

R: When they came, yes. Now, a good deal will turn upon the specific arrangements that are made with Japan about the use of Okinawa as a base. It isn't important as a place for storing nuclear weapons. That is of no great consequence, but to have Okinawa available to assist in the defense of Korea is very important. That should also be important to Japan, and I would hope that the arrangement would include

provisions that Okinawa would be available to support South Korea. My guess is that the Japanese will go a long way to accommodate our needs for bases on Okinawa now that they have the political reversion of Okinawa assured to them.

M: What about other policies in connection with Japan during the Johnson years? I gather that Japan increasingly supported our Southeast Asian effort after about 1965 or '66. Were there any other major difficulties that arose that Mr. Johnson got involved in personally with Japan?

R: President Johnson was personally involved, primarily, only in the Okinawa issue. We had, of course, running difficulties with Japan on trade matters. We are very large trading partners with each other. Both countries have a system of private enterprise, a surging economy. Both of them have an almost insatiable kind of economy--nothing is ever enough. Regardless of what happens today, tomorrow has to be bigger and better. In that kind of a trading situation there are bound to be irritants of all sorts--tariff barriers, non-tariff trade barriers, discriminatory taxes, discriminatory policies on investment, special taxes on American-scale, American-size automobiles. They were concerned about our attempts to limit their export of textiles to the United States and other Japanese imports to us which tended to disrupt our markets, because the Japanese were able to come into our markets with great vigor so we tried to handle those issues through the joint Cabinet Committee that we had with the Japanese. We talked about them frankly and in great detail and kept them more or less under control, but in general our relations with Japan were very good. We had, as I say, these normal problems of vigorous trading patterns, but on political questions we and the Japanese got along very well.

M: That kept them below the Presidential level then?

R: That's right.

M: What about Indonesia? Mr. Johnson began with a problem there, I guess in regard to foreign aid. Did he have a position as to what our interests in Indonesia were that became important at any point?

R: Sukarno's Indonesia was a very difficult country to get along with, and our relations with Indonesia continued to deteriorate so long as Sukarno was in office. That changed dramatically when Sukarno was forced out of office by the present group of generals, and there was a turn-around of

Indonesian policy.

I think the most concern we had over Indonesia had to do with the confrontation with Malaya. They got into a situation where they were sending guerrillas not only into the offshore parts of Malaysia over in Borneo, but also in Malay proper, and we were concerned because Australia and New Zealand had security commitments to Malaysia and had forces there. Under the Anzus Treaty, if New Zealand or Australian forces were attacked in the treaty area, and Malaysia was in the treaty area, that could very likely bring up the obligation of Anzus and involve the United States and our commitment to Australia and New Zealand. We tried to point that out to Sukarno in an effort to cause him to pause. Fortunately with the change in government in Indonesia, the confrontation came to a close; and that was a major step forward in the general political security situation in Southeast Asia.

I'm not one of those who claims that what we were doing in South Viet Nam made it possible for Indonesia to turn its policy around. There are some Indonesians who have commented that the very fact that the United States was present in Viet Nam and that the Seventh Fleet was there between Indonesia and mainland China gave them courage to move strongly against the Chinese Communists who were heavily involved in Indonesia and were participants in that attempted coup d'etat which led to the turnover in government, but I think it would be unfortunate for the United States to claim that what we were doing in Viet Nam was the thing which produced the change in attitude in Indonesia. I think those changes came about for Indonesian reasons and not directly because of what we were doing in Viet Nam.

M: I was smiling a minute ago not at your answer, but at the fact that you seemed to read my mind on these questions. I was just about to open my mouth to ask the question that you began to answer. Maybe we've been at this long enough that I can just turn the machine on and let you go on.

What about Korea? I gather that this is one of the instances where there was a real personal rapport between President Johnson and President Park that contributed a great deal to the success of our relations in Korea. Is that accurate?

R: Yes. President Johnson had a great respect for President Park and for good reason. President Park, under great

difficulties, had brought Korea along in remarkable progress, economically and socially and politically. He was tough in defense of the interests of South Korea but was reasonable and balanced and was not provocative or militant in his general attitude toward North Korea. He took a responsible attitude toward such questions as Southeast Asia. He seemed to be willing to play a role that reflected Korea's gratitude for the assistance it had had from the United States back in 1950. His willingness to put two divisions of South Korean troops into Southeast Asia was welcomed by President Johnson. South Korea had no treaty obligation to do so. It was not a member of SEATO, and when he made it clear that he was prepared to take part in that struggle down there, this of course touched President Johnson very deeply. And the Koreans turned out to be very good fighters in South Viet Nam, as they turned out to be by the end of the Korean war in their own country. But there was a personal rapport between President Johnson and President Park.

M: When did the renewed tensions along the armistice line in Korea become serious again?

R: I think that we began to be freshly concerned in 1967 when the rate of infiltration seemed to increase significantly. And when the North Korean leaders began making militant speeches about unifying the country by 1970 and making very bellicose statements about their own policy and attitude, we became very much concerned because we had fifty thousand American troops in Korea.

We had a very flat and direct security treaty with Korea. A renewal of the Korean war would be something that we would look upon with the greatest dismay because we had enough of a struggle going on in Southeast Asia. We didn't want a second struggle up in Korea. It was rather courageous on the part of President Park to put two divisions of his own troops into South Viet Nam at a time when he was having infiltration problems with the North Koreans, and when the North Koreans were talking in a very belligerent mood, but he went ahead and did it. But throughout '67 and '68 we were very much concerned about North Korea.

M: Was the Pueblo incident a calculated part of this, do you think, or was that just an aberration that was unrelated to their troubles with South Korea?

R: I will never fully understand just why the North Koreans

seized the Pueblo. It's one of those situations where a small belligerent country can act with a lack of responsibility simply because other countries don't want war. The Pueblo was in international waters. It was there to do some listening on communications in North Korea. We had an interest in picking up as much intelligence as could out of North Korea because of the belligerency of North Korea towards South Korea and the increase of infiltration into South Korea, but we were relying upon the high seas, the freedom of the seas--

M: There was never a doubt about its location?

R: Oh, no, never a doubt about its location. As a matter of fact, in the communications which the North Koreans themselves flashed back from the scene, they even put the position further out on the high seas than we did so they knew they were on the high seas. And when I say high seas, I mean beyond their own twelve-mile limit.

M: Yes, their definition of high seas.

R: And not just beyond our three-mile limit. But that was a very unhappy episode from beginning to end.

M: That's Presidential from the beginning, I expect. What was Mr. Johnson's reaction to that?

R: He was, of course, furious with the North Koreans, and like me [he] failed to understand just why they went out of their way to be so disagreeable about it. Nevertheless President Johnson did not want a war with North Korea. He made a prompt decision to try to get the ship and its men back by diplomatic means rather than by military means. We were faced with the fact that if you tried to use military force to rescue the men you might pick up dead bodies, but you wouldn't pick up live men and that you might well start a war at a time when we didn't want a war between North and South Korea involving American forces.

So we decided to swallow hard and try to get these men back by diplomatic means, and that took a great deal of doing. We had meeting after meeting that made no progress; and we finally released the men by a device which I described at the time as being without precedent in international affairs. We signed a statement which the North Koreans insisted we sign, but at the very time we signed it we made a statement saying that we denounced the signature and the statement itself was false.

M: They knew you were going to make this statement?

R: They knew in advance that we were going to make that statement. This had been worked out in advance. It's as though a kidnapper kidnaps your child and asks for fifty thousand dollars ransom. You give him a check for fifty thousand dollars and you tell him at the time that you've stopped payment on the check, and then he delivers your child to you. I think probably what happened was that the North Koreans came to the conclusion that they had milked the Pueblo affair for all that was in it, and that there was no particular point in holding on to these men any further.

M: The Russians didn't play any constructive role--?

R: I think it's possible that the Russians played a mediating role in that situation. We have no way of knowing. We asked the Russians on several occasions to use their influence with North Korea to free these men and the ship, but we never knew just what they did by way of follow-up on it.

M: Did we have to act to restrain the South Koreans in that atmosphere [when] under renewed infiltration, the attack on the Blue House, and the seizure of the Pueblo all sort of came together?

R: The South Koreans were interested in what might be called close-in retaliation, but I never got the impression that the South Koreans wanted to go into full-scale war. So to the extent that it was necessary to restrain them, it wasn't a very difficult job because they were not itching for war, either. They did get very incensed about the Blue House raid and about other types of infiltration that were coming across. There were times when they would carry out retaliation against North Korea by counterraids without our permission, and so we had a little job at times of cooling them down a bit and restraining them from these retaliations which they were inclined to pull off.

M: Mr. Johnson talked about the concept of regionalism in Asia. Was there any basis in Asia for the development of that regionalism, or was that something that we pretty well had to impose ourselves upon them?

R: No, one of the very encouraging developments in Asia during this period of the South Vietnamese conflict was that the nations in Asia during this period of the South Vietnamese conflict was that the nations in Asia themselves began to

draw together on their own initiative. Sometimes it would be on the initiative of the Japanese who would draw them together for an agricultural conference. Sometimes it would be on the initiative of the Koreans, sometimes the Thais, sometimes the Filipinos but they began to draw together in such organizations as ASPAC, in such organizations as ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), to try to work our closer methods of cooperation among them in a wide range of political, economic, social, scientific, technological fields. No, this is not something that we had to impose on them. There was a good deal of interest in this among the Asians themselves, and we felt that it was wholesome for the Asians to try to get together without the direct participation of the United States so they could feel that they were doing something on their own, and that Big Brother was not simply there monitoring everything they did.

Another thing that made a considerable difference in this matter was the new attitude of Australia. Australia and New Zealand had traditionally held themselves more or less aloof from Asian affairs. They looked upon themselves as a member of the Commonwealth but Australia began to accept its roles as a Far Eastern country and to take an active part in these regional discussions among Asian countries. This was a very marked development in Australian policy and was very wholesome in terms of encouraging the Asians to get together on a more realistic basis on their own affairs.

Now, bear in mind that New Zealand is a long way from Southeast Asia. I've been told that New Zealand is further away from Saigon than Saigon is from Paris. I think you'd have to take some measurement on that, but in any event they're not all that close in. They geographically have the capability of being more or less aloof, but they've decided not to be aloof, and they've taken an active part in the discussions among the free countries of Asia.

This goes back to an attitude of mine when I was Assistant Secretary under the Truman Administration. I at that time opposed the idea which later became SEATO. I felt that it was a mistake for the United States to take a direct part in a regional security arrangement in Southeast Asia in a way that would divide the Southeast Asian countries among themselves--where you'd have some countries participating and some not. It would be far better to let the Southeast Asian countries evolve their own regional security arrangement without the United States being a direct party, and then we could stand in powerful second line assistance,

second line support to the region, if it ever got into trouble. But the events of 1954 caused the Eisenhower Administration to take another view particularly when North Viet Nam was lost to the Communists and the prospect was that the rest of Southeast Asia would be exposed to penetration from the Communist North Viet Nam.

M: What about things like the Asian Development Bank where American participation was direct?

R: There our participation was essential because of the need for American financial participation but Japan is present on about the same basis as is the United States. But I look upon the Asian membership of the Asian Development Bank as being one of those groupings where the Asian countries will be drawing closer together among themselves. The fact that there is a Japanese director of the bank and that the bank is located in Manila takes away from it a sort of "Made in USA" stamp.

M: But was it Mr. Johnson's special interests--the concept of regionalism, and particularly the Asian Development Bank--was that something he personally was very--?

R: Yes, President Johnson wanted us to give all the encouragement we could to this growing regionalism in Asia, but to do it in a way which would not spoil it--to do it in a way which would allow maximum initiative to be taken by the Asian countries themselves because, you see, there you have one of those situations where you act quietly rather than publicly in order to let other people take the responsibility and the credit for what they are able to accomplish. Otherwise, you can get in the way of your own purpose.

M: Are there any other areas of Asia that Mr. Johnson's role becomes directly important that we haven't had occasion to mention? Asia is a big area obviously; I don't want to miss any that you think might be important.

R: I think that President Johnson's own personal relation with the leaders of Asia was very good. On his trips out there he spent time talking with a number of them. I was with him on some of those trips. He tried to develop a personal relationship with Asian leaders that would be a basis itself for mutual confidence and understanding.

We did have some tension with India over India's food problem. We were in the position of being the residual

supplier of food to India in the event of an Indian short-fall in food production. A drought came along about four years ago which gave India a real crisis in its food situation, and it appeared that they were going to have several million tons of foods from us if they were to meet their most minimum needs. That was a very expensive thing for us because, although we have food surpluses, those surpluses represent dollars as far as the American taxpayer is concerned. President Johnson came to the conclusion, shared by Secretary of Agriculture [Orville] Freeman, that the Indians themselves were not doing all that they needed to do to take care of their own food problem. For example, they took a very negative attitude toward private investment in fertilizer. They were not able to move food stocks from one state to the other because the states would try to hoard food--

M: The ones that had against those that didn't have.

R: That's right and not share it with deficient states. There were problems in agricultural extension. There was not enough of what we call agricultural extension. In trying to teach Indian farmers how to grow more food with the resources that they were then already using and there were other questions which all amounted to a lack of priority on the part of the Indian government to its own agricultural development. So President Johnson became very resistant to the idea that we would simply stand by and make up the difference in whatever India needed, regardless of what India did about it, and so he insisted on a change in Indian priorities in the direction of more emphasis on their agricultural sector. He had Secretary Freeman, who worked with the Minister of Agriculture in India, to work out a broad program of increased priorities, and that went to the Cabinet and was approved by the Indian Cabinet, and that has paid substantial dividends in the period since.

M: That was President Johnson's personal--

R: That was President Johnson's personal intervention of the Indian food problem that brought that about. Now, this was one of those situations where President Johnson was tough, but he was tough for basically humanitarian reasons because he fully understood that we simply did not have the capability of meeting India's short-fall of food unless India did everything that it possibly could to take care of its own food production. So that in the interest of feeding Indians, President Johnson took a very tough line with the Indian government and said to them, "Now look here. If you

expect the United States to do thus-and-so, there are a lot of things you've got to do on your own behalf which you're not doing in order to feed your own people." I remember one time President Johnson made the remark that the President of the United States cannot be more interested in feeding Indians than the Prime Minister of India, and what he was interested in was demonstrating that the Prime Minister of India was prepared to take the steps necessary to feed the Indian people.

M: The quid pro quo we were demanding was not support for one of our policies so much as something that they could do for their own internal--

R: No, no. We weren't asking any political quid pro quo in terms of Viet Nam, or a vote on Red China in the United Nations, or anything of that sort. The only quid pro quo we were asking for was things that the Indians ought to be doing for themselves, quite apart from the United States.

M: Was it related in any way to the India-Pakistan difficulty that occurred earlier, or was that an entirely separate episode that ought to be commented on?

R: That was rather separate, but we took the view during the Indian-Pakistan fighting that since we had strongly urged the two sides to take steps that would avoid the conflict, that if they wanted to ignore our advice and go to war with each other that we wouldn't pay for it. The conflict between India and Pakistan has been a big burden to the United States.

That sub-continent has been the principal recipient of American aid. The hostility between India and Pakistan has brought about a diversion of their own resources to their military establishments, and has caused them to refrain from trade with each other and the cooperative action that would make life better on the subcontinent as a whole. So when the Pakistanis first put several thousand guerrillas into Kashmir, the Indians moved troops into southern Kashmir and into Pakistan opposite Kashmir. Then the Pakistanis moved troops into India further south, and then the Indians responded by moving still more forces into Pakistan. In other words they allowed the matter to escalate very fast, on both sides contrary to the advice that was being given them by the United States so we in effect shrugged our shoulders and said, "Well, if you're going to fight, go ahead and fight, but we're not going to pay for it." So we suspended our aid to both countries during that period and

tried to express our disapproval of the struggle.

M: Were the events that led up the Tashkent settlement mainly Russian initiatives, or were we participating quietly in those as well?

R: We encouraged the Russians to go ahead with the Tashkent idea, because we felt we had nothing to lose. If they succeeded in bringing about any détente at Tashkent, then there would be more peace on the subcontinent between India and Pakistan, and we would gain from that fact. If the Russians failed at Tashkent, at least the Russians would have the experience of some of the frustration that we had had for twenty years in trying to sort out things between India and Pakistan. As a matter of fact I once, in a semi-joking way, told the Russian Ambassador that if he wanted them we would be glad to give him all of our old memoranda on efforts that we had made over the past twenty years to try to solve things between India and Pakistan as a part of their preparation for Tashkent, but that did not become necessary.

M: Would you like to switch over a world away to Latin America, or do you think there are other things about Asia that might be better put right here? I thought we could get started here on the Latin American side and then change that [tape].

A good beginning might be one of your own comments that I picked up out of the earlier transcript. I believe in the first session you mentioned that in summarizing the kind of President Mr. Johnson seemed to you, that he, for example, provided action for the Alliance for Progress programs. On the other hand, the critics have sometimes said that the Alliance died in the Johnson Administration. I wonder if you can comment on the divergence of views there.

R: It's always easy to criticize a program which is not perfect. The Alliance for Progress was an effort to mobilize the resources in the first instance of Latin America for development. The American aid was never to be more than about two percent of the gross national product of Latin America. Now, you don't buy countries for two percent.

We expected the Latin Americans to take far-reaching steps in their own behalf in terms of investment, tax programs, the elimination of corruption, improvement in the agricultural sector, improvement in education, improvement in public health across the broad front of development. We

wanted them to move fast, but on the other hand we wanted them to move by democratic processes as much as possible.

When you think about our own experience in this country--say during the New Deal of Franklin Roosevelt--you recognize that major steps of an economic and social character are highly controversial. We had a lot of trouble during the New Deal days in getting legislation through and moving to adopt the reforms that President Roosevelt was trying to put into effect.

Now, these Latin American countries also have their internal politics. They have vested interests. They have inertia. They have resistance to social change so that changes did not occur as fast as we hoped they might. Nevertheless the total effect of the Alliance for Progress was very constructive. I won't try to go into the figures--I don't have the figures at my tongue-tip here this morning--but I think that if you look at what was accomplished during the period of Alliance for Progress in investment, in new tax systems, in education, in public health, in increased agricultural productivity, you can see that it was a period of substantial progress in Latin America.

I think that one of the things that happened was that when a new Administration came in, they felt under some pressure to do things differently. It's almost inevitable that a new Administration will want to appear different than its predecessor. Just as President Kennedy invented the phrase, "Alliance for Progress," to show difference with the Eisenhower Administration, so the new Nixon Administration wanted to appear to be doing something different. In fact, the Alliance for Progress originated during the Eisenhower Administration. It was some of Milton Eisenhower's work that gave birth to the ideas which later became the Alliance for Progress.

Another thing which affects what you call things is the fact that foreign aid runs through cycles of interest as far as the Congress is concerned. We've had several fresh starts in foreign aid. Partly because foreign aid is a burden, people would be glad to do without it if possible. It gets to be boring from the point of view of the Congress, and it even gets to be boring from the point of view of the administrator. I myself appeared before Congressional committees thirty-two times in public testimony on behalf of foreign aid--four times each year.

M: They'll only authorize one year.

R: You have to appear twice at the authorization stage and twice at the appropriation stage each year, and you're supposed to make a different speech about foreign aid on each occasion. Well, when you make thirty-two speeches on foreign aid, it gets a little difficult to pretend that everything is fresh and new each year.

To some extent there was a feeling that the Alliance for Progress had run out of gas as a concept as far as the Congress was concerned, and that some kind of fresh start was indicated. I haven't yet seen clearly the main lines of the new Administration's approach to Latin America. The results of the Rockefeller report and the recommendations that President Nixon has made are not yet all that apparent. But something like the Alliance for Progress--whatever it's called--is going to be necessary because the United States cannot possibly ignore the needs of this hemisphere for economic and social development. But again we are very much the junior partner. Although foreign aid appropriations look large from our point of view, they're very small in relation to the gross national product of the country receiving aid, and they're only a small part of the total effort made by the countries themselves for their own development. But President Johnson put a lot of personal effort into the Alliance for Progress.

M: Did he do so as Vice President at all? Did he play any part in the Kennedy Administration's development of Latin American policy?

R: Very little during that period. He kept well informed on it, but he did not, so far as I can recall, play a major role in the actual decisions that were made. But he gave the Alliance for Progress his top priority as soon as he became President. I think I said earlier that during the first week of his Presidency he called in the Latin American Ambassadors and dedicated himself to the Alliance for Progress. He began to put the spurs to the rest of us to get going on action in support of the Alliance for Progress and to get away from the theorizing and the words and the concepts and the eloquence and to get around to actually doing things which would produce results in the countries of the hemisphere.

President Johnson always looked upon the hemisphere as, in a certain sense his priority area, despite the war in Viet Nam and despite our obvious major involvements in

Europe. He used to say that "This hemisphere is our home. This is where we live. These are our neighbors. If we can't get along with our neighbors, with whom can we get along?" This marked his approach to Latin America. He gave the Latin Americans time, attention, affection, interest, and, to the extent that Congress would let him, he gave them resources.

M: I suppose the climax of that effort, as far as the Alliance is concerned, is his meeting with the Chiefs of State in 1967 at Punta del Este. You accompanied him on that trip, did you not?

R: Yes.

M: And he met privately with all the Chiefs of State of the nations in attendance there?

R: Yes. Apart from the meetings that were held around the table of the group, he met individually with every Chief of State who was present, and I looked upon that as a very remarkable exercise of personal diplomacy on his part. He was well briefed on the problems of each country before he met the Chief of State. He had very good heart-to-heart talks with them about their problems, about what we could or could not do about them. He also helped to consolidate the group action that was taken in support of the Alliance for Progress and in support of Latin American economic integration in these private talks. I'm one who has always been skeptical about what can be accomplished at the summit. In general my view has been that summit meetings usually don't produce as much result as is usually hoped for, but I must say that summity carried out by the President at the Punta del Este meeting of Chiefs of State was a very definite plus as far as American relations with Latin America are concerned.

M: Did it require fairly tough talking on Mr. Johnson's part with such Presidents as Arosemena of Ecuador who was recalcitrant?

R: Oh, there were some misunderstandings, some disagreement, but President Johnson was very straightforward and direct and forthright, but yet friendly in talking over disagreements with his Latin colleagues. He, on the whole, found them receptive and cooperative and understanding of the North American position, but he didn't pull any punches when he would talk to them about differences that might exist. You mentioned Ecuador. I believe Ecuador did not

sign the final act, as I recall, but President Johnson didn't give anything away to fellows like that, and kept his balance and handled the situation very well.

M: Had he pretty well cleared with Congressional leaders before going how far he could go in offering continued American aid? I think he announced there an increase of a certain amount in our subsequent support for the Alliance.

R: We consulted with the Congressional leaders, and indeed got a very good resolution from the House of Representatives before he went to the Punta del Este meeting. We wanted to get a similar resolution from the Senate, but the Senate bowed its back and wouldn't give us a resolution of a sort that would be helpful.

Senator Fulbright, among others, took the view that it was not necessary to consult the Congress, that in general the Congress has usually supported Presidents who go off and make commitments for the United States, and that Congress shouldn't be asked to buy a pig in a poke. So there was one of those situations where the Administration was trying to consult the Congress, and the Senate was being resistant about being consulted. This contrasts rather sharply with the general criticism you hear that the Senate and the Congress wanted to be consulted on matters before any steps are taken. But the House of Representatives passed a very forthcoming resolution which encouraged the President to go ahead at Punta del Este and give the encouragement to the Chiefs of State down there that he did about continued support for the Alliance for Progress.

M: I don't know of any job in your State Department that changed more frequently than the Assistant Secretaryship of Inter-American Affairs. Is that related to policy, or is it just such a man-killing job that nobody can stand it for a very long time?

R: Well, it actually came about through a series of accidents of personnel. For example, we had Tom Mann as Assistant Secretary for Latin America for awhile, but then we wanted him to be Under Secretary. Lincoln Gordon went off to be President of Johns Hopkins. There were no changes in Assistant Secretary for Latin America based upon policy differences or desire to change policy. As a matter of fact, we regretted very much that there was such a rapid turnover on that job, but it was just impossible to maintain one man on it very long because something would happen.

M: This tape is about to run off. Let's let it do so before we start another question.

INTERVIEW III

INTERVIEWEE: DEAN RUSK

INTERVIEWER: PAIGE E. MULHOLLAN

DATE: January 2, 1970

Tape 2 of 2

M: Mr. Johnson's first Latin American crisis situation, I suppose, would be the Panama one immediately after he took office in January, 1964. Suppose you just describe his reaction there as an example of his early technique in dealing with crises of this nature when they came up.

R: Well, this will have been covered in President Johnson's own books by the time this material is available to the historian, so I will just comment on what seemed to me to be the highlights of the situation.

The Panama rioting started when some American school children refused to allow the Panamanian flag to be flown despite the fact that we had agreed with the Panamanians that the Panamanian flag would be flown at certain public buildings. The actual incident started through lack of understanding, in a sense, on the part of Americans in the Canal Zone.

But then the rioting got out of hand, and it became apparent that the Panama National Guard was doing very little to control the rioters, and that the government therefore was using the rioting as a means of political pressure on the United States. President Chiari took the line that the Panama Treaty had to be renegotiated, that there had to be a change in the situation. President Johnson took the line that although there's no subject that cannot be discussed between our two governments, we're not going to discuss them under conditions of violence, and that we would not be blackmailed into doing things that we would be willing to talk about in a quieter period. So throughout this period President Johnson was moved to insist upon a restoration of law and order in Panama as a prelude to a discussion of any issues between us, including the revision of the 1903 treaty, and he was very tough about that. He just would not have his hand forced by rioting which was being connived at by the government of Panama.

M: When you say "tough," this includes his personal telephone

conversation with President Chiari?

R: Yes. He made it very clear that the first thing that had to be done was the restoration of law and order, and that following the restoration of law and order and the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries, we could then sit down and talk about the problems we had, including the treaty. Now, the law and order was restored, diplomatic relations were resumed, and President Johnson then, with the help of Robert Anderson and others, undertook a series of discussions about the treaty in which President Johnson was prepared to be very forthcoming to the Panamanians.

We have only two basic interests in the Panama Canal--the one is its security and the other is its efficient operation--and our view was that so long as the security of the canal and its operational responsibility remained more or less in American hands that we could take almost any changes in the theory of our presence there that the Panamanians would insist upon. We could go a long way toward meeting them in revising that old treaty which under modern conditions reads like a neolithic treaty, anyhow. If you were negotiating a fresh treaty today, you would not possibly find a country willing to give you a piece of its territory in which you would carry out all the acts of sovereignty as though we were sovereign, as the treaty puts it.

M: Perpetually, too.

R: On a perpetual basis. Now we also, however, have to bear in mind that the canal is an international canal. There are many who depend upon its efficient operation. The countries living along the west coast of Latin America, for example, look upon the canal as being their life line. It's their principal trade route with all the nations of the world. They themselves were very nervous about our turning over the canal to the Panamanians.

I remember at one time I had a count made, and there were something like sixty different Panamanian Presidents in the course of about sixty-two years. No country has had a larger share of coup d'etats than Panama, and it looks as though they have changes of government simply to pass around the perquisites of benefiting from the canal in different hands. So the stability of the canal--the safety and stability and the efficiency of the canal--are our primary considerations. The theory is something on which we can

make concessions. So we did, and we eventually reached a draft treaty which both sides seemed to think was possible; but we ran into a situation in Panama itself where the Panamanians were not prepared to go ahead to submit the treaty to its legislature because of local political considerations and an upcoming presidential election and the possibility that the treaty would be seized upon by highly nationalist elements there to create confusion and perhaps even violence in Panama if an effort was made to ratify it.

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We had a lot of opposition in this country to the kind of treaty we were planning to put forward. We consulted continuously with the appropriate committees of Congress, but even so there were Senators and Congressmen who wanted to take a firm, no-concession attitude based upon the original treaty. There were very active representations made by the American colony in the Panama Canal not to give anything away that was of interest to them, and so we were going to face a fairly acrimonious debate in our own Senate over ratifying the draft treaty that we had worked out with the Panamanians.

So when the Panamanians decided that they would have to defer consideration of the draft treaty, we more or less relaxed because in the absence of a new treaty the old treaty remains in effect, and so we had nothing particular to lose by delays so long as there was not violence in Panama aimed at the canal. By the time I left office, the matter was in abeyance, more or less on the initiative of the Panamanians. The Panamanians have some idea now as to what kind of a new treaty they can get from the United States, and it may be that in the course of the next year or two the matter will come up again and an effort will be made to solve it.

M: At the time of the crisis there were analysts who thought that Mr. Johnson was making a lot out of the use of particular words, and that was contributing to keeping the crisis going. I've forgotten what the words were--"revise" or "consider" with different meanings. Was that an issue of substance that he was defending there, that made it seem as if we were perhaps following procedure a little bit more closely than we might have?

R: I don't recall the actual language that was in dispute at the time. I think that one of the problems that we had on our minds was not to appear to promise more than we could deliver, and we have a problem here in the kind of treaty that we could get ratified--that we can get through the

Senate prior to ratification. We did not want to build up Panamanian expectations that would go so far as to make it impossible to get the kind of treaty that we could approve in this country. Also we did not want to have arrangements about the canal that would erode the responsibility of the United States for the security and the operation of the canal, and beyond that we did not want to throw confusions and concern into all the users of the canal who did not want to see the canal turned over simply to Panamanian management and administration.

M: What about the appointment of Mr. Anderson as a special envoy? Why a man outside the Department in a case like this rather than using the resources of the State Department to carry out those negotiations?

R: This is a question that comes up in many situations. That is, why we don't use our Ambassadors for all negotiations! In many situations, in many negotiations, there is a high degree of technicality involved, and the Ambassador is just not sufficiently expert to negotiate a highly technical agreement such as a trade agreement or, a consular agreement or agreement on fisheries or wildlife, or things of that sort. So sometimes special negotiators are appointed in order to get a greater degree of expertise in the subject matter.

Then, sometimes a country will want to be sure that negotiations are at what they call a high level. This is a part of the cosmetics of the negotiation. I think that Panama would have taken the view that had we tried to negotiate a treaty through our Ambassador in Panama that this would not be at sufficiently high level because, given the importance of the subject from the Panamanian point of view, the appointment of a special representative of the distinction of Robert Anderson elevated the level as far as the appearance was concerned. Their Foreign Minister did most of the negotiating on their side. They had a special team of negotiators that dealt regularly with Robert Anderson, but when you got into the serious stages it was the Foreign Minister who took part, and even the President took part. Our Secretary of State and our President could not take on the chore of a full-time job while negotiating a situation of that sort, although the President of Panama and the Foreign Minister of Panama could spend almost full time on it because of its importance to them. So we appointed Robert Anderson to have a high level man who could give it all the time it needed.

M: That doesn't indicate then, in your opinion, a lack of trust by the President of the State Department at that period?

R: No. No.

M: Just a natural course of events.

R: And an effort to have a high level negotiating team headed by a very distinguished American who would be looked upon as the personal representative of the President of the United States.

M: What about Cuba? In the accounts of the crises during the Kennedy Administration, Mr. Johnson's name doesn't get mentioned very often. Did he play a rather minor role in those episodes, or any role at all?

R: Well, there were two principal episodes during the Kennedy period, the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Johnson did not play much of a role in the Bay of Pigs exercise. I recall very distinctly that Vice President Johnson's attitude toward the Bay of Pigs was very negative. I think that had the decision been left to him he would not have done it. That was basically my own view, yet after it was over President Johnson and I never let it be known that we had expressed misgivings and doubts about it, so that he was completely loyal on the subject when the catastrophe occurred.

On the Cuban Missile Crisis, he was much more active. He attended the executive committee which was established to handle the Cuban Missile Crisis, and I suppose that he attended at least two to three dozen meetings in which we were discussing the matter. It was a matter of such over-riding importance that it was necessary for the Vice President to be part of it. He, in general, supported the line which was adopted by President Kennedy--the quarantine--and he followed it very closely.

Those who have written that he had nothing to do with the Cuban missile crisis are just wrong, because he would come to the White House, he would come to the State Department, he would sit in on our informal meetings as well as the formal meetings in the Cabinet Room. He was on it day and night along with the rest of us and took a very active part in the Cuban missile crisis discussions.

M: You mentioned that in your case you generally chose to render your advice in such situations privately to the

President rather than in these meetings. Is that the way Mr. Johnson did in the Cuban missile crisis, also? Does this might explain why people thought he wasn't involved?

R: I don't have direct knowledge of the private talks which the President and the Vice President might have had at that time. I'm sure they had some, but I just don't have any way of knowing. I would think that since President Johnson was sitting in on the Executive Committee meetings and the National Security Council meetings and meetings with the Congressional leaders, people of that sort, that the President and the Vice President did talk about these matters between themselves privately.

M: Was he one of those participants whose views went through a change during the crisis--who originally favored perhaps a preemptive strike, and then changed that view with discussions?

R: I think that the President and the Vice President and the Secretary of State did not disclose their views at the early stages, until after the task forces had gone to work and made a study of the various alternatives that we had in front of us. I know I deliberately withheld my own judgment until the task forces had reported on how they saw the different lines of action that we might take. It is my impression that Vice President Johnson did the same thing. I don't recall that he was in there at a very early stage pressing for one solution rather than another. I do recall that he supported the decision taken by President Kennedy to put on the quarantine and try to get the missiles out without major hostilities if possible.

M: After Mr. Johnson became President, Cuba seemed to remain rather quiet insofar as our relations with her are concerned. Was this a conscious Presidential decision that we should leave Castro alone and sort of let things die down?

R: Yes. We were interested in circumscribing Castro and making it clear that Castroism in Latin America was not the wave of the future in Latin America, and so we were very active in assisting other countries of Latin America in dealing with evidences of Castro in their own country.

We, also, had during President Johnson's administration one or two episodes, such as the landing of arms and men on the coast of Venezuela, which caused the Foreign Ministers of the hemisphere to impose on Cuba all of the remaining

peaceful sanctions that are available under the Rio Pact. The only sanction which has not been used against Cuba has been the actual landing of troops, the use of armed force. It was felt that that was a drastic remedy which would involve large numbers of casualties on both sides, and that it was not necessary to go that far in order to protect the hemisphere against the influence of Castro.

Then we had a little episode--the turning off of the water at Guantanamo--and President Johnson's reaction to that was simply to make Guantanamo self-sufficient and independent of a Cuban water supply. We put in a distillation plant there and reduced the use of water in Guantanamo to a point where we were able to refuse the turning on of the water again by the Cubans, and our own military turned off the water when the Cubans seemed willing to turn it back on again.

I don't know how long the American position in Guantanamo is going to last. From a purely military point of view it has seemed to me that it is no longer necessary under modern conditions for us to have a base in Cuba. Had we given it up fifteen years ago we would not have suffered from a military point of view, but to give it up under military pressure or under threat of force would be another problem. Someday if there is a change of regime in Cuba, my guess is that the Guantanamo base will be abandoned as being not necessary since we have nearby bases in Puerto Rico and other places which make it possible for us to do whatever we need to do in the Caribbean without the use of Guantanamo.

M: You mentioned Castroism's influence on other countries. The anti-American policy people are always saying that we have widespread military activity--Green Berets and so on--around the hemisphere supporting various military governments. Was that widely true, in fact, then, that we were taking military action or helping take military action to control these Castroism elements?

R: We had a policy of assisting Latin American countries in dealing with guerrillas of the Castro-type. This meant improving their own local means of internal security, improving their communications, improving their training, to some extent improving their smaller items of equipment, improving their mobility so that they could move without direct United States assistance in dealing with the first stages of guerrilla action on their own. This involved training missions in various countries, but it was not true that this was assistance given just to the military regimes.

This was assistance which was also given to the democratic regimes to the extent that the democratic regimes wanted it. Most of our military assistance in Latin America came to be in the form of training. We'd bring their officers up here for training in the United States or in the training school down in Panama, and we got away from major items of hardware pretty consistently before the end of the Johnson Administration.

M: We did have field advisers in instances where troops were engaged--where Latin American troops were engaged?

R: Yes, although there haven't been very many engagements. There was that little ruckus in Bolivia, and we had some Green Beret-type advisers there working with them. But it was not necessary for Americans to be committed to combat. So far as I recall, we didn't have any casualties as a result of that advisory role.

M: And our policy was to provide this type of support to the Latin American governments without regard to what their nature was, not only to military governments but to all governments--democratic or military or whatever they happened to be.

R: That's correct. We were inclined to be cooperative if a Latin American government wanted assistance in training, for example, and I think practically all of them at one time or another called upon us for assistance in training their military personnel. It's very hard to draw a line between assisting a country to maintain its own internal security and supporting that country's government against its own people, and this was always a delicate line to draw and one that was not always successfully drawn.

We were not interested in building up Latin American military establishments to the point where they would take over the government, or where they would resist actual changes of the sort that we were trying to encourage under the Alliance for Progress. On the other hand, we were interested in their being able to deal with guerrillas of the Castro type.

One thing that has simplified the problem somewhat is that the Russian-related Communist parties in Latin America have pulled away from the Castro doctrine of militancy and have more or less played the tactics of the popular front. There has been some public debate between Castro and Moscow on this question of tactics and doctrine. My guess is that

little by little Castro has acknowledged to himself that the use of armed guerrillas in Latin American countries is not the way to get on with what he has in mind--that he's not going to succeed in doing that--and therefore he's doing less of that now than he did, say, eight years ago or six years ago. But, in any event, the idea that Castroism is an exportable commodity from Cuba into other Latin American countries seems now to be pretty well behind us. It doesn't appear to be the threat that we thought it might be at the beginning of the sixties.

M: How much pressure was Mr. Johnson prepared to put or to have his representatives put on various Latin American countries when American economic interests were vitally involved? I'm thinking particularly of, I believe it was the copper price problem with Chile, but I think it was involved in other areas perhaps as well.

R: Since the beginning of the Republic one of the functions of the Department of State, one of the functions of American foreign policy, has been to support American trade and investment abroad. Benjamin Franklin started doing that when he was the first representative of the colonies abroad so we have a settled policy of trying to promote American trade and investment outside the United States. We also have a considerable stake in the atmosphere for private investment, particularly in Latin America.

The Alliance for Progress, or government-to-government funds, are not going to be able to do the job of development which is required in Latin America. Private capital is going to have to play a big role. If a country treats private investment badly, that reduces the interest of other businessmen in private investment in Latin America. So we were concerned to maintain what was called a good atmosphere for private investment in Latin America because we wanted to tempt American investors to take part in the general development effort in the hemisphere. So when governments moved in on American enterprise, whether in Peru or in Chile, or wherever it might be, we tried our best to work out a solution which would be agreeable to the private investor so as not to frighten the private investors away from Latin America.

This is one of those delicate things because questions of sovereignty arise, and these countries are inclined to say that as sovereign states they have a right to deal with any companies doing business in their countries in any way they choose. We take the view that a sovereign country--a

sovereign government--nevertheless is able to make an agreement that it's supposed to comply with, and that how you deal with private investment is a very important matter of public policy.

Then we had in the background the Hickenlooper amendment to the AID bill. Under that amendment if there was confiscation of private investment without compensation, then we were prevented by the Hickenlooper amendment from giving aid to the particular country. It was a very drastic amendment which was opposed by the Administration at the time, but nevertheless the Congress enacted it into law. When it was on the law books you have to take it seriously because you can't act contrary to law. So what we tried to do was to, through negotiation--sometimes very vigorous negotiation--we tried to bring about a result which would not invoke the Hickenlooper amendment.

M: I believe you were successful in that, were you not?

R: In general. Up to this point we have not had to invoke the Hickenlooper amendment in Latin America. Peru has been very close to the borderline, and in a technical sense you could have justified invoking the Hickenlooper amendment against Peru. But it is such drastic action and leaves you no way home that every effort is made to avoid the application of the Hickenlooper amendment.

M: Did Mr. Johnson get personally involved in any of these episodes that involved investment protection or encouragement of the proper atmosphere for investment?

R: Yes, he was thoroughly briefed on each one of these cases and took a personal interest in it. As a matter of fact, I think he sent Averell Harriman down as a special emissary to Chile to work on the copper business, and then, too, some of these problems of pricing in Latin America affect pricing in the American market--in fact, our own situation as major purchasers from Latin America, our own production here in terms of competitive prices, things of that sort. At the time when the President was trying to hold the line on the increase of prices in the American mining industry, he didn't want the Latin Americans to break through and start increasing prices that would put unbearable pressures on the American producer so these things got to be very complicated, and the President was well informed on them and took an active part in the way they were handled.

M: Did he take any parallel action that you know of to try to

encourage the United States private sector to take actions to make their position more attractive in Latin America? I'm thinking, for example, of allowing Latin Americans full investment rights perhaps, or in other ways making their presence there less an irritant than they might otherwise be.

R: I don't recall that President Johnson personally did much of that sort of thing. We had a very distinguished group of businessmen under the chairmanship of David Rockefeller whose primary preoccupation it was to encourage investment in Latin America and to bring influence to bear to maintain a favorable climate for investment in Latin America. The State Department operated very closely with that group of men and encouraged them to go ahead with their work. But I don't have the impression that President Johnson personally did much about that.

M: I suppose the biggest single crisis is the Dominican Republic affair that resulted in intervention in 1965. The critics of that action charged at the time that our mission in the Dominican Republic acted in such a way from the very beginning as to make it impossible for the rebels to succeed. Is that an accurate criticism?

R: Well, you have to ask, "Which rebels?" Because had the rebel forces been limited to Juan Bosch's party and elements of that sort, we were prepared for Juan Bosch to return to the presidency. But when you talk about various groups of armed ruffians in Santo Domingo who had seized arms and were not under anybody's discipline, and who appeared to be directly involved with the most extremist groups, including the Communists, then we were not interested in allowing that kind of Communist group to seize power and to take over the country.

You see, in the background of the Dominican situation is the fact that the Organization of American States had imposed sanctions upon Trujillo. That was during the Eisenhower Administration. Then we had imposed sanctions upon Castro and had declared that Castroism was not acceptable as a political system in the Western Hemisphere, so that from the point of view of the OAS, the general opinion of the hemisphere, the return to power in the Dominican Republic of a Trujillo-type character or of a Castro-type character was beyond the pale.

I want to emphasize that when the first Marines went ashore in the Dominican Republic, they went ashore for the

purpose of evacuating American and other foreign nationals. With the buildup of tension in the Dominican Republic we had moved some of our naval forces into the vicinity of the Dominican Republic as a precautionary matter as we frequently do when the question of evacuation of Americans might become involved. We have contingency plans for almost every country as to how you evacuate Americans in the event of internal disorders and under a contingency plan worked out for President Kennedy we had moved elements of the fleet into the vicinity of the Dominican Republic. They had on board only a limited number of Marines who might be able to be helpful in evacuating Americans.

M: Were we asked at that point by other nations to remove their nationals as well?

R: The diplomatic corps in the Dominican Republic was wholly in favor of the action we took to put Marines ashore for the purpose of evacuating our own and foreign nationals. On the afternoon on which the decision was made, that was the sole issue. There was no government effectively operating in the Dominican Republic. The Chief of Police and the chief of the armed forces told us that they could not assure the safety of American and foreign nationals, and that they would have to have assistance from us in order to do so. American citizens were gathered in a big hotel just outside the city where there were various characters around spraying tommy-gun fire around the hotel, and it led to our Ambassador changing his mind in the course of one afternoon, reversing his position, and telling us that although he had told us earlier in the afternoon that he did not think that we should move in our forces, that he had changed his mind, that landing Marines was essential if we were to evacuate American nationals safely.

Then when we got ashore some very interesting things began to happen. Various elements of the Dominican political scene, including members of Juan Bosch's own party, came to us from downtown Santo Domingo and gave us the most hair raising accounts as to what was being done down there by these irresponsible armed bands. It was Colonel Caamanno, for example, who was supposed to be Juan Bosch's principal man in the city, [who] could not himself go into various parts of the city because other armed bands were in control and wouldn't let him come in, or at least he thought it was too dangerous for him to try to go in. So we were faced with the fact that the Dominican Republic was in for a civil war which could have been a very bloody civil war, and that the prospect that there might be either a

Trujillo or a Castro-type assumption of power there was very good. By that time we had been able to get our first meeting of the Organization of American States.

M: Had that not been possible earlier?

R: Well, the decision to put our Marines ashore was taken about five o'clock in the afternoon. Secretary McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and the President and I happened to be meeting on Viet Nam in the White House when the message came in from our Ambassador urging us to take action--to put the Marines ashore. We talked it over a bit and thought about it. We had been thinking about the problem for several days because it had been building up, and the decision was made to go ahead and put them ashore and to put them ashore straightaway. That was followed by a consultation with Congressional leaders who showed no particular opposition to it at that time.

M: Did anybody? Was there any major objection by a leader at that point?

R: I don't recall that at that first meeting there was any major objection made. Senator Fulbright later took a very negative view, but I don't recall whether he was even present at that first meeting that we had with the leaders of the Congress. If so, I don't recall that he made an eloquent speech on the subject.

The second thing that we did--the second instruction that the President issued--was to convene a meeting of the OAS as soon as possible. Well, now by that time of day--we began to try to get hold of them around six o'clock--and we found that the OAS Ambassadors were all over the place. Some were out at dinner; some were out of town; some were going to concerts; some were doing this; some were doing that; and it appeared that it was not feasible to get a meeting of the OAS before about nine o'clock the next morning.

In retrospect, I would think that it was a mistake not to insist upon a meeting that same evening even though it could not convene until midnight, or some Ambassadors had to be represented by number two men because the impression was left that we were not putting it to the OAS as quickly as we should have. But we had a meeting early the next morning over at the Pan American Union.

The interesting thing about what President Johnson did

was that the rest of the hemisphere did not condemn or discount what he had done and that it would move resolutions of censure of the United States for intervening in the Dominican Republic. Quite the opposite, they embraced it. They accepted it as the basis for organizing an inter-American peace force in which there were six nations represented before it was over and organizing an OAS commission to negotiate arrangements in the Dominican Republic which would make it possible for the Dominican people to choose their own government, to have free elections.

M: This required no pressure on our part to get them to--?

R: This required no pressure on our part. We had the sufficient two-thirds votes, and I don't recall that there was any animosity or bitterness there. As a matter of fact, the then-Ambassador of Mexico told me that he knew that under many circumstances that the United States would find it necessary to do what has to be done in various situations in the hemisphere, but that we should not ask Mexico to give it public approval because Mexico has some internal problems of its own about such matters. In effect he said, "Go ahead and do what has to be done here, and don't worry about Mexico. Just don't ask us to give it formal approval--public approval--in voting for resolutions and things of that sort."

My own feeling is that the Dominican episode did not set us back in general opinion in Latin America as many people have charged, but that there was general satisfaction certainly among the governments that a very messy situation in the Dominican Republic was clarified through the actual votes cast by the Dominican people for their own government; and that the Dominican Republic, instead of having a Trujillo or Castro in charge, had an elected president with a chance to pursue the course of constitutionalism in the Dominican Republic. My own feeling is that had we not acted in the Dominican Republic and had lost a lot of lives and if there had been a real blood bath in the Dominican Republic, we would have been severely criticized for allowing that to take place. I have always found it easier to answer the question why we did what we did than I would have found it to answer the question of why we did not do something if things had moved down the precipice into a real catastrophe in the Dominican Republic.

M: I take it, too, that your implication here by what you say about Mr. Johnson's second instruction to summon the OAS

would discount the claim made by some of the critics at the time that Mr. Johnson had made very disparaging remarks about the competence of the OAS to deal with situations such as this.

R: No, he didn't do that. I don't recall anything of that sort at all. I don't recall any contempt shown for the OAS or anything of that sort. Quite the contrary, he wanted us to take this matter before the OAS and get OAS action on it at the very time that he made the decision to put the first Marines ashore.

M: Mr. [W. Tapley] Bennett had been there only two or three days previously. At the time he was here for those instructions, was the situation still thought to be in hand? What kind of instructions did he take back to the Dominican Republic prior to the outbreak of the serious violence?

R: I think what we were trying to do was to negotiate, if possible, a political regime in the Dominican Republic which would avoid the two extremes of Trujilloism and Castroism. Now it was a very difficult thing to find people who were prepared to take responsibility in such negotiations, partly because it was a very dangerous thing for them. They could lose their lives by sticking their necks out in a situation of that sort, particularly with these irresponsible armed bands prowling around Santo Domingo.

I might say that throughout this period the countryside on the whole was quiet. There was no major problem. One of the reasons we built up our forces rather fast was that we thought we might have to send American forces out into the countryside to rescue Americans who were isolated in the countryside, but that proved not to be necessary, fortunately.

But what we were looking for was some influence in the center. My own impression is that if Juan Bosch had had more physical courage, had been willing to come back to the Dominican Republic and take his chances, that he might well have turned out to be President again. But he was afraid to go back and stayed over in Puerto Rico and didn't take an active part except by long distance.

M: Bennett's instructions would have allowed him to encourage Juan Bosch if he had returned and tried to take over?

R: I think so. We were not all that confident that Juan Bosch would be able to maintain an effective administration. We

gave him full support earlier when he had been elected as President of the Dominican Republic. We had him up to Washington on a visit before he took office, actually, while he was still President-elect, but we were impressed with the fact that some of his closest friends in the hemisphere were [Romulo] Betancourt of Venezuela, [José] Figueres [Ferrer] of Costa Rica, [Luis] Munoz Marin of Puerto Rico--

M: All of the ones that we respect.

R: All men that we respect and who were very intimate friends of Juan Bosch. All felt that Juan Bosch would not be able to organize and administer a government. Betancourt told me that Juan Bosch wouldn't last a year.

M: This was when he originally became--

R: When he originally became President--that Juan Bosch wouldn't last a year--that he was a writer and a dreamer and a poet, and that he was not an administrator. We tried to get Betancourt and Figueres and Munoz Marin in to give Juan Bosch some good advice about how to run a government, but Juan Bosch wasn't taking much advice in those days. So he proved not to be up to the job.

Again when we had the election under the OAS commission, Juan Bosch would not campaign. He remained isolated--holed up, wouldn't get out in the countryside like others--like [Jonquín] Balaguer did--and go to meetings and speak to the people and get on radio and television. Bosch was on radio once or twice, I believe, but he did not actively campaign. So it's not surprising that Balaguer was elected.

M: You mentioned one reason for the rapid buildup of troops as far as number of troops, it appeared that we might have to act in the countryside. Was there a major disagreement here over putting in such a large number of troops? I think that's one of the points that the critics frequently made, that our force was so great that we finally put in.

R: Well, one of the purposes of the expansion of our troops was to maintain a security zone around the city of Santo Domingo so that there would not be a major civil war in the country with large loss of life. If you're going to take on a job of that sort, it is important to have such overwhelming force that no one is going to challenge it; and we were faced with the possibility of being challenged not only by the armed bands in Santo Domingo, but by some elements of

the Dominican armed forces who were outside the city. So we had to have enough force there to make it clear that a challenge to it was not a very productive operation. Then, too, when you're trying to maintain a corridor around a city many miles long and a position on the air field and evacuation centers on the other side of town at the hotel, and you have to think about relieving your men--you can't just have a man on duty twenty-four hours a day every day, you have to have shifts--I'm not prepared to say that we had more force there than in fact was necessary to accomplish the mission that the forces were there to accomplish.

M: When did convincing evidence become available, or did it ever become available, that Communists either from outside or inside had seized substantial control of the dissident elements?

R: We began to get evidence of that almost immediately after we landed because different elements of the leading citizens of the Dominican Republic would come out of Santo Domingo and tell us what was happening inside the city. The Secretary General of Juan Bosch's own party came out and gave us such an account, and it was clear from what some of these groups were saying downtown that Communist elements were very much involved and that the Communist elements were heavily armed. So I think there's no question that one of the possibilities we had to think about was that there would be a Communist seizure of the instruments of power--the Radio Stations, the police stations, the communications, the arms depots, and things of that sort. And that with an effort of that sort, it might well be that a Communist dictatorship would result. That was one thing that we were determined to prevent.

M: Did Mr. Johnson--when he made his statement the second week regarding the activity of Communist trained on the outside--did he make that statement on the advice of the State Department, for example?

R: That came out of discussions that we had in the Cabinet Room and a review of the material that had been made available to us by the CIA and by the FBI and other sources of information.

M: That was not extemporaneous on his part?

R: It was not extemporaneous on his part. Some of us thought that he ought to delay another two or three days before making such a statement, but he made the decision to make it, I think, on the third day we were there, if I'm not

mistaken.

M: Yes, I believe that's correct.

R: On about the third day we were there.

M: Who initiated the idea for the Mann-Bundy-Vance mission?

R: That came out of our discussion around the Cabinet table. I don't think that you could identify a single individual who might have initiated the idea. It just evolves out of discussion. The effort there was, if possible, to negotiate a broadly based interim government of the center which could govern until there were elections. This would mean getting a government that would have--if not the support--at least the acquiescence of the armed forces, that would be acceptable to people like Caamano down in Santo Domingo so that you could get a peaceful solution to the problem and avoid the blood bath which might otherwise take place. That was the main effort of the Bundy-Vance mission.

M: Was there agreement among those three, or was there some division of purpose between Mann and Bundy, for example, as to what kind of solution you might achieve?

R: I think there were some shades of difference between Mann and Bundy. I think that Bundy was prepared to negotiate with a group which would not make categorical assurances about what they would do as far as the Communists were concerned. Mann wanted pretty categorical assurances that you would not get a Communist participation in the government in a new Dominican situation. The Bundy-Vance mission was rapidly superseded by the commission established by the OAS under the leadership of Ellsworth Bunker, and that soon took over the full responsibility for negotiating an interim government and making arrangements for elections.

M: Was there a point at which the State Department and/or the President--particularly the President--was forced to not give support to a potential arrangement worked out by Bundy and Vance with [Antonio] Guzman or other elements in the Dominican Republic?

R: As I recall, and the historian will have to check me on this, the Guzman effort broke down because it was not possible to put together a complete government, with all the portfolios filled--particularly with the armed services portfolios filled with people that would have the support of the military forces. It was a very complex negotiation. I

don't remember the details of it at the present time, but I never had the impression that there was a completed government negotiated by Bundy ready to step in and do the job because the various portfolios were not filled out, and it was that problem which caused that particular mission to be withdrawn and the matter turned over to the OAS commission.

M: What was Assistant Secretary [Anthony] Solomon's role?

R: His role, as I recall, was to look into the economic situation and to recommend the measures that were necessary to keep the economy afloat during all this political controversy.

M: So he wasn't involved in the political negotiations?

R: No, not very much. He was involved in what materials were required to keep the economy afloat, what kind of aid was required, what kind of subsidy, how to keep the countryside moving despite the fact that Santa Domingo was pretty well cut off from the countryside, had some problems about banking services and communications and things of that sort. He worked on those problems.

M: Are there any other instances in the Dominican imbroglio generally that President Johnson had to intervene personally in order to push through the ultimate settlement?

R: President Johnson followed the Dominican affair in great detail. One could almost say that he was the desk officer for the Dominican Republic for a period of some weeks there. And this would likely be true in any situation where American troops are involved. The President necessarily is going to be engaged in every aspect of a problem where American troops are involved. So we met frequently with the President during that period. He followed it in great detail, and I think took some satisfaction from the fact that we had gotten an elected government installed in the Dominican Republic. We were able to bring our troops out fairly promptly. We were able to do so under the general auspices of the OAS, and we had a result there which was compatible with the general political commitments of the hemisphere. That was an expensive effort, and we lost what--thirty-five or forty men killed. It cost us large sums of money to keep the place afloat during this period, and the post-election aid to the Dominican Republic was out of proportion to the aid that we were giving to other countries of comparable size in the hemisphere. But,

nevertheless, it avoided the tyranny of a Trujillo or the tyranny of a Castro and made it possible for the Dominicans to embark upon a constitutional path.

M: Are there any other areas of the Latin American problem that we haven't touched on that would need comment here?

R: I think it's worth making a side comment that President Johnson gave very special attention to our relations with Mexico. He said, "Mexico is our closest neighbor." Again, "If we can't get along with whom can we get along?" So he tried to do everything that he could personally in his relations with the President of Mexico and in dealing with problems affecting Mexico to work out solutions that were compatible with good relations between the two countries. This was true whether it was on trade matters or whether it was on water in the Colorado River and the salinity problem, or whether it was on going ahead with the Chamizal, or whether it was on Amistad Dam and things of that sort. I would say that during President Johnson's Presidency our relations with Mexico became as good as they've been in my lifetime; and this is because of the personal involvement that President Johnson felt toward our relations with Mexico.

M: He, also, I think in this case again had a very close and good relationship with the President of Mexico.

R: That's correct. That's correct.

M: What is your pleasure, sir? Would you like to go on with another geographical topic? You've been going for nearly three hours now.

R: I think we might let it go at this point and try it again.