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CARTHA D. "DEKE" DELOACH ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW I

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CARTHA D. DELOACH

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Signed by Cartha D. DeLoach on February 18, 1992

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INTERVIEW I

DATE: January 11, 1991

INTERVIEWEE: CARTHA D. DELOACH

INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette

PLACE: Mr. DeLoach's office, Hilton Head, South Carolina

Tape 1 of 2, Side 1

G: Let's start with your initial association with President Johnson. Was that while he was in the Senate?

D: Yes, it was when he was Majority Leader. The first time I met him was when Clyde Tolson, Associate Director of the FBI, and I was an assistant director, called me to his office and indicated that wouldn't it be a good idea if Mr. [J. Edgar] Hoover were to be the recipient of legislation by both the House and the Senate, giving him his salary for life when he retires?

And I said, "Yes, that would be nice." He stated, "The boss"--meaning Mr. Hoover--"wants you to handle it. I suggest that you see somebody like Lyndon Johnson and Styles Bridges." Bridges was, I believe, the Senate Minority Leader at the time--Mr. Johnson was Majority Leader of the Senate--"and see if they can't handle it in the Senate." And he said, "I don't know who you should see in the House. I'll leave it up to you, but see if you can't work it out." That was quite a job.

I called Mr. Johnson and went up to see him. He agreed to handle the leadership of the matter on the Democratic side and suggested that I see Walter Jenkins, his

Administrative Assistant, right away and talk to him. I did see him. Walter and I got along very well, as I did with the Majority Leader, the brief time I saw him for the first time on that particular occasion. I then went to see Styles Bridges. He was very favorable toward the matter. Then I had certain friends over in the House and contacts, so I went to see them.

That was at the close of the session. I was told time after time that while everyone was in favor of the matter, that the Congress would soon adjourn and that it was a likelihood that the legislation would not pass. Walter and I wrote the legislation for the Senate, and Judge--I'm trying to think of his name--he wrote it over on the House side. Styles Bridges and Mr. Johnson jointly introduced it on the floor of the Senate. The Congressman from Georgia introduced it in the House and, of course, I made numerous other contacts up there.

Everything went swimmingly well until it was about two days before the Congress was supposed to adjourn. Walter Jenkins kept indicating that he thought that, while we had a chance, it was a very slim chance. The same fact was true over in the House. I went out to Cincinnati, Ohio, to make a speech, and while there got a call from Styles Bridges' office indicating that he was out of town and he didn't think there was much chance of it passing in the Senate, and we were probably going to have to wait til next year.

I immediately got on the phone with Bridges. He was up in New Hampshire at the time. He indicated that he would come back to Washington. I had an FBI agent meet him at Washington National Airport and drive him to his office in the Senate. Walter

Jenkins again expressed pessimism. I talked to Judge So-and-so in the House and he thought that he could get it passed, and he did. As a matter of fact, he got it passed the following day. I recall I went to my mother-in-law's house in Cincinnati after making the speech and made approximately seventy-two phone calls from Cincinnati to Washington. I went out to dinner that night with the agent in charge, Ed Mason and Boris Letwin, an old friend of the FBI's. During the meal I received a call from Styles Bridges telling me that the legislation had successfully passed in the Senate. It had already been passed in the House and therefore, inasmuch as there were no complications, both the House and the Senate passing for all intents and purposes the same bill, it would become law and the President had only to sign it, as we knew that he would at the time.

But then twenty minutes later, I was also called from my table in the restaurant and it was Walter Jenkins on the phone. Walter stated he was sorry, but he just wanted to let me know that the Congress would adjourn the next day and they had not been able to get the legislation through. I said, "Walter, I just got a call a few minutes ago from Senator Bridges and it passed late this afternoon." He said, "Well, I'll be damned. I don't even know what's going on up here." (Laughter)

Well, that was my first contact with Mr. Johnson. Later on there was an allegation that an individual in Texas, who was later convicted for--I don't know the exact term, so I better not try to use it--but it was a federal violation and he went to the federal penitentiary. I can't think of his name.

G: Billie Sol Estes.

D: Billie Sol Estes. There was an allegation that Billie Sol Estes bought, paid for and gave

Mr. Johnson the family plane. At that time, Mr. Johnson was seriously considering running for the presidency, and he didn't want a stigma on his name, particularly one which he knew was altogether false. He had Walter call me and ask me to personally interview the individual who had made the allegation, and Walter asked if he could sit in on the interview.

I saw nothing wrong with that because if the allegation had been correct it would have been a violation of federal law. It was against the Majority Leader of the Senate and if he wanted to sit in on it, I saw no harm in that either, because if an attorney had requested to sit in with his client, I would have had to allow it anyhow. So, I told Walter there were no objections. The meeting occurred in my office at FBI Headquarters. I asked a lot of specific questions of this individual and, again to be brief, he backed down. He admitted that the allegation was false.

G: This wasn't Estes, though?

D: No, it was not Estes. It was somebody who had made the allegation concerning Estes buying the plane for Mr. Johnson.

I took a signed statement from this individual. That concluded the matter, and apparently Mr. Johnson thought that it had been handled in a very satisfactory manner. He started calling occasionally from the Majority Leader's office to my office.

On one occasion, he called me and indicated that he was backing someone to get a job in the Kennedy Administration. The Kennedy people were against it. He thought this was a very good man and he didn't know what to do, which was a rarity for him to admit something like that. I said, "Well, keep in mind that if the man does get the

appointment, prior to him coming on duty, there would be a request for an FBI investigation, and if the investigation proves satisfactory, or the Kennedys make a request for an investigation, we'll have to do it."

He got the pitch. He made a request for an investigation from the White House at the time, and the investigation turned out very satisfactorily. It was a very intense investigation. But none of the reservations that the Kennedys had--which according to the Vice President at the time, Mr. Johnson--were true and the investigation proved that. Largely, the Kennedys were against the applicant because he was Johnson's man. The Kennedys didn't want him, but the Kennedys had to take him after the investigation because there was nothing derogatory whatsoever.

So, those three things caused us to know each other--because the President apparently did feel that I played it straight and played it fair and let the chips fall where they may, and therefore he began to trust me and then called quite frequently.

G: Any insight on that first episode where the legislation was passed? Do you know how it was passed when it looked like it wasn't going to get passed?

D: I think that the fact that the Majority Leader and the Minority Leader, who jointly sponsored the bill, gave considerable strength to it and that's why it passed without too much debate. There were several, I think two or three dissenting votes, people who never had liked Mr. Hoover, but it was an overwhelming victory. Largely, it was the strength of the Majority Leader and the Minority Leader and the strength of the momentum we had in the House.

G: So I guess the trick was largely to get it on the calendar, get it considered in this short

time.

D: That's absolutely right.

G: Tell me about Lyndon Johnson's relationship with J. Edgar Hoover during those years.

D: They had been neighbors for many years at 30th Place, N.W. In fact, Mr. Johnson's home was right across the street from Mr. Hoover's, maybe about ten yards to the left, otherwise they would have been facing each other. The Johnson girls, Lynda Bird and Luci, would occasionally go over and pick leaves from Mr. Hoover's shrubbery and say, "Oh, I've got a souvenir leaf from J. Edgar Hoover's home." And he used to see them out walking, occasionally, not often. At times, Mr. Johnson would ask Mr. Hoover over for a drink, usually when he and Mrs. Johnson were having a small gathering. Mr. Johnson at all times recognized strength and knew how to use strength. Mr. Hoover was riding the crest of the wave at the time and Mr. Johnson knew how to use him. They were not deep personal friends by any stretch of the imagination.

There was political distrust between the two of them, but they both needed each other. Mr. Hoover was anxious to retain his job and to stay on as director. He knew that the best way for the FBI to operate fully and to get some cooperation of the White House was for him to be cooperative with President Johnson. President Johnson, on the other hand, knew of Mr. Hoover's image in the United States, particularly among the middle-of-the-road to conservative elements, and knew it was vast. He knew of the potential strength of the FBI--insofar as being of assistance to the government and the White House is concerned. As a result, it was a marriage, not altogether of necessity, but it was a definite friendship caused by necessity. While they would sort of "circle around

the corral" with each other, nevertheless, it was a good relationship, brought on by necessity, plus a certain amount of trust for each other and it extended back, as I say, a long number of years.

G: Did you have much contact with LBJ when he was Vice President? You mentioned the occasions related to the investigation and the background check for his--

D: Not too many occasions for personal contact, but he seemed to have a feeling of trust with me, and I had a feeling of trust with him. And, as I say, he did call. While he was the President, throughout all the time I knew him, he liked to personally handle things regardless of how large or how small.

For example, investigations of individuals to receive White House appointments. Rather than letting the Director of Personnel at the White House handle it, in many instances he followed such things like that personally. But, to specifically answer your question, there weren't too many contacts when he was Vice President, but he did call fairly often. Walter Jenkins also called quite often.

G: Then after he became President, you became the liaison to the White House, you said.

D: The day after he returned from Dallas, the day after he was sworn in as President, he called Mr. Hoover and indicated that he would appreciate it if I were assigned as his liaison between the FBI and the White House and, of course, I immediately was given that assignment.

G: Did Mr. Hoover call you in and explain--

D: Clyde Tolson called me in and indicated that, "The boss wants you to be the liaison between the FBI and the White House. He thinks that you know Lyndon Johnson and it

could be of help to the FBI." He didn't tell me that the President had called. I saw that later on in the form of a memorandum. I still have a copy of that, which Mr. Hoover dictated for his own files.

G: Did LBJ early on explain to you exactly what he expected and how he wanted you to perform in that role?

D: Well, several things happened. No, he did not call me in and say that, "I want you to do so-and-so," or, "I want you to have a specific role to play." He gave Walter Jenkins and Mildred [Stegall] instructions that I was to be given a White House pass, was to be given access to his office, and any time I called, he wanted to talk to me personally. Then several things happened which precipitated a closer relationship.

There were several people on the White House payroll, one in particular, that had been assigned there by John F. Kennedy and had nothing to do. She was a very lovely girl and she apparently was known very well to President Kennedy, but yet as far as having any experience as a press secretary or assistant press secretary was concerned, had not had any experience. President Johnson called me into his office one day and asked, "Who is this woman?" I pulled her file at FBI Headquarters and gave it to the President, who was entitled to review such files. Afterwards, he said, "Why is she back there?" So, I said, "Maybe you better talk to the Kennedy family about that." So, I recommended that in order for him to be absolutely open and above board, in other words, not to be tagged with someone who might embarrass him later on, that he should cause an applicant-type investigation of personnel to let him determine who should stay on and who should not stay on. It was up to him. It was his call. And this is the same thing as,

if you were a president of a company and I succeeded you, I would want to see an up-to-date accounting of the books, an auditing of the books, before I took over, because I would not want to inherit any of your possible mistakes or responsibilities which I was not sure about.

He thought that was a good idea and he did cause that to be done, and all future White House applicants were to be investigated.

G: That hadn't been done before?

D: That had not been done for all applicants in the Kennedy Administration. Mildred Stegall was placed pretty much in charge of the Johnson investigations and then Walter and I worked with the Director of the White House Personnel applications and, as I said previously, the President often called and wanted to know how they were progressing or what had shown up thus far. He took a very personal interest, particularly in his own immediate staff.

G: How did the Bobby Baker episode affect his attitude toward scandal? Did it make him more wary of possible problems with staff people?

D: First, the President, to my knowledge, never discussed the Bobby Baker case with me. From personal observation and remembering the President and the close relationship I had with him, I would say that it made him much more careful about his personal affairs in as close a privacy as possible.

Now, one example would be the time that I had a call from a friend at the *Washington Evening Star*, and he told me he had gotten hold of the copies of the President's intended tax return and the papers involving that tax return. Some things were

in there that, if they had seen the light of day as they were, would probably have caused some embarrassment to the President. But, if you knew the background concerning those things, they would not have caused any embarrassment. The newspaper person asked me to pass this material to the President. There was a close friend of the President's, a judge down in Austin--

G: A.W. Moursund?

D: Yes--he was preparing tax returns for him. I had the friend from the *Washington Evening Star* bring me a copy of the returns. I called the President and I said I had this material and I wanted him to know the *Star* gave it to me, and possibly he'd want to see the returns and then make a determination. He said, "Bring them over here right away."

I took the returns over to the White House and showed them to him. Later, I told the reporter, "There are a lot of things in here which, according to the President, are absolutely false. If they got to the public and a misconception was made concerning these matters, and without your knowing the background, it would be a very bad travesty of justice to make them public." And so he did not publish this; he killed the story. The President was very grateful for that.

G: Well, did it have to do with Bobby Baker or was it--

D: No, it did not have to do with Bobby Baker. It had to do with income of the President's, where it came from and how much it was, and so on. But, it was not fully explained in the tax return or the paper surrounding the tax return.

In my presence, the President called Judge Moursund and raised hell with him about allowing such a thing to happen. Obviously, someone had burglarized Judge

Moursund's office, or had paid somebody to get the material. It could have been a story which, you know, wasn't warranted.

The President, after the Kennedy assassination, was very fearful of his own life. He was a man of courage, but also he didn't want to take any chances. Often he asked me to do things which could have been interpreted as the FBI stepping beyond its jurisdiction, and stepping over into the jurisdiction of Secret Service.

For example, he would call and ask me to put an FBI agent on *Air Force One* on almost any trip. A lot of times, he wanted me to go personally and I, frankly, couldn't turn loose of my responsibilities and handle such assignments and I diplomatically told him that. We had a special agent by the name of Orin Bartlett [who would] usually be given that assignment. He would wear a gun. On each occasion I sat down with Jim Rowley, Director of Secret Service, and a former FBI agent, and explained to him what had happened, what the President wanted. He would understand and, as a result, there was never any bad feeling between the Secret Service and the FBI. Jim Rowley and I had a very close relationship.

G: Why do you think he wasn't content to just let the Secret Service do it?

D: Mainly, because of the Kennedy assassination. He felt that to have the FBI and the FBI's strength and the FBI's knowledge of intelligence ahead of time--which, admittedly, we'd also furnish the Secret Service--just gave him an added aura of protection, which he wanted. He was not a coward. The President was a very courageous man. He was a very strong man, but he wanted that added protection.

A good example was he called me one day and he stated, "I want you to have an

office in Fredericksburg, Texas." And I said, "Mr. President, where in the world is Fredericksburg, Texas?" (Laughter) And he said, "You've never heard of that?" I said, "No, sir." He said, "It's near the LBJ Ranch." The President called me personally. He said, "I want a man there." And I said, "Mr. President, are you considering the fact that there may not be any case load in that area and nothing for the man to do?" And he said, "Nevertheless, I want it done."

And so, we assigned a single agent. He had some German background. He remained there until the President left office, then we closed the office and moved him back to his original assignment. This is simply an example of the President wanting someone near his ranch, because he went there frequently and he thought it would be an added protection.

G: Did the President talk to you about the Kennedy assassination and his thoughts on it or explanations for it?

D: Yes, from time to time, he would refer to it. He referred to the fact that he moved that blood-red rug out of his office because it reminded him of the President being assassinated, and he put another rug in the Oval Office with the presidential seal on it.

He, at times, rambled about somewhat as to who may have caused it. He indicated that, "Could it have been the CIA?" And I said, "No, sir." And he didn't think so himself, he was just rambling in his conversation. "Could it have been Castro? Could it have been the Soviet Union?" And I told him no, that the investigation had been very thorough, that the Warren Commission had confirmed the conclusions of the FBI, that there was no conspiracy involved and that Lee Harvey Oswald--and Oswald alone did it,

and the matter should rest. But the President wanted to make certain that he had done everything to make sure that the proper conclusions, or the right conclusions, the truthful conclusions, were found and the record should be established. That's why he was adamant that, even though Mr. Hoover and I were against it, that the Warren Commission should be established, and that there should be both Democrats and Republicans on the Warren Commission, and that they have access to all FBI reports. He wanted the whole matter to be examined most thoroughly. And they did. But the Warren Commission was the President's idea.

He never really felt that the CIA did it; he never felt that anything was wrong with the FBI report, but he just wanted to make sure there was further confirming evidence and that's why he established the Warren Commission.

G: You mentioned the FBI's role in security and you've talked about the background checks. Were there any other formal roles that the FBI or you performed in terms of the Johnson Administration, in dealing directly with the White House?

D: Yes, in many instances. The 1964 Democratic National Convention is an example. Walter Jenkins called and said that the President had instructed him to contact me to head up a team to go to the Convention to keep Jenkins advised, and Jenkins in turn would tell the President. Of course, I always had access to the President if I needed to, but I didn't try to abuse it in any way and I usually worked through Walter and later on with Marvin Watson and Jim Jones.

But, [Walter] said the President was concerned that attempts would be made on his life, that [attempts] might be made on the lives of some of his assistants and some of

the heads of the Democratic Party that were there. He said [that] therefore he felt that we would have jurisdiction and that we should determine if there were any threats to the President's life or to any of the staffers' lives and should let him know.

I knew that we were walking on eggs at the time. I knew it was political dynamite, but I knew also that if the President felt strongly about that, that there was some semblance of jurisdiction involved and we should do it. But, here again, I cleared it with Mr. Hoover right away. He did not like it, but he instructed me to go ahead and do it.

I did follow the instructions. There were numerous pieces of information that turned up threatening not the President's life and not the lives of any of the staffers, but there were numerous plans for considerable violence and bloodshed. We were able to pass this information on to the proper authorities and, I think, perform some mission there within our jurisdiction.

I have suffered considerably as a result of this action, having been subpoenaed numerous times before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (the Church Committee) and various other bodies who accused the FBI strictly of playing politics at the time. A number of both Republican and Democratic Senators, following Mr. Johnson's death and during the Hearing of the Church Committee, insisted on my appearance on numerous occasions, and on two specific occasions indicated that the FBI was playing politics.

Well, consider the fact that you have the Commander in Chief, the President of the United States, calling and saying he wants this done and having some tinge of official

jurisdiction, what are you going to do? Are you going to say, "No, Mr. President, we will not do this." But those senators of the Church Committee were very bent on getting publicity, and as a result, they tried to make the most out of it. But as one senator later ruefully or regretfully told a companion he took to lunch following an appearance, "We didn't lay a hand on him." (Laughter)

G: Leaving aside the fact that this was a delicate matter, because it was something that the President asked you to do that even the Director was uncomfortable about: In looking at the history and the actual data gathered, did this give you any insights on the forces that you were monitoring at the time that were not available to the public? Did you get a different view of--well, I read, for example, that it was SNCC [Students Nonviolent Coordinating Committee] and CORE [Congress of Racial Equality] that you were monitoring in part, those were two of the organizations. From this monitoring, did you gain a different sense of what their objectives were and what their tactics were than were revealed to the public?

D: Yes. Let me explain first, simply for the record, that I did not personally recommend any wiretaps or microphones in conjunction with my assignment. I was an Assistant Director at the time. Another Assistant Director in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division, William C. Sullivan, recommended that there be wiretaps and microphones on various organizations, including the ongoing investigation which had been authorized by Attorney General Bobby Kennedy on Dr. Martin Luther King. As a result, there was considerable information picked up and then turned in to our team. I forwarded all facts to FBI Headquarters and to the White House, about possible violence, not on Dr. King's

part or any of his group, but certainly on the part of several black organizations at the time who wanted to perpetrate violence in order to gain publicity and attention at the Democratic National Convention. There was considerable planning in that regard, but it was all pretty much nipped in the bud as a result of our picking up the intelligence and notifying the appropriate authorities.

G: Did the local police authorities prevent it or did the--?

D: Well, there had been accusations that we did not notify the Secret Service of our presence in Atlantic City. That's absolutely false. I called ahead of time and told the Director of Secret Service, Jim Rowley, of our going and he asked me if I needed any assistance. I told him I'd keep that in mind and if I did, I'd sure be in touch with him. He told me who would be there from his organization, and I told him we'd be glad to cooperate to the fullest. Everything we received went to them also. The local authorities were also advised regarding potential violence.

But, to answer your question specifically, it did give us an insight, particularly as to how those organizations at the time artificially used acts of provocation in order to gain publicity themselves. We had known this for many years back, but it was first-hand knowledge at the time of the convention.

G: Was Robert Kennedy a factor here at this convention in terms of the FBI's role and was he aware that you were there?

D: He had to be aware that we were there because an FBI agent assigned to travel with him was made fully aware that we were there and spent time in our offices. But I must say again, for the record, that under no circumstances did the President, Walter Jenkins or

anyone else tell us to keep an eye on Bobby Kennedy or his activities. Kennedy's name was not even mentioned prior to our going there, during or afterwards. It had no connection with it whatsoever.

G: There were also, I think, some accusations from the Republican camp that there was some monitoring of the Goldwater campaign.

D: That was absolutely false. There was no monitoring whatsoever. There was a request from the White House, following the convention, that we give the President a run-down on the people associated with Barry Goldwater. I personally told the White House that I thought this was fraught with danger and I didn't think that we should go through with it. They dropped it like a hot potato. There were never even any name checks.

There were allegations, on one occasion, that we put a microphone on candidate Nixon's plane when he was going into Albuquerque, New Mexico. President Johnson personally called me and wanted to know if I could find out, and this was specifically his only request, what telephone calls the plane had made between Albuquerque and Washington, D.C., particularly to the Department of State or to the South Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States.

Reportedly, the President had a specific reason for doing it, because a request had been made to keep the South Vietnamese from going to the Paris Peace Talks.

G: This was in 1968?

D: That's correct. But the President did not ask me to put a microphone on the plane. He did not ask me to put a wiretap on. He just wanted to know were there calls being made to the South Vietnamese Ambassador or to the U.S. Department of State which might put

a crimp in the plans to get the South Vietnamese to go to the Paris Peace Talks.

He called me one night around midnight, and he asked me to have a memorandum on his desk by eight o'clock the following morning. And I said, "Mr. President, in order to do that, I will have to get our agents to wake up the telephone people in the middle of the night and to get them to go to their offices. As a result, your reputation will suffer and our reputation will suffer." He said, "What do you mean by that?" I said, "Well, Mr. President, let me just tell you one little story. During President Kennedy's regime, the administration was having trouble with trying to keep down inflation. The steel companies were asked not to raise prices. According to the White House, they agreed. The steel companies then turned around and raised prices and, as a result, President Kennedy was infuriated. Bobby Kennedy, the Attorney General, instructed the FBI to go out overnight, beginning late at night, and wake up reporters and presidents of steel companies, trying to get evidence of a conspiracy to raise the prices. Kennedy was clearly advised of the inherent danger involved, about charges of 'secret police' knocking on the door at midnight." He replied, "Don't worry about that. I'll take full responsibility."

Well, all hell broke loose and the FBI did receive considerable criticism. When we referred reporters to the Attorney General's office, Mr. Kennedy refused to accept responsibility. So, I told this to the President. I said, "You don't want that stigma attached to you by causing us to do something like this." He heatedly replied, "Who the hell do you think is your Commander in Chief?" And I said, "You are, Mr. President, there's no doubt in my mind, but I firmly recommend against it." And he said, "All right.

You do it first thing tomorrow morning and have a memorandum on my desk later on in the day." I said, "All right, sir."

And I did. There had been five calls made by Agnew's plane, none to the South Vietnamese Ambassador, none to the Department of State and I advised the White House that there hadn't been any in that regard and that's all there was to it. This matter was blown up all out of proportion. Somehow it was leaked--and I know in my own mind who did it--that the President had asked us to put a microphone on Mr. [Nixon's] plane.

G: Mr. Nixon--?

D: Mr. Agnew's plane--and that was absolutely false. In the first place, it would be almost physically impossible and second, well, unless you have a plane passing close by that is going to pick up the microphone reception that can be broadcasted to it, and even here the motor noise of the plane would drown out anything you might get anyhow. So it was never done and it was a complete lie that such action had been taken.

G: There was evidence, though, that Anna Chennault had been urging the South Vietnamese government to balk at coming to the table in Paris. Did you have any insight on that from--?

D: Well, I did not specifically mention those facts in my previous remarks. You have brought it up and I will say that the President told me, or Walter Jenkins told me, I don't know which one, that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I want you to look into this and I want the FBI

to put a surveillance on Mrs. Chennault, and I want you also to put a wiretap on the South Vietnamese Embassy." I said--I think it was the President--I said, "Mr. President, please call the Attorney General and instruct him to tell us to do this." At that time it was Ramsey Clark--the 'bull butterfly,' as Mr. Hoover used to call him. Ramsey next sent around a memorandum instructing us to put a wiretap on the South Vietnamese Embassy, and we did, following the President's instructions. Nothing in the investigation proved that Mrs. Chennault had been to see him, other than one further contact--the South Vietnamese Ambassador was talking over the telephone and indicated at one time that that woman had called him to determine what decision they had made about the South Vietnamese going to the peace talks, and he said that he had told her that his government had made no decision.

But Mrs. Chennault later came to see Mr. Hoover. All of the information on this case is in files other than the regular file system. I am not aware of what happened after Mrs. Chennault saw Mr. Hoover.

G: Did you have a sense in your own mind of whether or not President Nixon, as a candidate, was involved in this or whether it was--?

D: There was nothing to indicate that Mr. Nixon was involved in this matter. There was no evidence to indicate that. There was no evidence to indicate that Agnew was involved in it. I simply followed the President's instructions, and I'm not trying to back-track, I'm just telling you the truth.

G: Tell me about Walter Jenkins' departure and how your work changed after he left. But first--

D: Okay. I'll give you chapter, song and verse on that as I know it. I received a call one day from the Assistant Director in charge of the Identification Division, Lester Trotter. He stated, "Deke, I've got some bad news concerning a friend of yours." I said, "What is it? Who is it?" He said, "Walter Jenkins has been arrested on a homosexual charge." I said, "That can't be true. Hell, I've known that guy and I've traveled with him to Camp David at the President's invitation. Our families stayed together over a weekend and I visited in his home, and he's been in mine. I see him every day, and it just can't be true. He has no traits like that." He said, "Well, it is true." I said, "Well, how do you know?" He said, "I have a fingerprint card here from the Metropolitan Police."

Tape 1 of 2, Side 2

D: And I said, "Bring it over to me." And he did. So then I called the Metropolitan Police and arranged for agents in the Washington Field Office to go over and look at the record. It was reported that Jenkins had committed a homosexual act with an elderly man from the Old Soldiers Home in the men's room of the YMCA, and that he had been arrested as a result of it. It indicated his identity, and that's about all there was to it. I think the report further stated that he had been drinking at the time. So, I notified Mr. Hoover and Clyde Tolson. They were just as shocked as I was.

To go back just a little bit, I liked Walter Jenkins. I thought he was one of the most loyal men to his boss of anybody I've ever seen. Mr. Johnson worked him to death; he worked him like a slave. I've seen Walter Jenkins so tired that he'd fall asleep while he was talking to you. He worked sometimes eighteen, twenty hours when Mr. Johnson gave him things to do. I don't know whether Mr. Johnson knew how hard he worked

Walter Jenkins. That's always been a question in my mind. But Walter's loyalty and conscientiousness caused him to sacrifice his own health and his own family in order to comply with Mr. Johnson's instructions, he was so conscientious. I've seen him at his desk as sick as he could be.

Walter was very friendly to me, to my wife, to my family. The weekend after Mr. Johnson became President, Walter called us one Sunday morning and said, "The President would like you and your wife to come down and sit in the family room of the White House and look at his television program," an interview that had been taped the day before. We went down and there was Walter and his wife, Marge, and the President and Lady Bird and the two Johnson girls, Jack and Mary Margaret Valenti. To me that was pretty heady stuff. But I enjoyed the privilege. The President was very nice. He met my wife saying, "Deke, you over-married yourself." That made her feel very good. Later on the President suggested to Walter that Walter and his family take my family and me to Camp David and spend Easter weekend. Again, that was a very nice thing to do. We had dinner at Walter's house on a number of occasions; he had dinner at our house on a number of occasions. At no time did I ever detect any note of homosexuality, of effeminacy, or anything of that nature, concerning Walter Jenkins. He was just a hard-working, conscientious individual.

Later on--and I realize I'm skipping ahead and you can stop me any time you want to, but I want to give you the facts as I know them---a psychiatrist, with Walter Jenkins' permission, opened Walter's file. Walter had been seeing this psychiatrist occasionally, but not about homosexuality. The psychiatrist said in Walter's case and in the case of any

individual, we all have latent weaknesses. He said, "In you it may be you're a pyromaniac or a murderer or what have you. In Walter's case, it was homosexuality." When your system breaks down from overwork, fatigue, sickness, illness, drunkenness, what have you, those latent weaknesses will come out. He said, "In Walter's case, that particular day the arrest occurred, he had been sick; he hadn't eaten for twenty-four hours. He had agreed to go to the opening of the *Newsweek* office in Washington, D.C. He decided to walk; he thought that might clear his head. He went there; he had four or five martinis there and coming back, as he passed the YMCA, he had to relieve himself. He went in and his latent weakness came out. And he did go through the act."

In a later conversation with me, Walter denied the act. In the interview with the two agents, at which I was present, when they took a signed statement from him, he admitted the act. In later conversations that I had with Justice Fortas, Justice Fortas knew that he had committed the act. But it was a matter of physical breakdown, rather than a matter of doing something which was a frequent occurrence, I'm satisfied.

My wife wrote Walter Jenkins a letter when he was in the hospital. The President called me in the late afternoon following the arrest and he said, "Is it true?" I knew what he was talking about. He was in New York at the time. He was making a speech that night at the Hilton Hotel. I said, "Yes, Mr. President, it is true." He said, "Well, how do you know?" I said, "Well, I have the police report. I have checked it thoroughly. The arresting officers have been interviewed and I have the fingerprint card; I know it's true." He said, "Well the damn Republicans. They have perpetrated this." I said, "No, Mr. President. It actually occurred and there is no indication it was a setup by the

Republicans." He said, "Well, I'm going to fire him right away. What do you think about that?" I said, "It's the worst thing you could do." He said, "Why do you say that?" I said, "Because the man is sick; he has been sick. He's been working almost to the point of death for you, and for you to take an abrupt act like that would make it look like you're a cold, selfish, heartless individual." He said, "What do you think I should do?" I said, "I think that you should issue a public statement saying that Walter had been working hard; he had been ill, that you're sorry you didn't know about it; that he will be placed on extended leave and that you wish the best for him and his family in the future; that an investigation will be requested to determine if any violations of security had occurred and all facts will be fully given to you, to determine if anything had occurred, and to the Attorney General."

He said, "All right. We'll do that. You go down to the White House right now"--I was at home by then; it was getting pretty late--"You go in and see Lady Bird. And you go over to the hospital." I said, "We'll do that. I'll personally take a signed statement with Mrs. Johnson present."

So, I went down to the White House and went into, not the Oval Office, but Walter's office, which was right next door, and Mrs. Johnson was there talking with Clark Clifford and Abe Fortas, who was not Justice at the time. He was still the President's lawyer. And I told Mrs. Johnson what the President had stated, and Clark Clifford and Abe Fortas were against it. They said Mrs. Johnson should not be seen because reporters would be at George Washington University Hospital. She looked at me and said, "Lyndon wants it done and I'll go with Deke."

We called over there ahead of time before we went and the doctors indicated that Walter was heavily sedated; it wouldn't do us any good to go. As a result, I reported back to the President and he said, "All right, you have him interviewed the following day." And I did, with two agents. They interviewed him extensively. Walter denied any previous incidents. He did admit the YMCA incident to the agents and to me; I was in the background, but I heard it. He denied any allegations of security, and frankly, the investigation conducted by the FBI later on, which was a complete thorough investigation, failed to show that there had been any previous incidents of homosexuality, including the time during World War II when he was the captain and commander of an all-black company of soldiers.

So that pretty much is the whole thing. The incident wrecked his life; it, I think, caused serious complications for his children, who for the most part have led very tragic lives. His wife, Marge, became an alcoholic and died; Walter's dead now. But to the day of his death, we retained friendship and I think he was a very capable, loyal, hard-working individual that tragedy struck. I feel sorry for him; I feel sorry for the family. I wish I could have done something to help them.

G: Had there been an earlier incident or arrest in the late fifties, do you know?

D: There was a further fingerprint card which did show one previous arrest. Mr. Hoover asked me why I had not checked files prior to our relationship with Walter and President, and I told him I saw no sense in doing it. I just hadn't done it. I started to ask him, "Why didn't you do it?"

G: Were you involved in any of the subsequent discussions about Mrs. Johnson's public

statement or whether or not the President should issue a statement? She did issue a very compassionate statement.

D: The statement was not read to me prior to her issuing it, but it was along the lines of what I had suggested the night before to the President. Later, Clyde Tolson called me and said, "Don't you think that Mr. Hoover should send flowers to Walter Jenkins in the hospital?" I said, "Yes. I think that that would be a nice thing to do, considering all the assistance he's given the FBI." Flowers were sent in the name of J. Edger Hoover. A reporter picked it up and wrote glaring headlines about it. I suggested to Mr. Hoover, "Why don't we just say that I did that without your knowing about it?" He said, "No, I did it and that's the way it's going to stick." Walter got flowers from many other people.

But, in accordance with my recommendation to the President, there was an investigation. As I previously stated, the investigation did not reflect, other than this one fingerprint card, previous incidents of homosexuality. I received a number of phone calls from Abe Fortas asking me to change this, change that in the overall report. None of the recommendations by Abe Fortas had anything to do with Walter Jenkins' homosexuality or the current incident. It had only a bearing on whether the President could have been embarrassed or not. I recall vividly Mr. Hoover leaving at the usual time, at quarter to five in the afternoon, and calling me and saying, "Don't you make any changes whatsoever in that report, any further changes. None at all. That's it and that's the way it's going to stand." I said, "Okay. As far as I'm concerned, that's good enough for me."

G: Well, what was the nature of Fortas' concern?

D: Any reference which could have been embarrassing to the President, not from the standpoint

of a homosexual relationship, just information that might have had some bearing: The President having worked him too hard or something of that nature. Just from a humanitarian standpoint.

G: Any insight on the efforts of Clark Clifford and Abe Fortas to keep the story out of the newspapers?

D: I don't know anything about that. I had heard from Abe Fortas that an attempt had been made, but as you know, in Washington it's impossible to keep a story out of the newspapers, regardless.

G: Did LBJ ever stop believing that the Republicans were behind it, do you think?

D: He had deep-rooted suspicions, not only concerning political opponents, but--he said to me once, which was a little embarrassing--after the State Department had leaked a very confidential directive he had sent them, he was ranting and raving and said, "There are only three people in government that I trust. One is Dean Rusk"--who was Secretary of State at the time--"Tom Johnson"--who was his press secretary at the time; Billy Moyers had already left--"and you, Deke DeLoach." And he said, "Why?" I wondered myself. But he said, "All three of you come from the clay hills of Georgia and from small towns. You're country people and you're the only three I trust in government." He trusted a lot more people in government, but it was nice of him to say that. I think it gave an insight into the fact, though, that he trusted small-town, country people who had come up the hard way, like he did.

I have always felt, and still strongly feel, that the compassion of Lyndon Johnson stemmed from his days as a poor boy in the hills of Texas, his teaching of Mexican youngsters and living with people that were in dire straits. I think despite his reputation as

being a politician, that nevertheless, he did have a very sincere compassion about people.

G: After the Walter Jenkins incident, was LBJ alarmed about the prospect of more people with homosexual tendencies in the White House?

D: He stepped up the investigations of people in the White House, yes. As a matter of fact, just to straighten out the record, that is when he wanted investigations of everyone. I

recommended that we have investigations of all people having responsible positions on the staff. The procedure came out pretty much as a direct result of the Walter Jenkins incident.

G: How did the White House operation change after Walter left?

D: It tightened up considerably. He not only went along with the recommendations concerning investigations that I made to him, but he called Mr. Hoover and asked Mr. Hoover to assign me to the White House for a period of time to conduct a survey of all communications, mail and security at the White House. I took two of my people over to the White House and sat in the White House Library--used that as more or less a command post. The President issued a memorandum instructing people to comply with my questions. Some of the old timers didn't like it, but it had to be done because he instructed it be done.

G: What was the purpose?

D: Mainly, to determine the flow of communications and mail in the White House. To make sure that there was better security and that there be a more efficient handling of communications, particularly from a security standpoint. We conducted a very thorough investigation--it lasted a week--and then submitted a report. He was very pleased with the report and he ordered that it be put into process immediately.

I detected in him more of a suspicious nature after Walter left and he never mentioned

Walter's name in my presence after that.

G: Really?

D: He never did. I occasionally brought up Walter's name, saying I had heard from Walter and he's doing fine. Walter called me on occasion and indicated that Mr. Johnson was calling him in Austin and talking to him from time to time, getting advise and counsel. But that was all "deep snow" and they didn't want anybody to know about it.

G: You were around enough to get a sense of how aides like Walter would relate to the President. Were they relatively candid around him? Were they intimidated by him?

D: Walter was intimidated by the President; he was scared of him. When the President would bark at him he would cower. Walter in his usual personality was jovial, a people man, compassionate, but with the President--it was all, "Yes, sir, Mr. President. Yes, sir. I'll do this right away." And the President sometimes with just the three of us in the Oval Office would raise hell with Walter in my presence and berate him considerably. But, then on the other hand, he would be highly compassionate and would give him things and send him places on vacations and be very mindful toward the family.

As I say, the President had eccentricities, and temperament was one of them, but I'd have to hasten to say that he also was a very compassionate man. When my daughter was in the hospital, in the Anderson Clinic in Alexandria, with a very serious back operation, as she came out of surgery, the first thing that she saw in her room was a yellow rose of Texas in a vase with the presidential seal on it. This was just an eighteen-year-old girl that he had never met before, but she was my daughter and he did this nice thing.

This was the same daughter--you know with a large family you have to put

restrictions on usage of the telephone because we had only one telephone line coming in the house. I was constantly getting calls from the Bureau and also from the White House. The President tried to get me for eighteen minutes one Saturday night and my daughter was on the telephone. She had violated the three-minute restriction that I put on for the kids, because she thought it was unnecessary and didn't agree with it, being an eighteen-year-old, so she kept on: yak, yak, yak, yak, yak. But the next morning we were going to church and two technicians showed up in our front yard. I wondered what they were there for and they said, "The President has instructed us to put a private telephone line in your house." I said, "Well, fine. That's indeed a privilege, so go ahead and put it in the kitchen." He said, "No, he told us to put it in your bedroom." (Laughter) So for the rest of his term and about two or three months into the Nixon Administration there was a White House phone in our bedroom.

G: How often did he call?

D: I could say quite frequently, but that wouldn't be altogether true. But I'd say three, four times a week; sometimes from *Air Force One*, sometimes from the LBJ Ranch, sometimes from the White House, sometimes he called from his bedroom. He'd just get to thinking about investigations and he would call and want to know the status. As a result, I had to be ready. He has called at two-thirty in the morning on occasions and other times it was late in the evening or during the day during the weekend. He'd always call FBI Headquarters during office hours.

G: After Walter left, who did you work with at the White House?

D: I worked with Marvin Watson and with Mildred Stegall. Later on I worked with Jim Jones. Marvin was a totally different personality than Walter, but we got along well together and we

visited back and forth in each other's homes. Marvin is a deeply religious individual of great integrity, as I think Walter was. But Marvin was much more so and was not the polished professional or politician that Walter was. But he learned fast.

I remember one time being in Marvin's office waiting to go in to see the President. The President came out, which he occasionally did, into Marvin's office and he shook hands and put his arms around me and Marvin stepped up and said, "Mr. President, you're going to see a famous athlete this afternoon, and the press has suggested that they might want to take a picture of you and that athlete arm wrestling." And the President looked at him with the stoniest, steely glance and said, "The President of the United States does not arm wrestle." Marvin says, "Yes, sir, Mr. President."

G: Was Marvin intimidated by LBJ in the same sense that Walter had been?

D: No. Marvin had great respect for the President, but he was not as--he jumped, but he was not--he didn't show the humility that Walter did.

G: Not as nervous?

D: No, not as nervous as Walter was.

G: How about Bill Moyers? You must have seen the President with Bill.

D: Bill Moyers was more of a bouncy-type personality than either Walter or Marvin. Bill was very respectful to the President. Bill was more of a politician-type individual, even though he was an ordained Baptist minister from Texas that the President brought out of oblivion and made something of. Nevertheless, Bill was not as deeply, in my opinion, a member of the Johnson inner circle as was Walter or Marvin. He would never have been a Walter Jenkins. Bill knew how to dodge, how to answer, how to play the game, but he was not as

close to the President as Walter was and later on as Marvin was. And I think events have proved accordingly.

I enjoyed my relationship with Bill. We got along very well together, and he recently showed up, or was asked to come to a social event where I was being honored by a large group on Hilton Head. And he came and made some very nice comments about me, which I deeply appreciated. During the time that he was at the White House, I was able to be of service to him as a friend, and particularly in one incident was able to help him in what could have been a very embarrassing situation.

G: Was this a personal problem?

D: It was a personal thing and I wouldn't want to comment on it.

G: Was there much rivalry of competition among the White House aides?

D: No, not like there was in the Kennedy Administration or in previous--I don't know anything about administrations after the Johnson Administration. But the fact that Walter had been with the President for so many years; the fact that the President had an inner circle of friends--Jack Valenti, Barefoot Sanders, Jake Jacobsen, people like that--others in the White House recognized that they were not going to crack that inner circle, and as a result they accepted that fact and there wasn't the usual political gamesmanship. There was nobody questioning Walter Jenkins' judgment or decisions made because they knew they came from the President and the President trusted him. So there was very little of jealousy. He had his own inner circle and he kept his own inner circle.

G: Tell me about Lyndon Johnson's relationship with Bobby Kennedy.

D: Well, I think the President was distrustful of the Kennedys because he knew that they

disliked him intensely. He was hurt and humiliated by the taunts and the jibes and the sarcasm that the Kennedys pointed towards him as being a backwoods Texas hillbilly, the lack of culture, matters of that nature. There was a great difference in personalities as you know. I think that the sincerity of Mr. Johnson and his compassion for people somewhat rattled the Kennedys from time to time. He was very distrustful of Bobby because he knew Bobby wanted to be President. There are so many things that would explain that relationship, and it is very difficult at this stage of the game to remember them all.

There was the time that the President--and Walter told me this first-hand and so did the President later on. The President had to get rid of Bobby and did not want Bobby to be his running mate as Vice President in 1963. So, the President and Walter devised the idea, and I'm sure Abe Fortas had something to do with it too, of the President making a public statement to the effect that no one in his cabinet would be selected as the Vice President, which ruled out Kennedy, in as much as he was Attorney General at the time. Kennedy came over to see him and tried to talk him into revising the decision. They had a long conversation and Kennedy left the Oval Office going back into Walter Jenkins' office, and while standing stood at the door, stated, "We would have made such a great team." Well, the President didn't want him because of the way Bobby Kennedy and the entire Kennedy clan had treated him, mistrusted him and closed ranks against him.

I was out at the Sheraton Hotel that afternoon at a seminar after the announcement was made. Seventy-three telegrams were received by the President at the White House. He told Walter to call and have me come down to the White House, sit in there and read telegrams and give my opinion as to what the basis of the telegrams represented. I did; they

proved to be from members of the Catholic faith from Massachusetts who had sent telegrams. Obviously, many of them were--because the phraseology was exactly the same, many of them had obviously been engineered by the Kennedys. I wrote the President a memorandum and gave him my opinion.

I think that--I'm trying to think of a number of other incidents.

G: How about the Bobby Baker investigation? Did Lyndon Johnson feel that this was being propelled in order to embarrass him?

D: Memoranda in FBI files reflect that I went to see Justice Fortas on one occasion and indicated to him that the FBI had received information that the Kennedy people were trying to stir this up in an effort to embarrass the President. And that the Supreme Court in considering this matter should be very careful in [view of] the fact that Kennedy had authorized the wiretap in writing, the FBI had not done it on its own, and the fact that Kennedys should not be allowed to embarrass either the FBI or the President. And Fortas fully recognized the matter and said that would be taken into consideration in studying the overall thing.

The President, on a number of occasions, mentioned to me that he was very leery of the Kennedys ever getting anything on him that could be used, which would knock him out of the presidency and put Bobby in. It was a very touchy time.

G: Was there anything in particular that worried him or was it just--?

D: He never did mention anything specifically. And the Department of Justice here again was just like the FBI, on a tightrope, a lot of stress and strain brought on because of hostility between the Department and the White House. The Justice Department was very, very

suspicious of anything the FBI did which might react favorably to President Johnson.

For instance, Ed Guthman, who now is with the *Los Angeles Times*, or was at one time, called me one day and asked me to have lunch with him. I did, and we sat down and ordered. He then proceeded to tell me that the FBI had not waited until President Kennedy's body had become cold until we started favoring the President. And I said, "Now wait a minute. He is the Commander in Chief and anything that we have furnished him, we have also furnished the Attorney General." And he said, "That doesn't make any difference. You're doing a lot of favors for LBJ and he is favoring the FBI. The Attorney General doesn't know everything that you're doing and it's just not right, just not right." That explains the situation.

Bobby was an extremely difficult Attorney General to get along with. He wanted all the publicity possible and Mr. Hoover, of course, was anxious for the FBI to achieve any available publicity. It's hard to understand, but in order to make it clear, I often told agents classes when I was lecturing to them that you have got to have favorable relations with the public in order to make those doors swing open easier, and one of the best ways to do that is to get favorable publicity, and have favorable relations with the public.

For instance, when the [Joseph] Valachi papers came out--which were engineered by the FBI as a result of our taking signed statements from Valachi in the federal penitentiary, concerning the existence of a Mafia--we furnished all that information to the Attorney General's office. I took over a suggested article for *Reader's Digest* by Mr. Hoover which would expose the thing, and giving the FBI credit for breaking Valachi and getting all the valuable information. Guthman said, "No, you're not going to release this. The Attorney

General is going to do it to the *Saturday Evening Post*. And we won't allow you to do it."

Well, I went back, and it made Mr. Hoover furious. As a result, I leaked it to the *Chicago Daily News* prior to Kennedy releasing it to the *Saturday Evening Post*. It burst their bubble and they weren't able to take credit for it.

But we had to operate like that. Bobby was trying to take over the FBI, and run the FBI, water down the FBI to his own liking. However, I enjoyed knowing him. I met his wife once or twice. I appreciate the fact that he asked my family to come over to his office on my twentieth anniversary in the FBI, at which time he swung my little daughter about and placed her on that stuffed tiger he had in his office. I enjoyed the favorable attention he showed me, but he did that to numerous FBI personnel and I think it was just his desire to get as much hold over the FBI as he could to do his bidding. You might say, well, he was the Attorney General and therefore we were answerable to him; that's true. No doubt about that. But there also was--you just don't interfere with a machine that's going very well. He was trying to re-do the whole machine to his own liking, and he didn't have the experience or respect to command things like that. I did appreciate his notes to me and presents of books. I did not like his over-ambition, arrogance or viciousness.

G: There was a public debate about the extent to which he had authorized the surveillance of Martin Luther King.

D: He authorized, in writing, the wiretaps on Dr. King. This was later denied. Katzenbach, Kennedy's successor, also authorized wiretaps on Dr. King. Katzenbach, in appearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, stated, "Well, that looks like my initials. It's where I put my initials in the margin, but I don't believe I would do such a thing." Well, of

course he did or we wouldn't have done it in the first place; and so did Kennedy. Katzenbach explained publicly to the press when it was brought to his attention that Kennedy's signature was on the paper authorizing the wiretap, that the Attorney General, Kennedy at the time, specifically wanted to find out the extent of communist infiltration insofar as Dr. King was concerned.

There were a lot of questions asked in that regard before the Church Committee. But Kennedy did authorize that wiretap, yet even today writers will shy away from blaming Kennedy for authorization. The truth of the matter is--and FBI files will reflect this if they haven't been sealed as a result of the court order of Judge John Lewis Smith--Kennedy asked for the wiretap on Dr. King and Mr. Hoover authorized or instructed Courtney Evans of the FBI, who was our liaison man with the Justice Department, to go over and tell Kennedy he felt this was the wrong thing to do and we shouldn't do it. A week later information came to the Bureau's attention, which was sent to the Attorney General and at that time Mr. Hoover had changed his mind and requested a wiretap on King, in writing, which the Attorney General approved. But it was at the Attorney General's instigation that the first request came over, which the FBI recommended against and caused the Attorney General to withdraw it.

G: Why did Mr. Hoover change his mind?

D: I strongly believe he wanted to be able to furnish the Attorney General and the White House with any information which would have an impact on the civil rights movement in the United States which would allow infiltration [sic] by some elements which he felt might be wrong for the civil rights movement and for the country as a whole. There might be considerable disruption and violence.

Dr. King was not a member of the communist party; he was not a member. There was some association, as a result of information turned in by two informants who were brothers, with elements of the party who had been members or who were at that time members of the party. One person had been a member of the National Committee of the CPUSA.

G: Going back to Katzenbach, I think at those hearings Katzenbach suggested that he may have signed a cover document that perhaps had been the cover document to something else rather than the actual order itself.

D: The record is there for anyone to see.

G: Really?

D: Yes.

G: Aside from the paper trail itself, was there anything that convinced you that these two individuals had actually favored the surveillance, the taps?

D: You mean Kennedy or Katzenbach?

G: Yes. Was there any oral communication or anything like that?

D: I'm sure that Mr. Hoover and Kennedy and Mr. Hoover and Katzenbach possibly discussed it telephonically or in meetings, but as Katzenbach stated publicly, Kennedy wanted to find out the extent of communist infiltration. I would assume that he also [did] or else he wouldn't have authorized it.

G: Any insights on LBJ's attitude toward this surveillance?

D: He received the information as a result of the investigation and then ordered it returned to the FBI. He never made any comment to me, that I recall, concerning the matter. He never

made any comment to me personally on the matter.

G: One has an image of Lyndon Johnson on the one hand being fascinated by the yield that all of the intelligence gathering came up with and, on the other hand, being disturbed about the intrusion into people's private lives. Was there this dual sense in his own attitude?

D: I think basically Mr. Johnson was always against electronic surveillance, and it stemmed from his beliefs concerning the invasion of privacy.

G: Can you elaborate? Can you tell me what those beliefs were?

D: Well, I know he instructed the Attorney General on either one or two occasions that he didn't feel that a wiretap law should be passed unless it was severely restricted in nature. I think that he was not against uses of electronic surveillance in matters of kidnapping or total espionage, sabotage, matters of grave internal security nature. But, I do think that he probably was against using electronic surveillance, most definitely not in criminal cases which are not major in nature, because he felt it was an invasion of privacy. I never did discuss the matter with him.

G: And yet he did seem to be very interested in the FBI reports. There are all these accounts that he would read them, that he would study them, that--

D: The only thing I know in that regard is that I would take them over to Walter; Walter would read them, he would either brief the President or send them in to the President to read, and then at the President's instructions would give some of them back to me. On one occasion he did indicate the FBI should be very careful in its distribution of such reports. There were allegations, and I hear them today sometimes--

G: You were saying that there have been allegations or charges to this day--you didn't complete the--

D: About some member of the FBI, or I, had volunteered to have the King tapes played for the press. That's a base lie; in the first place, I was never in possession of any of the tapes. I heard only one tape on one occasion for approximately twenty minutes and asked the Assistant Director of the Domestic Intelligence Division, who brought it to my office, to turn it off and take it back. They were retained in possession of William C. Sullivan of the Domestic Intelligence Division and I never had anything to do with them, and most certainly could not have played them for a member of the press. I never showed any member of the press any of the memoranda concerning the investigation. So, consequently, it was just a base lie that the FBI--and I can't think of anyone else who would have done it; it was such a delicate matter and consequently it just wasn't done. When it's heard today that we had done that, it's just absolutely false.

G: Well, do you think anyone else in the Bureau could have done that?

D: I don't know of anyone.

G: Reporters did say, and editors, that they were invited to listen to these [tapes].

D: But when you ask them who heard them, they can't provide any names. It's just like allegations made concerning the FBI's shirking civil rights investigations. But when you pin them down and say, "Okay, what investigation was incomplete? What investigation was mishandled?" they can't name one. They make the basest of allegations yet they can never back it up.

G: Was there a concern that Martin Luther King's behavior would affect the civil rights

movement? Did the FBI--?

D: I can't read the minds of the Attorney General or any of them at that time insofar as that specific question is concerned. Here again, I was the Assistant Director of the Crime Records Division. I had nothing to do with internal security, and I don't know whether there was genuine concern in that regard or not.

G: One of the published reports was that perhaps you or another FBI official met with Roy Wilkins to discuss the problems with Martin Luther King and the potential harm that these problems could do to the civil rights movement. Any insights on that?

D: The record will reflect that Mr. Wilkins did come to see me and that I received him. I had met him beforehand. As a matter of fact, the head of the American Civil Liberties Union at one time in Washington was a good friend of mine and I often had lunch or dinner with him. He was the one that brought Wilkins to my office, and Wilkins and I talked in private, and Mr. Wilkins told me at that time that he knew of the rumors floating around and that he hoped that we had no intentions of exposing any such information.

G: Did you meet with anybody else? James Farmer?

D: I knew James Farmer well. In fact, I had lunch with him occasionally in Washington when he was Assistant Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. I don't recall that we had any specific talk concerning Dr. King or the civil rights movement, but I knew him well, I liked him and, as I said, we had lunch together occasionally.

G: You attended the meeting with Director Hoover and Dr. King, and I think Andrew Young and Ralph Abernathy in December, 1964. Tell me about that meeting. There have been such varying accounts of what happened there, just the nature of the meeting. This was after Mr.

Hoover had made the statement about King, and King I guess had at first said some critical things about the Bureau.

D: Well, you know, society has changed considerably, but back at that time there was considerable stress and strain insofar as society was concerned, not only brought on by the Vietnam War situation, but by the civil rights movement. The FBI needed to have as many friends as possible in order to adequately obtain facts in civil rights investigations, and Dr. King made the statement publicly in Albany, Georgia, that all FBI agents handling investigations in this area are southern-born, reared and educated and therefore their reports were biased and prejudiced; that blacks therefore could not get a fair investigation.

At that time four out of five agents assigned to the area were northern-born, reared and educated. Mr. Hoover felt very strongly that Dr. King's statements had damaged our chances of getting information from individuals, particularly blacks at the time, and therefore he was very upset about Dr. King's statement. Shortly thereafter he allowed a press conference with the Women's National Press Club. They had previously requested to see J. Edgar Hoover, and he had always turned them down, but this time he agreed to see them. I was sitting with him at the time. One of the twenty-two women present asked him about Dr. King's statement in Albany, Georgia, and Mr. Hoover explained the circumstances. He told them, "Dr. King is the most notorious liar in the United States." I passed him a little note saying, "Don't you want to say this off the record?" He didn't pay any attention; he threw the note in the trash. I sent him a note on two other occasions, and he threw both of those in the trash. On the occasion of the third note, he said, "DeLoach tells me I should say this off the record; I will not say it off the record, it's on the record." Well, with that all those women left

there like a covey of hens and went straight to the telephone and the story broke.

There followed a long telegram from Dr. King and a public statement by him saying that Mr. Hoover had obviously bowed under the weight of the affairs of his office and was therefore not rational. The stuff hit the fan. I always felt while Mr. Hoover was courageous in standing up for the FBI, that it was somewhat unnecessary to incur a fight at that particular time between two public figures, because no one could win, neither King nor Mr. Hoover. But, nevertheless, it happened and I was Mr. Hoover's assistant, and therefore I worked for him. Later, I suggested that Mr. Hoover meet with King or we interview King--first we interview him--and King refused to return my call. I later suggested that Mr. Hoover meet with him and just iron out any differences. At that time Abernathy--not Abernathy but the former mayor of Atlanta--

G: Andrew Young?

D: Andy Young, whom I got to know quite favorably. He called me and said that Dr. King would be in Washington on such and such a date and suggested a meeting at, I believe it was, either three or four o'clock in the afternoon. Mr. Hoover instructed me to be with him during the meeting, and I met Dr. King outside Mr. Hoover's office and took him in to see Mr. Hoover. Dr. King had Reverend Abernathy, Andy Young and one other individual with him. There were four men.

G: Walter Fauntroy?

D: Fauntroy, that's right, who later on was a member of the House Assassinations Committee, who subpoenaed me to appear before them.

The meeting lasted for approximately an hour and forty-seven minutes, I believe,

and I later wrote a seven-page memorandum covering the entire meeting. Mr. Hoover talked the majority of the time because he was a very powerful talker and conversationalist. During the time he stressed to Dr. King that Dr. King be very careful of his associates because he was a leader in the civil rights movement, and be very careful concerning any personal escapades that might be made. Dr. King assured Mr. Hoover that he would; that [he] was against communism; that he was not a communist himself; that he wanted to cooperate with the FBI because he felt that that was the best way the people of his community, the blacks, could withstand attacks by the Ku Klux Klan and other elements against the civil rights movement. It was a very peaceful meeting. Later on I called it a "love feast" because that's exactly what it was.

When they got up to leave, Dr. King suggested that they issue a joint press release and Mr. Hoover said, no, he didn't think that was necessary. Dr. King then went out to Mr. Hoover's reception room--I accompanied him--and pulled a previously prepared press release, that had been prepared prior to his arrival, and read it to the reporters present. There was not much to it, just that he'd had a nice meeting with Mr. Hoover, and that they'd had a meeting of the minds and something of that nature or indicating that, and he left.

G: Did he have any requests of Mr. Hoover or any recommendations?

D: None whatsoever. He assured Mr. Hoover that he would cooperate with the FBI and ask his people to cooperate with the FBI.

G: Was there any discussion of the Albany, Georgia, statement?

D: No, except Dr. King denied making the statement.

G: Really?

D: He denied making any statements derogatory of the FBI or taking any actions which would be inimical to the best interests of the FBI.

G: The writers who have researched and written about the FBI during this period have stated that in the wake of the murder of the three civil rights workers in Mississippi--[Andrew] Goodman, [James Earl] Chaney, [Michael H.] Schwerner--that the Bureau really changed in terms of how actively it pursued or addressed civil rights areas. Is this the case? Did you notice a change in the wake of that incident?

D: No. There was no change. The FBI was intense in its desire to follow the letter of the law and conduct thorough investigations. We had an excellent agent by the name of Clem McGowan, who is now dead, but he was in charge of the Civil Rights Unit within the General Investigative Division of the FBI. He was such a thorough man. All the agents that worked for him were very experienced. They supervised the investigations at FBI Headquarters. There was no change in intensity whatsoever. The FBI already had civil rights schools for the agents, teaching them how to conduct the investigations on a constant basis, even before and after the murder of the three civil rights victims.

There was--I don't know whether you want me to go into that or not but--

G: That particular investigation and your own role in that, vis-a-vis the White House.

D: Well, there was intense pressure on the part of the press and the general public for the FBI to solve that case, just as there was intense pressure on the investigation involving the assassination of Dr. King, which I personally supervised. The President would call over almost every day and ask me what the latest status was, as would the Attorney

General. We had numerous agents working on this case in Jackson and Philadelphia, Mississippi, and those small towns in the area the incident occurred. We also at one time had as many as three thousand navy men and marines assisting us in wading through the swamps. It was a tough, tough, tough investigation.

I was down there from time to time, and I went down the day before Mr. Hoover came down, and set up all the things for him to do the day that he was there. I was in constant touch with Roy Moore, who was the agent in charge in Jackson, and also Al Rosen, who was the Assistant Director in charge of the General Investigative Division in handling the matter on the scene.

G: What do you think happened in that case in terms of the actual events of the--if you would call it a kidnapping and murder? Did you ever piece together in your own mind the story or an accurate outline?

D: I don't understand your question.

G: In terms of how those three young men were apprehended by whatever local group it was, whether it was the Klan or whatever--

D: It was the Klan.

G: --and the circumstances of their being killed. Was there anything that precipitated it?

D: Yes, I think the general feeling down there at the time was people had forgotten rationalization. FBI agents were shouldered off the sidewalk, refused food in restaurants; a Klansman put rattlesnakes down on the floor of the driver's seat of an agent's car; four Klansmen walked up to the door of an agent's home carrying a black, wooden, crude coffin, knocked on the door; his wife came to the door and they told her that her husband

was dead and buried in that coffin and dropped it and left; where Klansmen we knew to be Klansmen would taunt the FBI publicly saying, "If you step foot on my property, I'll kill you." That was the general demeanor of the public, not the entire population, but a segment of the public at that time, and that caused bigotry, ignorance, violence and caused the deaths of the three civil rights workers.

To my knowledge there was no evidence that those civil rights workers were doing anything other than what they intended to do, and that was to cause the blacks to register to vote so there could be additional strength on the part of the blacks in the State of Mississippi through democratic effort. That was resented; their presence was resented. The fact that they were more or less "foreigners" or out of state at that particular time when feelings were running high, that caused the murders of Chaney and Schwerner and the other victim. The FBI took a lot of abuse; they worked ungodly amounts of overtime. I was with them down there part of the time; I know.

G: Were you ever threatened in that kind of situation down there?

D: Only one night when--as a matter of fact, it was the night that Mr. Hoover spent the night down there. He and Clyde Tolson were housed at the Sun and Sand Motel, or something like that. And I had a double room next to them [with] Special Agent Bill Gunn, whom I had assigned to go with me to take notes, all for the record during the entire time. He was to set up meetings with press and all the media. At midnight--I was so tired that I told him to take any calls that came in during the night. About midnight I turned over and here he was--I woke up and he was saying, "Yes, ma'am. Yes, ma'am. All right, ma'am. Yes, ma'am. I agree with you, ma'am. Yes, ma'am. All right, ma'am," and he

hung up. I said, "Bill, who the hell was that?" He said, "Well, just some old biddy, the wife of the local head of the Ku Klux Klan." And I said, "Well, what did she say?" "She said that you and J. Edgar Hoover were nothing but a bunch of LBJ nigger-loving sons of bitches." And I said, "Why did you agree with her?" He said, "I thought that would be the best way to shut the old biddy up, and get her off the telephone [without] waking you up." I said, "Well, don't ever say anything to anybody like that."

Bill Gunn later became an editor of *Reader's Digest*. He was a very excellent agent, a good man.

Why was Mr. Hoover down there? He was down there because the President called and told me he wanted an office set up in Jackson, Mississippi. And I said, "Well, I don't know whether the case load would warrant the expense of setting it up or not." And he said, "I want it done and I want you to tell Edgar I want it done immediately." I told Mr. Hoover and there was the usual grumbling on Mr. Hoover's part about having to do it. He would grumble to me but not to the President, of course. But he issued instructions that it be done, and that it be done immediately. And the President also said for Mr. Hoover and me to go down there when the office was finished and to hold a press conference and to assure the people in that area that we would conduct thorough and fair investigations. So we gave orders that the office was to be set up immediately.

We had an agent by the name of C. Q. Smith who was excellent at handling matters with the General Services Administration and was somewhat of a technician himself when it came to building. We put him in charge down there and he would call me every day and report to me the progress of setting up the new office. Actually, we

were given such little time by the President to do it that we only had a small reception room, an office for the Assistant Special Agent in charge to the right of that, and to the left of it, the office of the Special Agent in charge. When you left the area you were supposed to open a door and go into the agent's room, where you would supposedly have desks, et cetera. Actually, it was an empty warehouse. We had only those three rooms. We were told not to lean against the walls because they might fall down. We were afraid that a reporter might accidentally lean against the walls.

Anyhow, in one of the calls that C. Q. Smith made to me, I asked the usual, "How you doing?" And he said, "Well, Mr. DeLoach, I want to let you know that a few minutes ago we were hammering so fast that an agent got in the way and was nailed to the wall. We haven't found him yet." (Laughter)

But the President's order had to be carried out. I went down a day ahead of time, set up an appointment with the Governor, who was Paul Johnson at the time, and a very, very cooperative man. I also set up appointments at television stations, radio stations, arranged for the newspapers and so on to come to the press conference. Mr. Hoover came in the following day. I met him at the airport. A fence had been set up of rope; the reporters broke through the fence and ran toward his car. I stopped them and stated that there would be a conference later on and that he didn't have time to talk then.

The head of the Highway State Patrol went with me to the airport to meet Mr. Hoover. We went first to the Governor's residence and met with Governor Johnson. The head of the Highway Patrol did not go in with us. Mr. Hoover turned over to the Governor the name of one individual who was a member of the Ku Klux Klan who also

was a member of the Highway Patrol. He got a firm agreement from the Governor that the Governor would do everything possible to put down the burning of churches, lynchings, further violations of both federal and local law. It was a good meeting.

In turn, the Governor asked Mr. Hoover to take additional personnel from law enforcement in Mississippi to the FBI Academy. Mr. Hoover agreed to that and instructed me to set that in force right away. We did. Instead of taking one or two a year from Mississippi, we started taking twelve a year in order to give them additional training and education in law enforcement. After the conference, Mr. Hoover wanted to go to Philadelphia, where the incident had occurred in Mississippi. I recommended against it, and he decided not to.

G: Why did you recommend against it?

D: I thought it would be dangerous at that time for him to be there, just as the Secret Service would recommend against the President going somewhere where he might be exposed. The feelings were running so high. And another call that we got at this motel where we were staying was--you asked before, was I threatened any time I was down there--the caller had said, "When you and J. Edgar Hoover stick your heads out of your rooms tomorrow morning, you're going to get them blown off." I had agents with submachine guns in the vicinity when we stepped out the next morning. It proved to be just an idle threat, but I had to be careful. But, because of that and because of the feelings running high, I recommended against going to the small town of Philadelphia.

G: Did the Governor help with the investigation of the civil rights workers?

D: He issued instructions to the State Patrol, that they be of assistance to the FBI, and we

had no difficulty with the Patrol as a result of the Governor's feelings. The situation has totally changed down there now. You don't have hostility like this. But it was so bad at the time, that when I went back to Washington, shortly before the bodies were found, a minister had been paid money--who also was a member of the Klan and knew where the bodies were buried. I told SAC [Special Agent-in-Charge] Roy Moore, "Look, we knew that the Klan has been wiretapping our phones, when you call me in Washington to report the finding of those bodies, you just say that an oil well has been uncapped." So he called me a few days after that to report on finding one of the bodies. Mr. Hoover told me to let him know as soon as I found out, and he would go to the White House at the President's instructions. I was to come over there too after the first body had been found. And then the second and third bodies [were found] and he reported those "oil wells" had been uncapped. When the third "oil well" had been uncapped, meaning the third body had been found, and they had been identified through various forms of identification by the agents on the scene--and the smell was unbearable, of the dead bodies--the President first called the families of the victims. Then he and Mr. Hoover went on television--I still have a picture of Director Hoover and me standing in the back while the President was talking on network television indicating that the bodies had been found and the victim's parents had been notified. The investigation, however, just wore on and on and on.

G: Did LBJ talk to you about that episode?

D: Yes.

G: Tell me what he said about it.

D: He was very intense about this case. He was very intense about the disruptive acts of the

sixties. He was very upset. He told me repeatedly, "You've got to find the people who did it." And he put considerable pressure on the FBI and on me to do that. I was constantly dictating little notes to send across to Mr. Hoover about the President calling and wanting to find out the status and what we were accomplishing.

He had a fifth sense [sic] about what to do on such occasions and the idea that I said previously of our putting an office was warranted there, I'll have to admit. The caseload was sufficient to warrant the [office], especially in civil rights matters. And we've had an office there ever since then. But that was his idea to put it there to let the public know that he was concerned, the federal government was concerned, the FBI was concerned enough to put a large group of agents in that office and to investigate those matters. But the agents had a hell of a rough time handling their responsibilities. Nobody ever gives the FBI credit for the tough times that they have in handling things like that when society has problems at such a fever pitch. But they sure as hell will be quick to criticize you if anything turns up wrong, or later on with distortions of history, as has been often done.

G: I wonder if there weren't occasions during this time when the FBI prevented other acts of racial violence and never got credit for having done so.

D: They may have been given temporary credit as a result of the FBI press releases and there have been numerous editorials through the years where the FBI has been given credit. But, here again, you have to go back to signs of the times. I had a very dear, old friend who was publisher of the *South Carolina State*, South Carolina's largest newspaper, in Columbia. His name was Sam Latimer. I got to know him first because he wrote a nasty

editorial concerning the FBI's investigation of civil rights, indicating in effect that the FBI had no right to be mingling in local affairs and so on. I flew out to Indianapolis to see him where he was attending a business meeting and we had a long talk. As a result of my standing up to him and him voicing his reasons and my voicing my reasons, we became good friends and respected each other. But here was a man who was well educated, a graduate of the University of South Carolina with honors, a leading citizen of the town, on the Board of Trustees of the University, that was complaining about the FBI's investigation of civil rights cases. That's what many people believed at the time, it was local interference stemming over from the old Civil War days and that the federal government had no right to intercede in matters. So it was a tough time. We were more or less "damned if you do, and damned if you don't."

G: But were you aware of instances where the FBI, acting in this role in the South, actually prevented bombings or prevented attacks on blacks or things of this nature?

D: In many instances, yes. In many instances where the FBI was given little or no credit but had performed a very stellar job.

G: Are there any that stay in your mind as being especially significant?

D: It's been so long ago I can't remember all of them, but I do recall bitterness in some instances over the fact that the FBI did such a splendid job, yet got little or no credit. I had a friend that was the General Counsel for the NAACP and we talked frequently with each other. His name was Clarence Mitchell. We would have dinner together occasionally. I learned--well, I didn't learn; the General Investigative Division of the FBI advised me that the Klan was going to burn a cross in front of his home and possibly burn his

home. I sent agents out there, along with local police. When the Klan showed up, they scared the hell out of them. Clarence was very appreciative of that.

But these are things that the public never knows about, and we never issued any press release. The public today, unless they read a book by Don Whitehead, former Bureau Chief of the Associated Press in Washington, called *Attack on Terror*--that was the most factual accounting of the murder of the three civil rights victims that has ever been written. There is not a single word of falseness in there. But you see something like *Mississippi Burning*, the movie, and it's very misleading. Or you see trash put out by some of the networks today where they have completely distorted history and make the FBI out to be ogres, uncaring. And exactly the reverse is true. It gets trite to say, "I was there; I know." But it's true; like many other FBI agents, I have sacrificed so much of my family and my own personal life in trying to do things in setting the record straight, and yet history is so completely distorted that it's pitiful.

Mr. Johnson, I think, is a good example of knowing and understanding the full role of the FBI and what it can do to preserve the Constitution. Now admittedly, if you get right down to a fine-tooth comb, you'll find that Mr. Johnson probably tried to use the FBI from time to time in instances wherein we had no jurisdiction. It would be hard put for me to explain those things to you except the one incident I mentioned. But Mr. Johnson was not the President who used the FBI more than any other President; Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was regarded as a great liberal, used the FBI far more than did Lyndon Johnson. But today, you take the Democratic National Convention, the murder of the three civil rights victims, many other incidents, you'd think that Lyndon Johnson was the

one that really used the FBI more than anyone else. It's not true.

G: Tell me about the FBI's role in the 1965 voting rights march at Selma and the activities surrounding it.

D: That immediately brings to mind, of course, the old allegation made by numerous individuals that the FBI stood by while blacks were beaten, et cetera. The FBI has a very specific area of jurisdiction, as given to them by the Congress of the United States. The FBI does not offer protection to anyone unless ordered to do so by the President and the Attorney General. As a result, the FBI did not go around with blacks, whites, anyone else in the civil rights movement, protecting them from a personal standpoint, one on one. In the first place, you didn't have enough manpower. You couldn't conduct all the investigations assigned to the FBI in the fields of espionage, sabotage, kidnapping, fraud against the government and so on, if you're going to assign agents to matters outside our jurisdiction. So the hue and cry that agents did not protect blacks is a false one, a terribly false one. We had no jurisdiction and did not do it. We were never ordered to do so by the President or the Attorney General.

G: Did LBJ understand?

D: Yes, he did.

G: He didn't expect--?

D: Not at any time did he expect us to protect individual blacks or whites, but he expected thorough investigations and he would read the reports himself. He often commented to me about investigative reports. But that's not the answer to your specific question; your question concerned 1965, I believe, and the--

G: Selma march.

D: --Selma march. We had no jurisdictional responsibility to do anything other than to report on it, to investigate it thoroughly, to investigate any civil rights violations in connection with that march wherein blacks were beaten as they stepped off the bus, and arrest those that perpetrated the beatings if the Department of Justice so ruled.

Now there's something else that should be understood here too, and it's vastly misunderstood in American society today. The FBI does not make a determination as to prosecution; the FBI has the authority to investigate matters, but in any civil rights violation, after the basic facts have been obtained, a memorandum for the record is sent to the Department of Justice, the Civil Rights Division of the Department, saying, "This allegedly occurred. Do you want us to investigate it? Should it be a preliminary investigation or should it be a full field investigation?" And as a result, when the Department wrote back and said, "No, we don't want you to investigate that; it does or does not appear to be a violation of federal law," we had no recourse but to stop the investigation. But the FBI then, and possibly today, is blamed for the fact that something occurs which individuals think may be a civil rights violation under federal law and the FBI doesn't investigate it. It's not the FBI; it's the Department of Justice which makes that determination. But you know, you can explain it until you're blue in the face, but people will not understand it. It's the great FBI that's fallen on its rear end once again, in their opinion. The "butchery of history" is amazing, done mostly for sensationalism and bias.

G: Did the FBI have a role in the Selma march that has not been publicized?

- D: Well, only what I've said about the careful taking of notes and the investigations concerning the apparent violations of civil rights, and the referral of all of those matters to the Department of Justice to determine whether or not prosecution should be entertained. That was very intense.
- G: One criticism was that an FBI informer was actually in the car with the people that murdered Viola Liuzzo and that he should have prevented the murder from taking place.
- D: I don't recall that specific matter in detail. I know we did have an informant in the case; I know that the informer gave us information as to who perpetrated Mrs. Liuzzo's murder. Mr. Hoover and I were en route from Jackson, Mississippi, in one of the White House planes, a small Jetstar, and the plane dropped him off in New York, and I went back to Washington. We were advised at the time that the murder had occurred; he turned to me and told me to get to Washington as soon as possible, and I should serve as the Acting Director while he was out of town. I was told to keep him advised concerning the matter. I issued immediate instructions, sent an inspector down to the scene of the crime. A thorough investigation was made and that matter was solved in a very short time. As to whether or not the informant was in the car, I'm not certain.
- G: Thomas Gary Rowe, I think was his name.
- D: I believe so. As to how he could have prevented it, I don't know. But as I say, my memory is very vague concerning that matter.
- G: Anything on President Johnson's involvement in this episode or the investigation of it?
- D: Well, here again, he was very incensed and he gave us very specific instructions that a thorough investigation be conducted. He knew it would be anyhow, but he wanted to be

kept advised of the developments as he did in all major civil rights cases.

Aside from that particular phase of it, I was in his office on two or three occasions when he read casualty lists from Vietnam. On one occasion I literally saw him cry when he was doing that. He told me on one occasion, "They're beaten"--meaning the North Vietnamese--"they're cowed, but they won't give up. This just tears me up. I can't sleep at night."

On the night after the Walter Jenkins incident when he called from the Hilton Hotel in New York where he was scheduled to make a speech, I asked him, "You sound very bad. What's wrong?" He said, "I have this cold. I feel like hell. Lady Bird tried to talk me out of making the speech, but I've got to do it anyhow." And then he started talking about the Walter Jenkins matter.

He was a man of compassion. He closely followed these things more than any other President I've ever known. He took a personal interest in many matters, not from the standpoint of curiosity, but he knew he was Commander in Chief and it was the responsibility of the Commander in Chief to be involved in these things. I think that's a credit to the man.

End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview I