The LBJ Library Oral History Collection is composed primarily of interviews conducted for the Library by the University of Texas Oral History Project and the LBJ Library Oral History Project. In addition, some interviews were done for the Library under the auspices of the National Archives and the White House during the Johnson administration.

Some of the Library's many oral history transcripts are available on the INTERNET. Individuals whose interviews appear on the INTERNET may have other interviews available on paper at the LBJ Library. Transcripts of oral history interviews may be consulted at the Library or lending copies may be borrowed by writing to the Interlibrary Loan Archivist, LBJ Library, 2313 Red River Street, Austin, Texas, 78705.
In accordance with Sec. 507 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (44 U.S.C. 397) and regulations issued thereunder (41 CFR 101-10), I, James O. Eastland, hereinafter referred to as the donor, hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America for deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, and for administration therein by the authorities thereof, a tape and a transcript of a personal statement approved by me and prepared for the purpose of deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. The gift of this material is made subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. Title to the material transferred hereunder, and all literary property rights, will pass to the United States as of the date of the delivery of this material into the physical custody of the Archivist of the United States.

2. It is the donor's wish to make the material donated to the United States of America by terms of this instrument available for research as soon as it has been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

3. A revision of this stipulation governing access to the material for research may be entered into between the donor and the Archivist of the United States, or his designee, if it appears desirable.

4. The material donated to the United States pursuant to the foregoing shall be kept intact permanently in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

Signed by James O. Eastland on September 10th, 1975

Accepted by Harry J. Middleton, Director, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library for Archivist of the United States on September 19, 1975

Original Deed of Gift on File at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705

ACCESSION NUMBER 76-9
INTERVIEWEE:  SENATOR JAMES O. EASTLAND

INTERVIEWER:  Dr. Joe B. Frantz

DATE:  February 19, 1971

F:  This is an interview with Senator James Eastland in his office in the New Senate Office Building in Washington, D. C. The interviewer is Joe B. Frantz, and the date is February 19, 1971.

Senator, you came to the Senate twice when you were getting started, I believe. You were appointed to fill out a term and then you came back after a brief period and ran again.

E:  That's right. I was appointed for 88 days, didn't run in the special election, but ran fifteen months later for the six-year term and was elected.

F:  You didn't know at that time that you were going to--you're getting close now to thirty years in the Senate.

E:  That's correct.

F:  Who is senior to you around here, not very many?

E:  Allen Ellender on the Democratic side, and George Aiken on the Republican side.

F:  Well, you look as if you're going to out-last them all.

E:  No, hope them all good luck.

F:  When did you first get to know Lyndon Johnson?

E:  Oh, I met Lyndon when he was in the House. I didn't really get to know Lyndon until after he came to the Senate. I think, as I recall, Lyndon was elected in 1948.

F:  That's right. That's in that famous "landslide election."

E:  That's right. Landslide Johnson. I used to call him "Landslide Johnson." Also, Drew Pearson charged he was laying down," and I called him "Laying down Johnson," teasing him.

F:  When he first entered the Senate in '48, was there much indication that he was going to go on to be the Senate leader that he became?
E: Well I think everybody realized that Lyndon had superior intelligence and had tremendous political ability.

F: How did a man that junior get to be first the Senator minority leader and then the majority leader?

E: I think Dick Russell's influence had a lot to do with it.

F: Did Senator Johnson and Senator Russell get pretty close pretty quickly?

E: Yes sir, they were close friends. Got to be close friends very quickly.

F: Did you, in those early days, see much of Senator Johnson, or was he just another junior colleague?

E: Oh, I saw him on the floor, and of course I'd meet him at the few social events where I was and where he was.

F: Was he pretty active in sort of trying to make an impression on his senior colleagues?

E: I didn't notice that, no.

F: Were you surprised when he did emerge as the Minority Leader?

E: No sir, I was not surprised. He had the ability. As a rule back in those days, the Minority Leader or the Majority Leader was always a candidate for defeat. Scott Lucas was defeated when he was Majority Leader, so was Ernest McFarland.

F: It's a good way to go out, wasn't it?

E: That's right.

F: You were on the Committee on Internal Security along about this time.

E: I became a member of the Committee on Internal Security when it was formed. Now I don't believe that Committee was formed until the early 1950's if I recall correctly.

F: Right. Well now of course the big issue in the next half-dozen years was the so-called McCarthy issue. Did Senator Johnson ever show his hand on that?

E: Not that I know of.

F: As far as I can tell, he kept rather quiet throughout.

E: That's the way I recall it, but I don't trust my memory.
F: Did you find this to be a sort of technique of his, that on controversial issues like this he would sort of ride them out rather than line up on one side or the other?

E: I never noticed that, no.

F: One of the big issues which would particularly interest a Texan and to a great extent a Mississippian at this time, was the tidelands issue. That's one reason pure and simple why Governor Price Daniel ran for the Senate because of the extreme interest. Did you work with Senator Johnson on tidelands?

E: Yes sir. If I recall, the bill cleared the Judiciary Committee. That's the way I remember it. I was a member of the Committee at that time.

F: Did the two of you draw fairly close on this, because over the years you did become quite close in the Senate?

E: I didn't understand you.

F: Did the tidelands, is this the issue in which you really became acquainted with Senator Johnson?

E: Oh, I knew him of course, and talked to him. I was not on any committee that he was on.

F: You became, in '56, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee.

E: Yes sir, with his help.

F: That's what I wanted to ask you about.

E: With his help.

F: Because he's Senator Majority Leader and I understand he supported you all the way.

E: He did.

F: Tell me a little bit about this fight, because there was some static as I recall.

E: Yes sir, there was. Wayne Morse and Senator (Herbert) Lehman from New York opposed me, and I had Lyndon's support all the way.

F: Now you had seniority, as far as seniority was concerned you were definitely in line. But you have had a few instances in the past in which seniority has been overridden, not many, but some.

E: Well I don't know of them.
F: Well I understand up until that time there had been three times in the whole history of the Senate in which seniority had been overridden and they were trying to make a case of it in this instance. What did Johnson do to help?

E: Well, he worked it out so that these two fellows would make speeches against me but would not ask for a role call vote.

F: They would, in other words, just have the privilege of saying they had spoken out and they would retire?

E: Yes sir, that was Lyndon's handiwork.

F: And the threatened fight never really developed in a public sense?

E: That's correct.

F: Now then, as chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, of course you had the distinct problem of sitting on the first major civil rights bill since right after the Civil War. And Johnson has gotten both credit and discredit for this through the years, but looking at it historically it is a landmark bill. I mean it turned a lot of things around--as I'm not telling you.

E: It didn't clear the Judiciary Committee.

F: Tell me how that tactic was worked.

E: Well, a committee that has no rules, the Senate rules govern. The Senate rules provide that to file a cloture petition must be signed by 16 Senators. So we had unlimited debate in the Judiciary Committee. We had 15 members so there wasn't any way anyone could file a cloture petition and of course they couldn't have gotten the votes there if they had.

F: What did the Majority Leader do to get the bill on the floor?

E: The first bill was passed during the Eisenhower Administration by the Nixon subterfuge which he held that a bill coming over from the House, didn't have to go to a committee, that it could lie on the table and be motioned up. That was the way the first bill was passed, and as I recall at that time Strom Thurmond spoke two or three days, set the world's filibuster record.

F: Did you see any difference, incidentally, now that you've mentioned Mr. Nixon, between his presiding over the Senate as Vice President and Vice President Johnson's presiding over the Senate?

E: Well no Vice President presides much over the Senate. He's there when there's a close vote or something so he can break the tie, or something that's very important, then he'll be there
when the vote comes. I've never noticed any Vice President that presided much except Henry Wallace, who stayed on the floor--

F: That rather surprises me about Wallace, was he that interested in the work of the Senate?

E: Yes, and he stayed on the floor a good bit.

F: Does the Vice President have much clout with the Senators? In a sense he is their senior officer, but on the other hand he is not a member of the Senate?

E: No sir, I don't think that at all. I don't think any Vice President has much influence with Senators.

F: Did the fact that Lyndon Johnson had been a Senate Majority Leader make him any more effective as a vice president?

E: Of course. I don't think it's because Lyndon had been a member of the Senate. But Lyndon knew how to get things done, and he was very effective as Vice President. He had friends in the Senate, of course, he had many friends, but he knew how to maneuver and he knew how to get things passed and it made him a very, very effective Vice President. I think it was his talent to manipulate that did it.

F: Coming on down to 1960, did you go to the convention in Los Angeles?

E: Yes sir.

F: Were you surprised when Johnson accepted the vice presidency? Did you have any intimations of this?

E: He sent for me and sent for John Stennis and told us that he had not made up his mind, that he'd been offered the vice presidency. Now as I recall, that was the morning after Kennedy was nominated. I noticed Earle Clements and Bobby Baker; they said they didn't know what to do, but they were arguing that Lyndon should take the vice presidential nomination. When we left I made the statement to those who were with us that Lyndon was going to accept it because Earle Clements and Bobby reflected Lyndon's thinking.

F: So that there was no great surprise on your part.

E: No, I expected it.

F: Had you supported him prior to the convention for the presidency?

E: Yes, sir.

F: Did you have any real hope that he might get the nomination?
E: No, I didn't believe he was going to get the nomination, but I supported him, did all I could for him.

F: The Kennedys were too far out in front by convention time.

E: Well that's right.

F: This sort of left you now between a rock and a hard place, because of course a lot of people in your home state aren't very pleased with Kennedy as the presidential nominee, and I remember that you and Governor Ross Barnett sort of got at cross purposes on this. How did you handle this situation?

E: I went on statewide television for the ticket.

F: And you thought that Mississippi's future lay with the party, rather than getting out?

E: I won't say it lay with the party, the choice was between Kennedy and Nixon. I supported the Kennedy-Johnson ticket.

F: Did you get the feeling that Johnson's position on the ticket reassured a good bit of the South in this?

E: I think that's true. I don't think that Kennedy would have carried any Southern state. And I think Kennedy would have been defeated if Johnson had not been on the ticket.

F: Did you ride a part of that whistle-stop campaign--no, this is in '64, I'm getting ahead of the story. What was Governor Barnett's position in this, he didn't want either one of them, did he?

E: He had to depend on electors, and he was a new Governor; of course, he had a lot of influence with the court houses over the state and he called in the county officers and put the heat on them. It was a very close vote as I recall.

F: I don't want to spend too much time on the Kennedy years, but two or three things that happened do lead into the Johnson period, and one was the extension of the Civil Rights Commission which came up in the summer of 1961. And I gather that once again there was a bit of an end sweep on this rather than going straight through your line.

E: To tell you the truth, the Civil Rights Commission has been renewed a number of times, and I do not remember 1961.

F: On this particular occasion it was tacked onto a money bill.

E: Well that could be. I know I opposed it.
F: As far as I could tell, Vice President Johnson did not get involved at all in the events down at Oxford and the Meredith case.

E: I don't think so.

F: Now then, in '63 of course the Republicans start gearing up in Mississippi with the hopes--Kennedy is still President--but with the hope that maybe they can take Mississippi in '64, that there is enough dissatisfaction with the Kennedy Administration there, particularly over the civil rights issue. Have you been under any great pressure to leave the Democratic Party through the years?

E: No sir.

F: People have recognized your position--

E: People ask you not to do that, that is leading people in the State. You have some extremists.

F: Where were you at the time of the assassination?

E: In an automobile going to Mississippi. I heard about it at New Market, Virginia, and we turned around, my wife and me, and came back to Washington.

F: Kind of spoiled a weekend for you among other things. What were things like in the Senate when you got back there?

E: We had a new President--of course everybody was shocked at the assassination. The Southerners were saying that they were glad that a Southerner did not do it.

F: Did 1964 present you with any problems as far as Johnson's candidacy was concerned?

E: Not a bit.

F: What happened as far as the Mississippi delegation was concerned?

E: It was compromised, and the delegation would not accept the compromise and withdrew from the convention. That's the way I recall it. I was not a delegate and did not attend the convention.

F: Now then, did Governor Johnson pretty well go down the line with the Democratic party in '64 as you recall?

E: Governor Johnson, as I recall, announced that he would be for the independent electors, but I noticed that people closest to him supported Lyndon Johnson for President. I'm saying his closest associates and employees in the Governor's office.
F: Governor Johnson was much easier for you to work with than Governor Barnett, was he not?

E: No, I got along all right with both of them. I had supported both of them.

F: Did you ride that Lady Bird Special in the fall of '64?

E: Yes.

F: Tell me what that was like as you went through Mississippi.

E: Well--

F: Where did you get on?

E: Got on at Biloxi, went to--well, I get mixed up. Maybe went into New Orleans.

F: Yes, it wound up there. Were crowds friendly?

E: Yes, sir.

F: Weren't any incidents?

E: No, none at all. Of course there was a lot of hostility.

F: But it didn't give you any problems?

E: None at all.

F: And you did not go to the convention in '64?

E: No, sir.

F: Did you just chose not to?

E: Well, let's put it this way, I was not elected a delegate.

F: Didn't want to be? Did the problem of those three civil rights workers at Philadelphia create any problem between you and the White House?

E: None at all, I had nothing to do with it.

F: What about your relationship with the Warren Commission, as the head of the Senate Judiciary Committee did the Warren Commission have any contact with you or did it work entirely independently? In other words, did it touch base with you?
E: No, I had no contact at all with the Warren Commission. The President called me in advance and told me what he planned to do.

F: Did you think that was a good procedure?

E: Yes, I think it was a good procedure. I think their conclusions were wrong. I think that some foreign country, the ruler of some foreign country, was behind the Kennedy assassination.

F: What makes you think that?

E: Well just let me put it this way, I believe that.

F: Now then, Mr. Johnson comes in, and there are certain reassurances to the South, and then he launches on a very ambitious civil rights and immigration program. Did you get much static from your constituents on the President?

E: Of course I got some static, got considerable static and had a lot of static during the campaign in 1964 when I supported the national ticket.

F: Did the White House ever try to put any pressure on you on some of these bills?

E: None at all. Lyndon Johnson was always very friendly with me and was always very nice to me.

F: The papers are always talking about White House pressure. Is there a lot of White House pressure, or is that just fiction?

E: Well I've never felt any. Not from Roosevelt or Truman or Eisenhower or Kennedy or Johnson either.

F: You've seen quite a raft of them, haven't you?

E: Yes.

F: Did the President ever talk to you about his civil rights stand?

E: No sir.

F: What about immigration?

E: I don't recall whether he did or whether he didn't, I just don't remember. It wouldn't have had any affect on my stand, he knew that.

F: It would just be a talk.
E: Yes.

F: Did you visit much with him during his period of the Presidency? Did you go down to the White House?

E: Frequently.

F: To talk legislation or just to talk?

E: Well, he'd talk legislation, to talk nominations and then just go down there to talk.

F: Well now, nominations had to clear through you--

E: Through the Judiciary Committee.

F: Through the Judiciary Committee of which you are chairman, and you've got a Justice Department that sometimes seems to be going in one direction from the Senate Judiciary Committee. Did you have any problems with the Justice Department?

E: No, sir, I've had no problems with the Justice Department.

F: Was Mr. Johnson's appointment technique any different from his predecessors?

E: No, sir.

F: The line is pretty well spelled out?

E: The judges in the Kennedy-Johnson era were more liberal than those when Eisenhower was President.

F: Did you ever see anything of the supposed conflict between Senator Yarborough and President Johnson.

E: You bet I did.

F: Did Senator Yarborough ever talk to you about it?

E: Yes, sir.

F: You think it was real?

E: I don't think anything about it, I know because I'd get holds on judges. He and the Vice President, when Lyndon was Vice President, the President when he was President, they were fussing all the time about appointments in Texas.
F: What do you do in a case like that where you've got senators from the same party who don't agree, or at least leaders from the same party.

E: Well, they always worked the thing out among themselves.

F: Fought awhile and finally agreed.

E: Yes.

F: What was the general procedure? Kind of a bit of sharing? In other words, if Yarborough will go along with this appointment then the Vice President or whatever his role was will later support a Yarborough man, kind of a trade?

E: That's correct.

F: In a case like that, you just sit and wait until the thing is worked out?

E: Yes, sir. I knew it would be worked out. Now let me say further there that between senators from different states, we have the same problem when they get into a fuss over appointments, and I'd sit and let them work it out.

F: This isn't confined to Texas then.

E: No sir, in fact Texas wasn't any worse than a number of other states that I know about.

F: President Johnson and Senator Russell seemed to have drifted apart in the last few years. Do you have any clues?

E: I didn't know that.

F: Well that's rumored and I wondered whether you thought it was real.

E: Oh, I had heard that, but I never did believe it.

F: Coming down to '68, in the summer of '68, you were passenger on a Delta airlines plane that another passenger tried to highjack.

E: That's correct.

F: Tell me about that.

E: Well, we had had dinner and I went up to the men's room which was right by the door into the engine room.

F: Where were you headed?

E: I was headed for Houston, Texas.
F: From here?

E: That's right.

There was a hostess there and a man standing by her side. I thought they were waiting to get in, they turned in the restroom, and I turned by back and got to the side of the man and turned my back. And in a minute I heard someone say, "Mister, if you don't go back to your seat, I'll kill you in a minute." And I looked around and he had a 38 special, blue steel, with nickel grill work pointed at me, so I went back to my seat. When I got back to my seat he was in the engine room with the crew. The captain announced that we had a very dangerous situation and for people to be calm. I told the people around me to watch for the sun so we could tell where we were going. He turned southeast--the plane turned southeast, and I knew then that he was headed for Havana because as I learned we were just 35 miles south of Nashville, Tennessee when he got the ship.

F: How did they handle him?

E: They talked him out of it over the Gulf of Mexico.

F: You got that far!

E: Yes. Now as I've heard, this is hearsay, this man had cancer, and he imagined that if he got to Cuba he could get away from his cancer.

F: Must have been working on him. Do you have any solutions to highjacking? Because this is a problem.

E: Well of course it's a problem. No, I have no solution to it, except we'd have to induce the Cuban government to return them to this country. Now how that can be done I don't know, and don't think it could be done.

F: In the summer of '68, getting back to politics, President Johnson sent the nomination of Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice, and as you know this become one of his defeats in a sense. Tell me about the role of the Judiciary Committee on this.

E: Well he told me--I visited him in Texas in August of that year during the recess of Congress. Lyndon told me that I was the only man who had kept his word 100 percent. Now I was in Mississippi before that, and my plane was waiting, or the plane we were using. I was going to the marriage of a daughter of a close friend in Hattiesburg. I got a call from the President and told me that he was considering Fortas for Chief Justice, but he didn't know what he was going to do. He talked to me fifty minutes, and I thought it was going to throw me late for the wedding. I could tell because I knew the way Lyndon operated that he was going to appoint Fortas.

F: Was he doing his usual talking on all sides--
Eastland -- I -- 13

E: That's right, that's right. Then in a day or two I came up to Washington, and he sent for me.

F: He hadn't named Fortas yet?

E: No, but he had the nomination papers already fixed out. Got me to come to the White House, and he was going to send it up that afternoon.

I said, "Mr. President, this appointment is going to be terribly unpopular. He's not going to be confirmed by the Senate, and he's going to tear this country up. That is, it will generate a lot of ill feeling in the country." Well, he said, "I don't want to ask you to do but one thing, and that's not to make a statement." Well I said, "I'm not going to make a statement." I'd already learned that to be effective you've got to keep your mouth shut. He said, "Well, I'm going to ask you something else." He said, "Will you let him out of the Judiciary Committee?" And I said, "Yes, at my own time."

So, I did let him out of the Judiciary Committee, but I held him in the committee until after the Republican convention, because I knew then that the Republicans would defeat the nomination after their convention and after they had a ticket.

F: Well, now, Sam Ervin was one of the fighters against the Fortas confirmation because of Fortas' constitutional views. Do you know off-hand--I haven't interviewed him--whether he ever conferred with the President on this?

E: I don't know.

F: Did he talk with you on it?

E: Oh, I guess so; I couldn't recall.

F: Is it your feeling that in a sense time was the factor that defeated Fortas, a matter--of course these revelations of his lectureships and so forth didn't come out until much later, but at this point that the delay is what gave the opposition the time to get its grounds together and go after him?

E: I knew that the Republicans after they got their convention and after they had a presidential candidate and vice presidential candidate they expected to win the election. And they were going to defeat that nomination, I knew that. And name their own Chief Justice. That's just the law of politics.

F: Did the fact that in a sense Chief Justice Warren had not resigned make any real difference in this?

E: No, that was all argument.
I think there is one thing that hurt Fortas, hurt him very badly, and that was the pornography decisions. I know that there is a church organization that brought down some films that the court had legalized and saying, "Here look at it," and they had threatened to buy several thousand--have several thousand copies made and give them to Parent Teachers' Associations. And you'd ask a fellow that was going to run that way if that was shown, how are you going to answer it. There was't any answer to it.

F: Do you think--now the Fortas was reported out of Committee with opposition but not enough to kill it, do you think that if it had gone into a floor vote, it could have carried? We're not arguing about whether it would--but from your counting of heads?

E: Well, certainly he would have been confirmed or there wouldn't have been a filibuster.

F: The question was whether it was worth it.

E: If we could beat him, if we had the votes to beat him, it wouldn't have been a filibuster.

F: Homer Thornberry just gets lost in all of this, doesn't he? I mean, until you do something about Fortas there is nothing you can do for or against Thornberry.

E: That's right.

F: Had you known Homer fairly well?

E: No, sir.

F: On that trip that you made to see the President in August, this is just before the Democratic convention, did you all talk at all about the possibility of his running again? Have you ever talked to him about it?

E: Well, yes, we discussed it. He told me under no conditions would he run.

F: There's a great deal of uncertainty right up until the convention--

E: In fact I was there when--we left the night before President Nixon and Vice President Agnew got to Johnson City to confer with the President.

F: Did you ever hear the President express himself on the Agnew nomination?

E: No, sir. Agnew had been nominated just a day or two before.

F: Did the President indicate whether he had any intention of going to the Democratic Convention?

E: No sir, that wasn't mentioned.
F: Have you seen the President since he went out of office?
E: No, sir.
F: Have you been in touch with him at all?
E: No, sir.
F: Did you ever discuss with the President the extension of the federal government's powers, because I know this has gone counter through the years to a number of the things you stood for.
E: I've talked to him about so much I couldn't tell you.
F: You have watched now presidents since Franklin Roosevelt at a very high level. Do you think that Lyndon Johnson--they have said sometimes he was the last of the New Dealers, do you think that stands up, or do you think he carved his own direction?
E: I think he carved his own record. I think Lyndon was--there are a lot of things that I didn't agree with, of course, but I think Lyndon made a very able President.
F: In what way do you think he was able?
E: Well he'd make decisions, and he had the courage to make unpopular decisions. I'm getting in foreign affairs now.
F: Did you ever discuss the Viet Nam war with him?
E: Oh yes, he would call the committee chairmen at different times about Viet Nam, and then call on each one of us to get up and state our views in the White House.
F: Did you get the feeling he was fairly rigid on this, or do you think he really was trying to find alternatives?
E: I think he was trying to find alternatives, of course.
F: And he always came up with the solution of pressing for victory.
E: That's right. No, not pressing for victory--that's what a number of we Southerners were arguing with him about, because we didn't blow the fire out of North Viet Nam.
F: Did he, when he got contrary advice to his policy, did he listen pretty carefully?
E: Of course he'd listen, and then he'd tell us what his thinking was.
F: Did he stay—I know a President has other concerns—but did he stay on fairly good terms with his old Senate colleagues through the presidency?

E: I think so, I think so. I think Lyndon gets pleasure in doing favors for people, and he'd go out of his way to do you a favor. I remember one time he sent for me to come down to the White House at five o'clock and I did, and we discussed some matters. Then he asked me if I had any problems, and I had two things I wanted done; I've forgotten what it was. He picked up the telephone, called the departments involved and told them to do it.

F: You know there's a move on to take these off-shore islands from Mississippi and turn them into some sort of a national recreation area. Have you been active in that movement?

E: No, sir, I haven't been active in it. Congressman (William M.) Colmer is very much interested in it. I think we've gone along with whatever he wanted provided we retain the mineral rights, not under the islands, but we limited the federal government to a mile from the islands, which was the way it settled.

F: How would you compare President Johnson with President Kennedy as far as technique for getting bills through the Congress is concerned.

E: Well Kennedy didn't know how. We had his whole program bottled up. But when Johnson became President he passed all of it, and I knew he was going to do it, I knew he had the ability to manipulate them through.

F: The fact that you opposed a number of them never impaired your friendship at all?

E: None at all.

F: I mean he understood and you understood the politics of the situation.

E: That's correct.

F: Did you have to listen to much static that he was a traitor to the South?

E: Well you know a lot of people claim that. I think that feeling has died down now, I don't hear it any more.

F: In a political sense, what they are going to do to patch up the relationships between the Democrats and—the national Democrats and Mississippi?

E: I can't tell you that, I don't know.

F: Humphrey obviously wasn't the one to do it.

E: That's true.
F: I don't recall, do you remember whether Humphrey campaigned at all in Mississippi? I know he made a visit there before he was ever nominated in April of '68.

E: Frankly I don't know, I don't think so, no, he didn't come into the state.

F: Did you have any opportunity to observe the relationship between the Vice President Humphrey and President Johnson?

E: Yes, sir.

F: Do you think that it was a satisfactory relationship, that it didn't deteriorate over the years that they were together?

E: I don't think it deteriorated, no. I think Humphrey was loyal to him.

F: And you think if Johnson had run in '68 he would have kept Humphrey? You didn't get any feeling of a dump Humphrey movement?

E: No, sir.

F: Were you surprised when President Johnson announced that he was taking himself out of the race in '68?

E: Yes, I was surprised. I was in Houston, Texas that night, and I'd been invited to the Petroleum Club; there were several of us, by a very prominent man in Houston who was very close to the President. He took us to the Petroleum Club and after we were seated, he told us what was going to happen.

F: Oh, he knew already.

E: He was telephoned the afternoon before he claimed.

F: May I ask who it was?

E: I wouldn't tell you if you did.

F: All right.

E: We got back to the hotel and Lyndon was either speaking then or it was a rerun. I saw it on television, in the suite of rooms we had there.

F: Did you ever talk to him about the decision?

E: No, sir.

F: Do you think he did it strictly to take Viet Nam out of politics or--
E: No, I don't. I think that he thought that he couldn't be re-elected. Now I think he would have been re-elected had he run. Now I say that with one thing in mind. He would have probably lost the primaries; he would have been nominated, and I can see where he'd think that would hurt him and it probably would have.

F: Primaries are just held in the wrong states.

E: Yes, but in the showdown I think he would have been re-elected President. Now he told me in August who he thought was going to be elected President.

F: Did he think it was going to be Nixon.

E: I'm not going to comment.

F: There wasn't any question by August that it was going to be Nixon that was going to be nominated though was there?

E: Nixon was not already nominated.

F: That's right, you went between the conventions. Okay, well Senator, can you think of anything else you think we ought to talk about?

E: No, sir. I'll answer any question I can.

F: I certainly appreciate this, and I appreciate you taking the time.