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THOMAS H. KUCHEL

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ACCESSION NUMBER 01-13

INTERVIEW I

DATE: May 15, 1980

INTERVIEWEE: THOMAS H. KUCHEL

INTERVIEWER: MICHAEL L. GILLETTE

PLACE: Senator Kuchel's office, Los Angeles, California

Tape 1 of 1

G: You came to the Senate in 1953, I suppose. You were appointed to replace Vice President Nixon, as I understand it.

K: Yes. I guess my tenure began [at] the tail end of 1952. Nixon resigned a day or so early and that had something to do with my seniority. I was made senior to some of those who came in on the same date. Jack Kennedy and I were elected the same day but because of what Nixon did I think I was a little ahead of him in seniority. I'd forgotten that.

G: Do you recall your first impressions of Lyndon Johnson?

K: That was his first time as majority leader and I have some recollection of Senator Johnson spending a lot of time with Dick Russell, who was really a very classy fellow, and Clinton Anderson and Walter George. I remember him on the floor moving about as he was kind of wont to do, moving up and down the aisles and talking. He used his time effectively to communicate with the brothers. Yes, I recall him. Kind of a man of action in the Senate chamber.

G: He was the minority leader during this two-year period, 1953 to 1955, by a very slim margin, one or two votes.

K: Yes, you're right. I remember that.

G: This was a time when Senator [Robert] Taft was quite ill and [William] Knowland was beginning to take over. Could you compare his relationship with Taft on the one hand versus his relationship with Knowland on the other?

K: I had not known Senator Taft before I was appointed to the Senate. I had, however, a rather long relationship and friendship with Billy Knowland. I think that Lyndon Johnson and Bob Taft, having served together, had a mutual respect. I don't think Bob Taft was ever a hale-fellow-well-met, and he represented Eisenhower in the Eisenhower Administration although he fought General Eisenhower on some of the basic positions which Eisenhower had taken. He and Lyndon Johnson had a perfectly correct relationship. I was not at all intimate and I don't know how personal it was. Bill Knowland was rather strict with himself and I think it was rather difficult for anyone to become close to Bill Knowland. I rather think I was probably one of the few that ever was. So Lyndon Johnson and Bill Knowland never had a warm personal relationship of any kind that I remember.

G: Do you recall occasions of Johnson outmaneuvering Knowland?

K: Yes, I do. You'll have to nudge my memory, but yes, that did happen.

G: I think there was one on a Small Business Administration bill where the question of temporary controls was at issue, and I think that Knowland had unilaterally decided, "Well, I'm in the majority, we can go ahead and remove these controls," and Johnson managed to muster enough votes to beat him on that. It may have been a parliamentary issue. How would he do this?

K: I have occasionally referred to Lyndon Johnson in his role as a party leader in the Senate as a genius, and I didn't use that term lightly. He really took to that kind of government service better than many people. He knew who he was dealing with. He could be a tough guy.

G: How so?

K: Oh, I think that if he relied on a fellow Democrat for a vote on a particular issue and the Democrat for some reason failed him and either wouldn't show up, run away from the responsibility or vote the other way, Lyndon would remember it. And to the extent that the leader of a party can bestow favors or withhold them, Lyndon applied his powers fully. But he was skillful in the ways of the Senate. I think probably Dick Russell provided much of the backup in recommendations for the use of the rules of the Senate, which are not obtuse but they are a little difficult I guess to get on to. You have to be experienced, you have to live with them for a while to know what they are. So Lyndon had that kind of support in debates and in moving things through the calendar.

I know I've skipped over the Bob Taft period of majority leader and I really don't remember too much about that. I was brand new; I was really overwhelmed with the place and it took me a little while to get my feet on the ground.

But Lyndon would keep the Senate in session, too, if that seemed to be appropriate to attain his ends. I remember many times during that time that he was majority leader that he'd keep us in session all night long, and we'd, oh, three or four in the morning gather downstairs and have breakfast. The dining room was open, you know, all night long. He would use what he had to great advantage. He knew the arts of

persuasion very well. So he just applied them and was successful.

G: Was his persuasion limited to the Democratic side of the aisle or was he able to work it the same way with Republicans?

K: Lyndon maintained a very good rapport with President Eisenhower, and he developed friendships with people on the Republican side. But I think he respected the fact that it would be difficult sometimes for a Republican to vote for a Democratic issue. On the other hand, you had this strange situation. Many of the Eisenhower recommendations were controversial and the controversy was supplied by Republican senators. Not exclusively, but to that extent, when Lyndon Johnson would vote in favor of an Eisenhower bill or issue he actually was supplying part of the leadership that Ike needed. There were incidents, of course, where Bill Knowland, the Republican leader, would oppose his president. The impetus that Johnson gave to carrying the day for Eisenhower sometimes was maybe the difference between winning and losing it. My support of Eisenhower was almost total. There were a couple of times maybe when I didn't support him, but I was way up in front in that. I remember you had Republicans opposing him and you had Lyndon Johnson and some of the Democrats supplying the leadership.

G: I guess on foreign affairs this would be particularly the case.

K: I think that's right.

G: Johnson seems to have been able to skim off some Republican votes on key votes where it was very close, and some of the ones that he would usually go after would be people like Bill Langer and Molly Malone.

K: Wild Bill Langer.

G: What arguments would he use in appealing to these senators?

K: Well, he may have had different approaches to different members of the Senate, but any time that I ever discussed issues with him, Lyndon--if I can call him by his first name with due respect to him--talked issues and principles. I always heard that a Democratic leader would be rewarded if he stayed with Lyndon. Well, there was no reward that a Democratic leader could give to a Republican, or at least not of the same magnitude. Lyndon Johnson knew his subject matter and he could argue and present his point of view effectively. Now I think²and bill probably Bill Langer was always regarded more or less as one of the so-called moderate or progressive Republican senators, of which I was one, who presumably were able to make up their minds on some issues and reach a different result than some of their more conservative colleagues. I would suppose that on some issues that Lyndon would have won on the basis of the votes he picked up from those progressives.

G: Let me ask you about the tidelands bill. This was something he was very interested in, and you were on the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee. Do you recall his interest in tidelands and any contact you had with him on that bill?

K: Well, first of all of course, his colleague from Texas, Price Daniel, who had lived with that issue, was attorney general from his state, I think was given, perhaps by Lyndon, an encouragement to take the lead in the debate in the Senate, and he was aided and abetted by Spessard Holland of Florida particularly. So that I think Lyndon Johnson's skills in the tideland issue probably came from the manner in which he scheduled debates on amendments and that kind of thing, and his pushing some of his Democratic colleagues

into the responsibility of leading the debate. I do not recall anything specific that he did.

G: Okay. How about the New Mexico controversy over the [Patrick J.] Hurley/[Dennis] Chavez election? Remember that?

K: Well, I do indeed. I think I was one of two Republicans who voted against the attempt by my party to throw little Dennis Chavez out, I remember when I made up my mind--you might be interested in this, this one sentence--the late Charles Potter of Michigan had been designated as the Republican spokesman in this attempt to oust Chavez. I asked one question; I said, "Was any complaint ever lodged against Senator Chavez of New Mexico by any state or federal prosecution office?" The answer was no and I made up my mind. And Lyndon Johnson obviously labored as majority leader. I think Margaret Chase Smith and Bill Langer and I were the three no votes. Now, no credit can be given to Lyndon for the vote that any of us cast. You know what I mean. It was kind of a case where politics was going to be used to simply destroy a member of the Senate and to kick him out.

G: Let me just ask you about several bills here, and if you remember anything about the legislative issues involved or the votes: the continental shelf bill in 1953 and the oil for education amendment?

K: No, I don't remember. It was part of the overall tideland fight, but I have no recollection of that. I'd have to refresh my memory first.

G: Anything on flood prevention or drought aid? These were some measures that Johnson was interested in.

K: Well, I'll give you one little personal recollection. I was on the Appropriations

Committee, and we had a public works amendment that was of enormous importance to California. And dear old Willis Robertson of Virginia--he's a sweet, fine, wonderful southern gentleman--was fighting my amendment. Lyndon was on the committee, and I was sitting next to him that day. He said, "Now I'm for you on this. Why don't you make your motion when Willis is through talking?" I did and the roll was called and we won. So that there was a good example of Johnson leaving his fellow Democrats to vote in favor of an amendment that had to do with building up the West.

G: How about the Bricker Amendment?

K: The Bricker Amendment was highly controversial, but again, I do not recall Lyndon Johnson's part in that debate. You had Democrats on the Foreign Relations Committee leading the debate from this opposition point of view. I don't recall.

G: Reportedly he was responsible for the George substitute.

K: If he was, I would not have been privy to any of that discussion.

G: In 1954 there were some Taft-Hartley amendments offered by Senator [Barry] Goldwater, and those were defeated narrowly. All the Democrats voted unanimously against them, which was--considering the philosophical range in the party--amazing. Do you recall how Johnson was able to hold the party together on that one?

K: No, I do not.

G: How about **the** Omnibus Housing Act of that year? I believe that was when they had the defeat of the Capehart amendment.

K: You know, to be helpful to you I should read a little or in some way prompt my memory. I do not recall. All I can tell you is--you mentioned Homer Capehart. Lyndon Johnson

was on the floor during any heated debate on matters that he deemed important. If he was not on the floor he was in his office. He was phoning, he was discharging his leadership responsibilities. He knew what the issues were; he had able staff assistance, little Bobby Baker was a very able assistant to the Democratic Senate. I remember sometimes when I was whip I would go over and ask him what his roll call would show on something coming up, simply because he and the people under him knew what was going on. And Lyndon Johnson had all the techniques there and just called the signals. But I can't help you; I just don't recall the specifics.

G: Was part of it maneuvering, being able to bring something to a vote at the right time when his people were in the chambers and the Republicans were not?

K: No question about that.

G: Can you recall any specific occasion where he rushed something to a vote and it passed primarily because of the timing?

K: Not without having my memory prompted.

G: How about the minimum wage when they raised it to a dollar?

K: I have no recollection.

G: Anything on the Hells Canyon legislation?

K: Only that Wayne Morse, who was a brilliant person, highly volatile and a real loner, took over the opposition to the construction of the dam on Hells Canyon. Lyndon treated him with kid gloves, almost everybody did. I got along with Wayne Morse pretty well as years went by, but he was a difficult character, and Lyndon held him in minimum high regard, to use the legislative phrase. Some of the Democrats who were very able and

who were very close to the Majority Leader--I think Clint Anderson comes to mind--may very well have been ideologically in favor of the position that Morse was taking in that kind of debate. But I have no recollection of any floor strategies that Johnson used.

G: Let me ask you about the Lewis Strauss nomination. By this time you were whip. That confirmation was expected to carry, and it didn't happen. Do you recall?

K: Yes. Yes, I do. It was something of a surprise, if not an actual shock, to find on the roll call that Margaret Chase Smith cast her vote against confirmation, if I recall correctly. I think I do. I have no doubt that there was a good deal of merit in some of the rumors which floated around at that time that Lyndon and Clint Anderson had been responsible for persuading Margaret Chase Smith to cast that vote. There was a good deal of bitterness between Clint and Strauss. I think that it was a very skillful parliamentary victory for the Democrats.

G: The rumors, as I recall, had to do with the Portsmouth Navy Yard or something, keeping open one of the navy yards.

K: I would imagine that that had something to do with it. Now that you mention it, I have a recollection of that.

G: Let me ask you about the McCarthy censure. You voted against censure. Of course, it was a close, controversial issue. Do you have any insights on the selection of the Watkins committee?

K: No. I recall the Watkins committee and its membership. I think the people who served on that committee were very able. I think Arthur Watkins was an excellent man. And Joe McCarthy, in my opinion, was not an excellent man. You might say, "Well, why did

you vote the way you did for him?" We talked a minute ago about the attempt to oust Dennis Chavez from the Senate. I have a recollection that I put the Dennis Chavez issue alongside of the--

G: On the Senate floor in your speech.

K: --McCarthy issue. I don't remember that I made a speech on that subject, but I tell you, I hated that whole debate. McCarthy was not a nice man. He had almost insulting qualities about him, and I think he got to Lyndon a little bit. I think probably Lyndon took an extra effort in seeing that the Watkins committee, and also the old man from New Hampshire or Vermont who first brought this issue to the floor--Ralph Flanders! I think Lyndon was of a mind to be helpful to them. This fellow was not doing the Senate any good.

G: Did Johnson ever talk about McCarthy to you?

K: I am inclined to say no.

G: Let me ask you about Johnson's relationship with Vice President Nixon. Do you think he trusted Nixon?

K: I don't think so. I think that his relationship with the Vice President was superficially correct, but I don't think that he wanted to spend any time with the Vice President. I don't think he liked him; I don't think he liked the way he did business.

G: Did he ever express these sentiments to you?

K: Well, I am inclined to think he did, but I can't tell you. I'm inclined to think he did on a thing like that.

G: I suppose one of the reasons that he never wanted a tie vote was because he couldn't be

sure of how Nixon would vote in breaking a tie.

K: I don't know that you can say that. I think on many issues [where] it would have an administration overtone to them of any kind, you could predict that Nixon would support the administration. So I don't know that you could quite say that.

G: Johnson seems to have had a lot of influence within the administration, people like Robert Anderson, an old friend from Texas.

K: Is he still alive?

G: Yes.

K: Lives in New York City?

G: I'm not sure. I think he's still with--what? Atlantic Richfield. He's either in New York or suburban Washington. But Anderson and Jerry Persons and Bryce Harlow and Bill Macomber, people like that. Did the Republicans in the Senate feel that Johnson was too cozy with the administration in this respect?

K: If they did, it never filtered through to me. I think that General Eisenhower really was most grateful to the support that he was given by Lyndon Johnson. You had then, and I suppose you still have, a segment of the Republican Party which then was isolationist and which today is maybe a modern development of that, and they didn't want the Eisenhower program. Some of the Republican senators were pretty crude and rude in their comments about Eisenhower. Well, my God! The Republicans that I ran around with, including Everett Dirksen, held General Eisenhower in the highest respect. So it was a great thing that Johnson came along and helped them. No, I think probably without any question some of the archconservative Republican senators, looking on General

Eisenhower with some suspicion, didn't like anybody, Lyndon Johnson or anyone else, helping Eisenhower.

G: Johnson has said on one or more occasions that his job as majority leader was to keep Everett Dirksen from going across the aisle and embracing Dick Russell, or to keep the southern Democrats and the Republicans away from each other. Was this his strategy, and if so, how did he pull it off?

K: Oh, sure, that would have been part of his overall strategy, because as you know, there had been, in days gone by, a camaraderie in many areas between southern Democrats who were able and in many respects some of the best in the Senate--they had their relationship with the conservatives in the Republican Party to exert their influence on those issues, particularly in the field of civil rights, where they agreed. Johnson, of course, deserves a lot of credit because he took a leading role as time went by that was at complete variance with what his southern brothers had traditionally favored. Dirksen, who I was very fond of and respected, also ended up with an excellent record on civil rights, where some of the people in the Republican Party would throw stones at him as being too liberal. So to that extent Dirksen severed many of the connections that he had with those great southern senators.

G: Did you ever have the impression that Lyndon Johnson wanted to keep Dirksen in the Senate and that he wanted to keep you in the Senate as well?

K: Yes, I'm inclined to think that he looked with great favor on Dirksen as his opposite number, and to a bit lesser extent on me as the Republican whip. That carried through his days in the White House. It just comes to mind very quickly, one time when he was

president he convened the leadership of the Congress in connection with a threatened railroad strike. After he got Arthur Goldberg down from the UN to talk in favor of the bill that he was going to sponsor, he went around the table and most of the Democrats said that they couldn't support it. He came to me; I said, "I'll support it." Dirksen was in the hospital so I was acting Republican leader at that meeting. Well, he couldn't show his glee or his appreciation any more than then and in subsequent moments. Because here I am a Republican and I thought it would be good for the country not to have a railroad strike, and I would vote for his legislation. My God, he thought that was the greatest.

G: Let me ask you about the 1957 Civil Rights Bill. Do you recall his work there?

K: No, tell me about it a little bit.

G: Well, that was the compromise where Title III was removed.

K: What was Title III?

G: It is my understanding that it empowered the attorney general's office to have some enforcement powers in the act, and the Democrats, southerners, felt that it was too vague and I think was codified to some of the Reconstruction acts.

K: I have no particular recollection of what you ask. But generally speaking, he was an active leader in the whole gambit of so-called civil rights legislation, which commenced with General Eisenhower's request for money to be used by a civil rights commission, which the southerners just frothed at the mouth on at that time in opposing. No, Lyndon Johnson was an activist in the parliamentary maneuvers and parliamentary debate in the Senate and also outside in rallying support. He performed a great service.

G: I gather he and Dirksen worked especially close on some of the civil rights legislation.

K: That's true, and Hubert Humphrey, who was my opposite number. Hubert and I were working together in floor strategy, all subject to our leaders.

G: I notice that you were paired for extending the OASI benefits in the Social Security amendment, and again, voting against the majority of the Republicans. Do you recall anything about that vote?

K: No, what was it? Do you have anything more?

G: Well, this was in 1956. It extended the Old-Age and Survivor Insurance and made disability payments eligible at age fifty and things of this nature.

K: Did the Eisenhower Administration have a position on it?

G: I believe they were opposed to it.

K: They were?

G: I believe so.

K: Jim Mitchell was Labor secretary. I usually stayed pretty close to him. But no, I don't remember anything else.

G: How about Alaska-Hawaii statehood, that whole question?

K: Yes. You had there a theory by some people in both the Democratic and Republican Parties to postpone what perhaps was the inevitable by cutting the issue in two and dealing with Alaska first and Hawaii second. I think there were some overtones of racism in that issue. Again, I don't recall any particular thing that Lyndon Johnson did. I think the Democratic and Republican leadership were pretty much together in that fight, and General Eisenhower was in favor of the twin statehood legislation.

G: I believe it was also in 1958 or 1959 that the big public works bill came up and you voted

to override the President's veto. Do you remember that?

K: Oh, I do indeed. I was quite distressed to be placed in that position, and I suppose that was the only time it ever happened. Oh, my Lord, I should say I do remember! I was invited down to the White House for a little arm-twisting. I thought it was a mistake and from a standpoint of California there could have been no question it was a mistake, because our people here in this state had an enormous stake in much of the legislation involved in that bill. I finally just concluded that as far as I was concerned it was my duty to vote to override. But I suffered lots of pains and penalties for doing it.

G: Any particular penalties that you recall?

K: No, not from General Eisenhower. I think maybe from some of my more conservative colleagues. They didn't like it. But I recall General Eisenhower with great affection and respect, and I think that I may say that he was fond of me.

G: Do you think that heart attack that Lyndon Johnson suffered in 1955 changed him any with regard to how he ran the Senate?

K: Well, he stopped smoking. He smoked too much before that. It was a nervous habit. He perhaps slowed down but imperceptibly.

G: Did he ever persuade you to vote for something that you were in doubt about or that you were reluctant to vote on?

K: I don't think so. You could refresh my memory. There would be some places where his ideology and mine would coincide. I came from the Earl Warren side of the street and that side was interested in many social problems. Lyndon was inclined that way, too.

G: What about bills that you were interested in for your state? Would he bring these along

to passage and then hold them up until he got your vote on something that he was [working on]?

K: No, never. As a matter of fact, the only fellow who held a bill of mine up was Ed Muskie, our new secretary of state. He held it up to see if he could use it as a hostage, and I went over screaming and he withdrew his objection. No. Lyndon Johnson actually had Hubert act for him much of the day-in and day-out Senate sessions when there wasn't a top important issue being debated. I had a long string of legislation for my state, and there was never a problem. I would go to Hubert and just say, "I've got a bill on the calendar. It's passed out of committee. There is no opposition to it." Or as sometimes was the case, Wayne Morse would put a hold on it, and I'd say, "Let's schedule it for debate and debate it." I never had a nickel's worth of trouble. No. If Lyndon Johnson ever did that with anybody he surely never did it with me.

G: Do you think he ever did it with other people?

K: Oh, I'm not so sure. I'll tell you, some people used to refer to Lyndon as a wheeler and a dealer, and Lyndon was pretty sharp. But I'm not so sure that he would have ever set himself up cold turkey to tell a fellow member of the Senate, "You can't have this bill unless you vote for this." I would hesitate to make that charge.

G: Well, for example, there's some indication that Hells Canyon was tied to the Civil Rights Bill in 1957, and that he was able to obtain some votes for Hells Canyon by promising--

K: By postponing that issue until the Civil Rights was out of the way?

G: I think it was a trade-off sort of thing where he said so-and-so will vote for Hells Canyon if you will vote for Civil Rights, or something of that nature.

K: I guess that's possible. I don't remember.

G: Let me ask you about his persuasive techniques. What did it consist of? Surely you were victimized once or twice during this period, the Johnson treatment.

K: The first thing I remember about the physical techniques, one day I was talking to Dirksen, and I said, "Dirks, look at Lyndon." This was before the 1960 election. Lyndon had gone to the back of the room where Jack Kennedy was seated, and he bent over Jack's chair and took Jack's lapels, one in each hand, and moved his head over so that their two noses were not more than a few inches apart and was grimacing and talking to him. I said, "Look at that." I do have a vivid recollection of that. And he would do that. You know, sometimes when you see John Connally on the tube these last many months, he picked up some of Lyndon Johnson's ways and that was one. Lyndon Johnson could screw up his face to indicate his extreme pleasure or displeasure about what he was talking [about].

I think once in a while I'd have a highball with him at the end of the day, and he would talk about something that was coming up. He knew in advance about my thinking. That was easy to telegraph. He had adventitious aides to help him. I have no recollection of the subject matter. But he was on the ball all the time. As whip, I would stay in the session and close it up at night. Seven o'clock, everybody else would be gone. Somebody, maybe Wayne Morse, would be filibustering or some work being done. But when the time came to make the motion to adjourn, Lyndon would come into the session from his majority leader's office. So that he stayed there all the time. Now he wasn't on the floor, well, that was my duty to be on the floor. It was the duty of his whip to stay

there, but sometimes the whip with his permission would leave. But he would come in at the tail end.

G: He had a great reputation for appropriating people and getting them to work for him. Did he ever give you the feeling that he had marshalled your support or something, enlisted you in the Democratic Party's cause, or more or less placed you in the position of representing the other side of the aisle in other words?

K: I was fairly close to him, and our relations were good. I think there was only one time that he got infuriated with something I did and I don't recall what it was. But no, I don't recall that, although it could have happened. On a number of occasions in terribly controversial legislation I saw fit to cast my vote the same way he did. Not because he cast it that way but because I agreed with whatever it was. It could have been, but I just . . .

G: He also has a reputation for calling senators late at night and trying to persuade them to vote for something that he was concerned with. Did he ever call you in the middle of the night?

K: No. No, he didn't. But he would call me, I think more when he was in the White House than when he was in the Senate. I'd see him every day. I was easy to get to, and I'd be on the floor. And he used to come over and sit down by me in the late afternoon. Rather than a phone call it would be doing it in person; we would be talking about things. That he did do. After four or five o'clock in the afternoon, particularly when you had a filibuster on any subject, with maybe one or two of the brothers talking, nobody else there, he'd come in and sit down, talk. He loved stories and part of it would be anecdotes

and persiflage. But no, he did business at that time on upcoming Senate bills. He did that with others, too. He was politicking.

You did know that he worked in California for a while, didn't you?

G: Yes. Did he ever talk to you about his experiences as a youth out here?

K: Oh, sure!

G: What did he say about them?

K: He lived over in San Bernardino for a while, ran an elevator in a building over there.

G: The Platt Building, yes.

K: Oh, yes. Good heavens, we talked about all of that. And he wanted to know about my forebears. Yes.

G: That California experience is something we know very little about. He didn't talk about it much to other people.

K: He did to me.

G: What did he say about it? How did he assess his stay out here?

K: He was a youngster.

G: He had run away from home, I think.

K: Well, he was on his own, but I hesitate to tell you that I remember that. But he was on his own; he told me he lived over there for quite a while, a number of months, made his own way.

G: Did he ever allude to this as a turning point in his life?

K: No.

G: Did he feel that it was significant for any reason?

K: If he did I don't remember. But he did on more than one occasion talk about his California experience.

G: I believe he used to tell the story of seeing a vice president while he was out here. Let's see, that would have been--I guess Coolidge was vice president.

K: I don't remember that. I have a dim recollection however of his knowing some people in San Bernardino whose names meant something to me a good long time later on.

G: Anything else on this legislation that we haven't talked about?

K: Well, I'm not really doing justice to him and his memory or to you, because it's been a long time ago and I don't think about it often. I had really an extraordinary experience with him all those years. I liked him and he was funny. He wanted to be a good public servant, and many of the things that represent milestones in our country's history would not have taken place without him. Now sure, there are other things that you could talk about that would be somewhat distressing, that whole Southeast Asia tragedy. But I just don't have them on my fingertips. Except as I told you, I used the word genius, he was that in his leadership capacity in the Senate. I'm going to have to excuse myself.

G: Sure. Well, I certainly do thank you, Senator. Appreciate it.

[End of Tape 1 of I and Interview I]